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 ABSTRACT 
Valuation of Unconventional Oil and Gas Development 
By 
Andrew J. Boslett 
Doctor of Philosophy of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics 
University of Rhode Island 
 
Public discourse regarding the local economic, environmental, and socio-cultural 
impacts of unconventional oil and gas development has been intense, especially in those 
areas of the country that are relatively unfamiliar with extractive industry. At the center 
of this debate is the contrast between the economic and financial benefits that accrue to 
local governments and landowners versus the environmental and socio-cultural costs 
borne by the public-at-large. Understanding how local citizens value unconventional oil 
and gas development is an important policy consideration for federal, state, and local 
governments. 
The overarching theme of this work, consisting of three manuscripts, seeks to 
contribute to the debate regarding the impacts of energy consumption and development. In 
two manuscripts, I use the hedonic valuation approach to value the benefits and costs of 
shale gas and oil development. I do this through the context of a statewide moratorium on 
development in New York and a long-standing severance between the surface and mineral 
estates in the western Colorado property market.  
My results indicate that homebuyers significantly value both the financial benefits 
and environmental costs of unconventional oil and gas development. In Manuscript 1, I 
 find that New York properties that were most likely to experience the financial and 
environmental impacts of Marcellus Shale development decreased in value by 23% as a 
result of the moratorium, which under certain assumptions indicates a large and positive 
net valuation of development. In Manuscript 2, I find that the homebuyers have large 
and significant valuations of the environmental costs of development on the order of 
35% of sale prices for those properties that have an unconventional well within a mile 
of the property’s extent.  
In my third manuscript, I again apply hedonic valuation and value the benefits and 
costs of silica sand mining in western Wisconsin. The great increase in the application of 
hydraulic fracturing in oil and gas production has led to an increase in demand for silica 
sand. This type of sand is an important ingredient in hydraulic fracturing. Silica sand 
mining has a number of local benefits and external costs. I use the hedonic valuation 
methodology to value sand mining’s impacts, focusing on property views and local air 
quality. I find strong evidence that both changes in view and air quality are negatively 
capitalized into housing prices.  I also find evidence of appreciation for those properties 
that are not as subject to those environmental quality changes. 
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PREFACE 
This dissertation is written in three-manuscript form. The first manuscript is co-
authored with Todd Guilfoos and Corey Lang. It has been published in the Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management. The second manuscript is also co-authored 
with Todd Guilfoos and Corey Lang. It is in review at the Journal of the Association of 
Environmental and Resource Economists. The third manuscript is solo-authored and is 
being prepared to submit to Land Economics or Resource and Energy Economics. 
 
Manuscript 1: Valuation of Expectations: A Hedonic Study of Shale Gas Development 
and New York’s Moratorium 
 
Manuscript 2: Valuation of the External Costs of Unconventional Oil and Gas 
Development: The Critical Importance of Mineral Rights Ownership 
 
Manuscript 3: A Bucket or a Sieve? A Valuation of Views and Air Quality around Silica 
Sand Mining in Wisconsin 
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Valuation of Expectations:  
A Hedonic Study of Shale Gas Development and New York’s Moratorium 
 
Andrew Boslett, Todd Guilfoos, and Corey Lang 
Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, University of Rhode Island 
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Abstract 
This paper examines the local impacts of shale gas development (SGD). We use a 
hedonic framework and exploit a discrete change in expectations about SGD caused by 
the New York State moratorium on hydraulic fracturing. Our research design combines 
difference-in-differences and border discontinuity, as well as underlying shale geology, 
on properties in Pennsylvania and New York. Results suggest that New York properties 
that were most likely to experience both the financial benefits and environmental 
consequences of SGD dropped in value 23% as a result of the moratorium, which under 
certain assumptions indicates a large and positive net valuation of SGD. 
 
Keywords: shale gas development; hydraulic fracturing; hedonic valuation; expectations; 
rational expectations; moratorium; difference-in-differences; border discontinuity 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Shale gas development (SGD) has dramatically changed the US energy landscape 
in the last decade. The Energy Information Administration (2013) predicts that the US 
will shift from being a net importer to a net exporter of natural gas by 2020 and domestic 
production will increase 44% by 2040. Much of the attention on SGD has been on the 
Marcellus Shale, which extends over 95,000 square miles across New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and West Virginia (Kargbo et al., 2010). Marcellus drilling began in 2005 
and has been the source of considerable extraction. From 2005 to 2014, 7,797 
unconventional wells have been drilled in Pennsylvania alone. 
While the macroeconomic benefits to the US economy are clear, there is 
uncertainty surrounding the local benefits and costs to households and communities 
impacted by SGD. Property owners with mineral rights can receive substantial gas lease 
and production royalties (Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, 2012); 
however, little is known about the magnitude of payments due to the private nature of the 
contracts. Potential costs of SGD could include various health and environmental impacts 
such as water pollution, air pollution, and traffic congestion. The impacts from the health 
and environmental externalities are also highly uncertain. 
Given the current scale of SGD and expected growth in the future, it is critical to 
understand to the local valuation of SGD. This paper seeks to answer this question 
using a hedonic framework, as housing prices should reflect the future stream of 
benefits and costs tied to the property. Empirically, this is hindered in two ways. First, 
the location of wells may be endogenous. Second, expectations about SGD form in 
advance of actual drilling, and if expectations are capitalized into housing prices, then a 
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simple before-after comparison may lead to incorrect inference about the valuation. We 
mitigate these confounding factors by specifically focusing on expectations and using 
an exogenous shift in expectations to reveal valuation.  
Just as hydraulic fracturing was beginning its exponential increase in 
Pennsylvania, New York State implemented a de facto moratorium on hydraulic 
fracturing on July 23, 2008, citing uncertainty about health and environmental impacts 
(State of New York's Executive Chamber, 2008).1 The state extended the moratorium 
multiple times between 2010 and 2014 (e.g., Wiessner, 2011) and, on December 17, 
2014, the New York Department of Environmental Conservation implemented a 
permanent ban (Kaplan, 2014). These decisions were highly contentious, as evidenced by 
several dozen towns in New York passing resolutions in support of SGD in the spring 
and summer of 2012 and 15 towns are currently considering secession (Mathias, 2015).2 
To date, there has been no hydraulic fracturing in New York. 
This paper exploits changes in expectations that resulted from New York’s 
moratorium on drilling and measures this event’s impact on housing prices. Importantly, 
the moratorium did not mark a change in the amount of hydraulic fracturing in New York 
– expectations about future SGD are the only thing that changed.  
We estimate the effect of the statewide moratorium using a difference-in-
differences methodology. We use Pennsylvania as a counterfactual because 
                                                          
1 There is considerable heterogeneity in state regulation on shale gas development as a result of different 
political, hydrological, and geological dynamics (Kulander, 2013; Richardson et al., 2013). Some states 
have used a more lenient approach to regulation. For example, Pennsylvania had no specific regulations 
concerning hydraulic fracturing until early 2010 (Kulander, 2013). Since then, Governor Tom Corbett’s 
signed Act 13, prohibiting any local regulation or restrictions on shale gas well production (Begos, 2012). 
Like New York, New Jersey and Maryland have enacted regulations to restrict or ban hydraulic fracturing.  
2 These resolutions could not supersede state law, but were meant to send a signal to state politicians in 
Albany and were in contrast to the more common local bans and moratoria implemented elsewhere in the 
state. 
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expectations about future SGD were likely similar to those in pre-moratorium New 
York, but in contrast with New York, those expectations were realized. Our aim is to 
identify the change in prices for properties in New York that are most likely to be 
impacted by SGD (both positively and negatively), relative to price changes for similar 
properties in Pennsylvania. We use private well water use as a proxy for properties 
likely to experience SGD.3 These are essentially rural properties outside of municipal 
water supply boundaries, meaning they have the space requirements for drilling. 
Further, contaminated well water is one of the most common and serious environmental 
costs. 
The design of our preferred sample is motivated by a border discontinuity and 
underlying shale geology. We begin with property transactions data for two 
Pennsylvania and three New York counties along the border. In the vein of recent 
border discontinuity designs (e.g., Grout et al., 2011; Turner et al., 2014) and 
specifically those that use state borders (Holmes, 1998; Rohlin et al., 2014), we restrict 
observations to be within five miles of the border in order to minimize unobserved 
differences in price determinants and best model the counterfactual for New York 
residents. Even after these restrictions, there are still substantial shale geology 
differences across the border. Thus, we further restrict observations to be in a specific 
band of shale thickness, a geological characteristic that strongly affects the amount of 
gas or oil in a reservoir (Advanced Resources International, 2013). These restrictions 
are meant to improve the similarity of expectations about future SGD. Post-moratorium 
spillovers across the border are a threat to identification. However, we contend that 
                                                          
3 While we cannot predict exactly where SGD would occur in New York, 99.8% of drilling in our 
Pennsylvania sample occurred in private well water areas. 
6 
 
these effects are minimal due to pre-moratorium expectations about spillovers, the rapid 
pace of drilling stemming from high initial prices, the area comprising a single labor 
market, and southerly flow of surface water.  
Using the 5-mile border and shale geology restrictions, our results suggest that the 
statewide moratorium decreased New York property values 23.1% for those properties 
most likely to experience SGD. Relaxing the sample restrictions leads to smaller 
estimates in the range of 10-21%, which suggests that effects are heterogeneous across 
our New York counties and that accounting for shale geology is critical for understanding 
expectations. We estimate a series of robustness checks that test additional shale geology 
restrictions, test for spillover effects across the state border, and use municipal water 
properties as an additional control, and results are consistent with point estimates in the 
range of an 18-26% drop in housing values. 
We interpret these results as a positive net valuation of SGD by buyers and sellers 
in New York and Pennsylvania. However, this interpretation relies on two assumptions: 
the expected probability of SGD in pre-moratorium New York is 1 and the expected 
probability of post-moratorium SGD is 0 and New York and Pennsylvania property 
owners and buyers accurately valued the negative and positive aspects of SGD prior to 
the moratorium. We estimate several models that bolster our confidence in these 
assumptions. However, if either of these assumptions are false, we are still recovering the 
effect of the moratorium on property values, which is driven by expectations over 
financial benefits and environmental externalities of SGD, and this is an important 
estimate for areas considering bans on hydraulic fracturing. Further, the estimates serve 
as a validation that expectations are capitalized into property values. 
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One of the models we use to test the assumptions needed for an interpretation of 
net valuation is a more traditional model of the effect of proximity to drilling using only 
our Pennsylvania observations. The results suggest no price impacts of proximity. While 
one interpretation is that the impacts of drilling are small, we interpret this to mean that 
ex ante expectations established in the initial expansion of SGD in Pennsylvania were 
capitalized into property values and were accurate ex post leading property values not to 
change. These results corroborate our claim that New York households near the border 
have accurate expectations about SGD, which in turn supports a rational expectations 
assumption in hedonic valuation. 
There are two major contributions of this paper. First, we provide new evidence 
of local impacts of SGD. Existing hedonic studies (Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber, 2014; 
Muehlenbachs et al., 2014) find negative impacts of nearby drilling for well-water 
dependent properties as large as -22%. However, Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber (2014) 
also find that negative effects dissipate to a statistical zero 6-12 months after a permit is 
issued. Our results lead to very different conclusions. One reason may be that both of 
these studies either use data exclusively from western Pennsylvania or derive most of 
their identifying variation from western Pennsylvania. A concern is that split estates, 
where mineral rights are sold separately from the property, are common in western 
Pennsylvania due to the area’s more extensive history of resource extraction (Kelsey et 
al., 2012). In contrast, split estates are relatively uncommon in our focus area of eastern 
Pennsylvania and south-central New York. Thus, our data are more likely to recover net 
effects of SGD because property owners hold mineral rights and will benefit from 
royalties and lease payments. Our interpretation of Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber (2014) 
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and Muehlenbachs et al. (2014) is that their estimates capture the negative externality of 
SGD near private well water, which is critical to understand, but mostly exclude the 
financial benefits because of the area of study. Consistent with this interpretation are 
recent survey findings that indicate a majority of property owners that do not hold the 
mineral rights to their property are dissatisfied with local drilling, whereas a majority of 
property owners holding mineral rights are satisfied (Collins and Nkansah, 2013).4  
While the split estate issue is perhaps the most critical, there are other 
differences between our study and others that could lead to different estimates of the 
local impact of SGD. We incorporate physical attributes of shale geology into the 
analysis, which existing valuation studies have not utilized. This appears to be 
important to creating valid counterfactuals in a difference-in-differences framework. 
Further, our treatment group has no direct experience with SGD, though they seemingly 
would learn about it as SGD expanded right across the border. Additionally, we are 
estimating area-level impacts that capture impacts occurring to whole areas, as opposed 
to a proximity analysis that captures differential impacts for properties nearby drilling. 
This focus may average away some of the negative effects of SGD if property owners 
in NY expect that they would be minimally impacted by negative externalities since the 
placement of future shale gas wells is unknown. 
The second contribution is to add to our understanding of how expectations are 
capitalized into property values. While many hedonic papers implicitly assume 
expectations exist and recent structural models have incorporated expectations (e.g., 
Bishop and Murphy, 2011; Ma, 2013), we offer a particularly clean, reduced-form 
                                                          
4 A survey by Brasier et al. (2013) found that landowners that hold their property’s underlying mineral 
rights have generally lower risk perceptions of SGD. 
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illustration of how expectations factor into prices. The effect of the New York 
moratorium is to change expectations, whereas the results of the proximity analysis using 
only Pennsylvania properties support the idea of rational expectations because no price 
changes occur once drilling commences. This work also complements hedonic studies 
that show new information can cause capitalization of dis-amenities, even when levels of 
dis-amenities do not change (e.g., Pope, 2008; Guignet, 2013).  
 
2. BACKGROUND 
 The first objective of this section is to catalog various estimates of benefits and 
costs of SGD, which is critical for putting our estimates of the net valuation of SGD in 
context. Given the private and dispersed nature of financial benefits, it is a contribution of 
this paper to compile these estimates. The second objective is to give a timeline of SGD 
in Pennsylvania and SGD regulation in New York.  
 
2.1 Financial benefits  
During shale gas extraction, owners of sub-surface mineral rights may sign a 
mineral lease contract with energy production companies, granting them the right to 
develop mineral deposits underneath their property (Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection, 2012). The two primary monetary benefits associated with 
shale gas production are lease signing bonuses and royalty payments. A lease signing 
bonus is an initial payment, based on acreage, for signing a gas lease contract (Weidner, 
2013). Due to the uncertainty of natural gas production, this is perhaps the most 
important element of the lease (Hefley et al., 2011). The payment level is based on a 
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number of variables, including geological factors, landowner-stipulated restrictions, 
nearby drilling results, and the current state of the natural gas market (Weidner, 2013). 
The average per acre signing bonus is $2,700 (Hefley et al., 2011), though this can vary 
from $50 to almost $6,000 (Humphries, 2008; Green, 2010; Eichler, 2013; Rieley, 2014).  
The other major monetary benefit is royalty payments, which are recurring 
payments on a proportion of natural gas production. The minimum royalty rate, set by 
law, is 12.5% of the value of extracted natural gas (Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection, 2012). However, the negotiated rate can be much higher, 
depending on the same factors that determine lease payments (Weidner, 2013). 
According to a Penn State University Extension associate, Marcellus Shale gas 
production has generated a cumulative total of $160 million in royalties for landowners in 
Bradford County, Pennsylvania as of late 2012 (Loewenstein, 2012).  
SGD infrastructure-related benefits can also serve as economic windfalls for 
landowners. Surface rights owners can receive monetary payments for allowing pipeline, 
compressor station, and water impoundment construction on their properties. These are 
often one-time payments. A payment for pipeline easement construction is based on the 
length of the constructed pipeline and can range from $5-25 per linear foot (Messersmith, 
2010). Due to the nuisance factor associated with compressor stations (e.g., Litovitz et 
al., 2013), payments for their construction can range from hundreds of thousands to 
millions of dollars (Clark, 2014). Payments for water impoundment construction can 
range from $40,000-70,000, but could potentially be lower or higher given their intended 
size and permanency (Clark, 2014).  
Lastly, governments have the ability to raise revenue through taxing shale gas 
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development, which in turn would have public finance implications. These public 
finance measures could then be capitalized in housing prices through improvements to 
public goods and services in local municipalities, such as schools. Pennsylvania did 
enact an “impact fee” in 2012 through Act 13, retroactive to 2011 activity, which 
charged a fee on a per-well, per-year basis.5 As SGD expands these impact fees could be 
a considerable source of income for local government; in 2012 impact fees in 
Pennsylvania brought in $202 million (Rabe and Hampton, 2015). The distribution of the 
fees can go to a variety of sources, such as county and municipal governments, various 
environmental and non-environmental state government agencies, and the state’s legacy 
fund (Powelson, 2013).These various estimates of monetary benefits highlight the 
variation and uncertainty of the how much revenue could be expected from future SGD. 
For additional details, see online appendix Table A1. 
 
2.2 Costs  
There are also a number of potential landowner costs of nearby shale gas 
development, which are primarily driven by environmental impacts. The hydraulic 
fracturing process is highly water intensive, so much of the focus on the environmental 
costs of SGD revolve around water quantity and quality impacts. Shale gas development 
has led to large increases in wastewater management needs (Rahm et al., 2013). In 
Pennsylvania, regional wastewater generation has increased by 540% since 2004 (Lutz et 
al., 2013). In terms of water quality, Jackson et al. (2013) find increased levels of 
                                                          
5 This source of income for Pennsylvania municipalities appears to be significant, but likely not to our 
study. Our main results rely on 2006 to 2011 data, we contend that this mechanism would have a minimal 
effect on housing prices and our estimates. 
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methane contamination in groundwater in heavy-SGD areas, while Olmstead et al. (2013) 
find evidence of surface water pollution as a result of SGD waste disposal and 
management processes. In 2014, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection released a list of more than 250 instances where SGD operations impacted 
water quality in the state.  
In addition, recent research has shown increased air pollution in areas close to 
shale gas extraction and processing infrastructure (e.g., Litovitz et al., 2013; Rich et al., 
2014). Increased air pollution associated with shale gas development may have 
significant public health implications (e.g., McKenzie et al., 2012). Although the 
mechanisms are unclear, Hill (2012) finds significant impacts of shale gas extraction on 
the birth weight of children born in nearby homes. Additional environmental costs have 
been identified as concerns such as seismicity (Frohlich, 2012), forest loss and 
fragmentation (Drohan et al., 2012), and ecosystem services and local biodiversity (Evans 
and Kiesecker, 2014; Kiviat, 2013). For additional details regarding environmental and 
social impacts of SGD, please refer to Table A2 in the online appendix.  
 
2.3 Timing of drilling and regulation 
Figure 1 presents a timeline of SGD and regulatory activity in New York and 
Pennsylvania. Marcellus shale development commenced in 2005 with the horizontal 
drilling and hydraulic fracture of a previously-drilled vertical well in Washington County, 
identified as the “Renz No. 1” well (Carter et al., 2011). Positive results from this and 
other early wells spurred development. Starting in 2008, around the same time as the 
New York moratorium, unconventional well development rapidly transpired in 
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Pennsylvania, and as of late 2014 a total of 7,797 wells have been drilled. Figure 2 shows 
the spatial distribution of the 1,468 unconventional wells drilled from 2006 to 2011 in 
Bradford and Tioga counties. 
In early 2008, the NY DEC received well permits to drill into the Marcellus Shale 
from multiple companies. These actions were preceded by 1-2 years of activity from 
industry land men, who would approach landowners about signing oil and gas leases. In 
May 2008, a group of landowners in Broome County struck a multi-million dollar 
contract with XTO Energy to lease over 50,000 acres. Landowners in other NY towns 
close to the Pennsylvania border received significant lease offers as well (Wilber, 2014). 
Online forums and discussions by property owners and landowner coalitions (e.g., 
Natural Gas Forum For Landowners) suggest that landowners expected significant 
drilling. This growing excitement was shared by those in the NY DEC’s Division of 
Mineral Resources, which organized a presentation titled “Marcellus Shale Gas Well 
Development in New York State” in May 2008 that positively reviewed the state 
government’s current capacity to regulate development and that additional environmental 
regulations were not needed. Clearly, during the years 2006-2008, residents were forming 
expectations about the probability of SGD in their area, as well as expectations about 
associated benefits and costs. All available information suggests that New York residents 
expected SGD, particularly in the southern part of the state near Pennsylvania.  
Although excitement regarding the economic benefits of SGD grew as reports of 
lease activity became public, there were still significant concerns regarding the 
environmental, social, and public health aspects of drilling (Wilber, 2014). Citing the fact 
that the state was relying on a previous environmental impact statement of oil and gas 
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drilling from 1992 that did not address the many unique environmental issues associated 
with SGD (Lustgarten, 2008), Governor David Paterson passed a measure on July 23, 
2008 that effectively blocked SGD for the near future. The primary intent of this measure 
was to postpone development in order to study the environmental and public health 
impacts of SGD, as well as New York’s capacity to regulate it (State of New York’s 
Executive Chamber, 2008).  
In late 2009, the New York City’s Department of Environmental Protection 
published an assessment of the potential impact of SGD within the city’s water supply 
area in the Catskills Mountain region. The report highlighted the water contamination 
risk associated with rapid development within the watershed. In the interest of further 
study of the environmental impacts of SGD, the NY state legislature or governor passed 
legislation to extend the moratorium multiple times from 2010 to 2013 (Hoye, 2010; New 
York Senate, 2010; Wiessner, 2011; New York Senate, 2012; New York State Assembly 
2013). During this time period, a potential policy was floated that would allow SGD in 
southern counties bordering Pennsylvania, but only in towns that explicitly approved it 
(Hakim, 2012). However, this policy was never enacted.  
After six years of legislative and executive order action, the situation culminated 
in a permanent statewide ban on SGD in December 2014 (Kaplan, 2014), driven largely 
by lingering public health concerns (NY Department of Health, 2014). As a result of this 
series of policies, no unconventional natural gas development has occurred in New York, 
which is reflected in Figure 2.  
Despite the statewide nature of the moratorium, New York is a home rule state 
that grants legislative authority to local governments to enact local legislation that may 
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limit state-level intrusion into local matters (Stinson, 1997). Given this history and the 
discontent with the moratorium, 45 New York towns passed resolutions in support of 
SGD in the spring and summer of 2012 (FracTracker, 2014). Fourteen of these towns are 
in our sample counties and are shown in Appendix Figure A3. These resolutions were 
passed by town councils and were not voted on by residents, but likely reflect residents’ 
sentiments. The resolutions had no impact on the ability for gas companies to operate in 
New York, but were intended to apply political pressure to state policy makers and signal 
to industry that these towns are supportive of SGD. One of the major landowner groups 
driving the passage of the resolutions, the Joint Landowners Coalition of New York, sued 
Governor Cuomo in order to expedite the state’s environmental and public health review 
of SGD (De Avila, 2014).  
On the other side of the debate, 176 New York towns implemented local bans or 
moratoriums on hydraulic fracturing in the event that the statewide moratorium was lifted 
(FracTracker, 2014). Most of these townships were located in areas of the state that were 
unlikely to experience significant SGD from the Marcellus Shale due to geological 
limitations (e.g., low thickness). In our three NY counties, there were only two towns – 
Owego (Tioga County) and Wayne (Steuben County) – that passed moratoria on shale 
gas development, both in 2012. 
 
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In this section we present a hedonic property model that incorporates the 
phenomena of interest, the valuation of expected shale gas development through the 
enactment of a moratorium. The hedonic valuation methodology, originally presented by 
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Rosen (1974), posits that the price of a heterogeneous good can be decomposed into 
implicit prices associated with its individual characteristics. By separating the price of the 
good into its implicit prices, the technique can help illuminate the value of each 
characteristic. The standard hedonic model assumes that all negative and positive 
discounted cash flows will be capitalized into the transaction price if there is full 
information about those attributes that derive benefits and costs.  
We apply the hedonic valuation concept to shale gas development through 
housing prices. The price function is given as Ph=Ph(L,S,N,Q(D),G(D)) where L is a 
vector of lot characteristics, S is a vector of structural characteristics, N is a vector of 
neighborhood characteristics, Q is a vector of environmental characteristics, and G are 
geological characteristics that allow for possible shale gas development (e.g., land 
overlying shale with retrievable gas). Shale gas development is represented by D. 
Geological attributes, G(D), derive value from financial amenities such as lease and 
royalty payments that gas companies pay to homeowners to gain access to the shale. The 
dis-amenities are represented by the effect on environmental characteristics, Q(D). We 
assume that development of the shale would also reduce environmental quality.6 A 
homebuyer derives utility from these attributes and a composite good Y, and is expressed 
as U(Y, L, S, N, Q(D), G(D)). The homebuyer maximizes utility with respect to a budget 
constraint and the expected utility gained from these attributes in relation to the 
composite good Y. 
Prior to development, the expected flow of benefits and costs coming from shale 
                                                          
6 This also represents other dis-amenities that are not environmental in nature but are costs of shale gas 
development that are born through damage caused by noise pollution, damaged roads, and increased 
demands on other public infrastructure. We restrict ourselves to this simplified notation for ease of 
discussion. 
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gas development are uncertain and ambiguous in sign. The expected effect of shale 
development through lease and royalty payments is positive, 𝜕𝐺 𝜕𝐷⁄ > 0. Geological 
attributes related to shale are considered a normal good and a positive attribute to the 
hedonic price function, 𝜕𝑃ℎ 𝜕𝐺⁄ > 0. Thus, if households expect SGD to happen, prices 
will increase for those properties likely to benefit, all else equal. The expected effect of 
shale development on environmental quality is negative, 𝜕𝑄 𝜕𝐷⁄ < 0. Since 
environmental quality is a normal good, 𝜕𝑃ℎ 𝜕𝑄⁄ > 0, expectations about SGD will 
decrease prices, all else equal. The expected implicit value, PD, derived from shale gas 
development is  
𝐸[𝑃𝐷] = E [
𝜕𝑃ℎ
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝐷
+
𝜕𝑃ℎ
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝐷
]                    (1) 
 (𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛)       +   −          +   +                                                  
Equation 1 defines the expected value of shale gas development, which contains 
uncertainty of the magnitude of the negative and positive effects of shale gas 
development. This uncertainty is derived from the fact that information about financial 
benefits and risks to environmental amenities is imperfect.  
Individuals adjust their expectations of the likelihood of SGD when a moratorium 
is put in place, and this affects prices. This change in expectations is what we will focus 
on to identify the net valuation of SGD. Without a moratorium, the probability of shale 
gas development occurring may be high and bounded at 1, and individuals expect to 
receive the full value of the shale gas development; when there is a moratorium, the 
probability of shale gas development is 0, and individuals expect to receive zero value of 
the shale gas development. The change in the expected value of shale gas development is 
captured by examining the differences in hedonic price functions with and without a 
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moratorium, ceteris paribus. This is the case in Equation 2, where M = 0 when there is no 
moratorium and 𝑀 = 1 when there is a moratorium.  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝐺𝐷 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 = (𝑃ℎ(. )|𝑀 = 0) − (𝑃ℎ(. )|𝑀 = 1)             (2) 
The change in expectations reveals the value of shale gas development to the area with a 
moratorium and provides an event that can uniquely identify this change in expectations. 
This valuation of expectations implicitly includes the negative and positive local 
amenities of shale development in Equation 1.  
Two assumptions are required to interpret the change in prices as net valuation. 
First, we assume that the probability of SGD is one without the moratorium and zero with 
it. As discussed in Section 2.3, given that leasing contracts were being signed and drilling 
permits were being applied for in New York and given the eventual well density in 
Pennsylvania near the border with New York (Figure 2), we think that residents believed 
that drilling would come to New York with certainty, especially those areas near the 
border with Pennsylvania. It is less clear whether expectations dropped to zero following 
the moratorium, given that it was initially temporary and then made permanent. If the 
perceived probabilities of the SGD are strictly within the bounds of one and zero, before 
and after a moratorium, then our model would underestimate the net value of shale gas 
development. We detail in Section 6.2 two robustness checks that allow for expectations 
to change slowly or change in the years after the moratorium and results are similar.  
Second, we assume that positive and negative impacts of SGD are accounted for 
equally through expectations. However, it is possible that expectations of negative 
externalities are discounted, i.e., 𝐸[𝜕𝑄 𝜕𝐷⁄ ] < 𝜕𝑄 𝜕𝐷⁄ , even if the probability of SGD is 
1. Several reasons for why this would be exist, such as hyperbolic discounting of longer 
19 
 
term environmental and health impacts, discounting of external consequences of 
neighbors’ actions, and uncertainty about well placements. If this assumption does not 
hold, our estimate may reflect financial benefits more than costs. Still, this estimate 
reveals valuation of expectations about SGD for a population that has not experienced it, 
which is policy relevant for other areas considering bans. We detail in Section 6.3 a 
hedonic model that tests for proximity effects of drilling. The results indicate no price 
effect, which we interpret as buyers and sellers forming accurate expectations prior to 
drilling, and thus prices do not change once drilling begins.  
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
We develop a model that identifies the impact of the New York statewide 
moratorium on housing prices, and thus reveals the net valuation of expectations about 
SGD. We employ a difference-in-differences model, which compares properties in New 
York before and after the moratorium to similar properties in Pennsylvania. As discussed 
in more detail in the next section, our preferred sample is comprised of properties within 
five miles of the state border with similar shale geology and only includes private well 
properties, which are most likely to experience SGD. This choice is motivated by 
intuition and prior findings; Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber (2014) and Muehlenbachs et 
al. (2014) find that private water properties are most price responsive to proximate 
drilling. We define the treatment group to be New York properties and the treatment is 
the moratorium.  
Equation 3 is our main specification: 
ln(𝑝𝑖) = 𝛽1𝑁𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑌𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖 
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+𝑋𝑖
′𝛿 + 𝜀𝑖                    (3) 
where 𝑝𝑖 is the sales price of property i, 𝑁𝑌𝑖 is a binary variable equal to one if the 
property is located in New York, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖 is a binary variable equal to one if 
the transaction occurs after the New York State moratorium on SGD, and 𝑋𝑖 is a set of 
housing, location, and temporal controls. 𝑋𝑖 also includes a constant to capture the 
omitted group of properties located in Pennsylvania that transact before the moratorium. 
Finally, 𝜀𝑖 is the error.  
The interpretation of the model coefficients is as follows. 𝛽1 is the pre-
moratorium price difference between properties in New York relative to Pennsylvania. 𝛽2 
is the price change from pre-moratorium to post-moratorium for Pennsylvania properties. 
The key coefficient in Equation 3 is 𝛽3, which is the double difference estimate. This 
term identifies the effect of the moratorium on New York properties, relative to 
Pennsylvania properties. As discussed in Section 3, our expectation about the sign and 
magnitude of this coefficient is ambiguous. It could be positive if New York households 
are concerned about the environmental dis-amenities of SGD and value the delay or ban 
of SGD. Alternatively, 𝛽3 could be negative if households anticipated economic gains 
from SGD and house prices had already capitalized that expectation. Lastly, 𝛽3 could be 
zero if the moratorium did not change expectations or perceived benefits and costs of 
SGD are small.7  
While the prior section laid out assumptions required to interpret coefficients as 
                                                          
7 One might think this type of specification and data could also be used to estimate the area level net value 
of SGD for Pennsylvania. However, we feel this is untrue precisely because expectations in both 
Pennsylvania and New York would muddle the comparison. A better comparison would be to compare 
Pennsylvania to some area with no possibility of SGD, with data prior to 2006 marking the pre-treatment 
time. 
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net valuation, there are also assumptions required for the difference-in-differences design 
to be valid. First, we assume that Pennsylvania serves as a good counterfactual for New 
York, in terms of house price dynamics. One potential concern is that areas in our study 
had different reactions to the US housing market collapse, which is correlated with the 
timing of the moratorium. In the Section 5, we show that our sample of Pennsylvania and 
New York homes follow a similar price trend pre-moratorium. Also, by focusing on 
observations close to the border, we hope to mitigate unobservable determinants of price 
trends.8  
Our sample choice of five border counties was meant to improve the treatment-
control comparison. Our refinement to focus in particular on properties within 5 miles of 
the border with similar shale thickness furthers the strength of the good counterfactual 
assumption. However, using bordering counties implicitly assumes that spillover effects 
are minimal. Spillover effects could be either environmental or economic. Environmental 
spillovers would occur if water or air pollution from SGD were to travel into New York 
from Pennsylvania. Evidence from Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber (2014) and 
Muehlenbachs et al. (2014) suggests that effects of water pollution are localized at about 
2km. SGD in our study area is limited to the Susquehanna River Basin, which flows 
south. Thus, any surface water contamination is also likely to flow south further into 
Pennsylvania rather than north into New York.9 Economic spillovers are increases in 
                                                          
8 Kuminoff and Pope (2013) find that lower value properties experienced larger boom-bust swings than 
higher value properties. Given the differences in price levels between the two states (see Table 1 and Figure 
4), it is possible that our Pennsylvania sample experience a larger bust. However, if this was the case, our 
estimates would be upward biased, suggesting the impact of the moratorium to be even more negative for 
New York prices. To test whether differential boom-bust trends may be impacting our results, we estimate 
models that include a series of $100,000 sale price bin fixed effects interacted with year fixed effects to 
allow differential boom-bust evolution by price tier. Results are consistent with our main results.  
9 An additional possibility is that property owners in pre-moratorium Pennsylvania formed expectations 
about environmental spillovers from New York into Pennsylvania in the event of SGD in New York. If 
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employment and spending across the border that indirectly or directly affect the housing 
market. Our estimates are unlikely to be affected by any economic spillover because our 
sample is restricted to a small area of just five miles on either side of the border, and thus 
can be thought of as a single labor market.10 An additional argument that applies to these 
two types of spillovers is that New York residents and potential buyers would have 
formed expectations about drilling in Pennsylvania and those expectations would be 
capitalized into prices prior to the moratorium. Thus, while spillovers may occur, they 
should be expected and already accounted for in house prices.  
Second, we assume that the treatment (moratorium) had no effect on the control 
(Pennsylvania). The main concern here is whether the moratorium on drilling in New 
York increased drilling in Pennsylvania. We argue that the pace of development in 
Pennsylvania (and elsewhere) was so rapid in the 2008-2011 timeframe that the lack of 
drilling in New York had no effect on prices or scarcity in Pennsylvania. Another way for 
drilling to be impacted would be if horizontal drills could cross state boundaries and 
extract New York gas from Pennsylvania, but this is in fact illegal.11  
Third, we assume that the implementation of the New York statewide moratorium 
was exogenous to the counties in this study. We believe this is a safe assumption for two 
                                                          
true, then the New York moratorium may have increased prices in Pennsylvania. We argue that this effect 
would have been minimal given the evidence of highly localized environmental impacts of drilling from 
Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber (2014) and Muehlenbachs et al. (2014).  
10 We additionally examined cross border migration to see if individuals relocated from New York to 
Pennsylvania after the moratorium. The results, presented in Figure A1 of the appendix, suggest no changes 
in migration patterns. 
11 It is highly unlikely that horizontal well drilling across state lines has occurred along the NY-PA border. 
New York has restrictions on how close one can drill to the state boundary (New York State Regulations – 
Environmental Conservation Law 553.1; personal correspondence with Thomas Noll, Section Chief of the 
Bureau of Oil & Gas Permitting and Management in the NY DEC Division of Mineral Resources). Though 
Pennsylvania does not have an analogous law outlining state border proximity issues, Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Protection officials note that it is unlikely that any horizontal laterals cross 
over into New York from Pennsylvania (personal correspondence with David Engle, Operations Manager 
in the Oil & Gas Division of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection).  
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reasons. One, it is a statewide moratorium, not just a moratorium for the three sample 
New York counties, and much of the support for the moratorium came from regions in 
New York outside of this sample. Two, many of the sample towns were and still are 
against the moratorium as evidenced by the fact that 14 of 37 towns in our New York 
sample passed resolutions in support of SGD during the spring and summer of 2012, 
while only two towns passed a moratorium.  
 
5. DATA 
This study was conducted with property transaction data from five counties along 
the New York – Pennsylvania border: Chemung, Steuben, and Tioga counties in New 
York; Bradford and Tioga counties in Pennsylvania. We specifically chose these five 
counties because 1) the two Pennsylvania counties constitute one of the major clusters of 
drilling in that state, 2) all five counties are primarily agricultural and rural in character 
and thus make for good comparison, and 3) they border each other so that unobservable 
determinants of house prices likely follow similar dynamics.  
We obtained transactions and property characteristics data from January 1, 2006 
through December 31, 2012 from each county’s property assessment office and New 
York’s Office of Real Property Tax Services. Sales prices are adjusted to 2011 levels 
using the CPI (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). For each property in our dataset, 
we have information on the number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, finished living 
area, acreage, and age of each property in our dataset. Three of the five counties in our 
dataset include multiple transactions per property. However, Bradford County (PA) and 
Steuben County (NY) could only provide us with information for the most recent 
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transaction for each property.12  
In order to identify each property’s water supply, we use data from 
Pennsylvania’s Department of Environmental Protection and New York’s Department of 
Taxation and Finance, Office of Real Property Tax Services. Pennsylvania’s data 
contains public water supply area boundaries, making sold parcel water supply 
identification straightforward. However, New York’s data on water supply access is in 
parcel centroid format, which represents every parcel in the state by its center point. 
Using parcel boundaries provided by county and regional planning departments, we 
connected sales data to water supply data using Geographic Information Systems (GIS). 
However, a portion of our sold parcels do not overlay a centroid. In order to identify the 
water supply for each parcel in our transaction set, we follow Muehlenbachs et al. (2014) 
and create buffers of 100 meters around all public water supply parcel centroids. Then, 
we assume that all parcels falling outside of these buffers are dependent on well water. 
Figure A2 in the Appendix presents all transactions in our five counties by water type. 
The figure makes clear several points. First, private water supply properties are almost 
exclusively outside of town boundaries. Second, Pennsylvania has a larger share of 
private water properties than New York. Further, there are very few public water 
properties within five miles of the border, especially in Pennsylvania.  
In total, our original dataset includes 26,138 property transactions across all five 
counties from 2006 to 2012. We include only single-family residential and mobile homes 
                                                          
12 We examined how this data limitation may affect results by only using the latest sale for all counties and 
coefficients were very similar to the main results presented in Section 6. The results are available upon 
request. 
25 
 
with private water, which leaves us with 8,466 observations.13 We drop all observations 
that sold for less than $10,000 or more than $1,000,000 in 2011 CPI adjusted dollars. 
Further, we hypothesize that lot size is a key property characteristic for forming 
expectations about benefits and costs to SGD. Pennsylvania has larger lot sizes on 
average, so we drop observations that fall outside of the 5% and 95% of the lot size 
distribution to ensure common support between our Pennsylvania and New York 
samples. Lastly, we drop eight Pennsylvania transactions that occur prior to the 
moratorium that are located within two miles of a permitted well. We do this such that 
all transactions pre-moratorium have expectations about SGD, but no realized impacts.  
Our analysis of the moratorium uses sales in the time span 2006-2011. 2006 
marks the beginning of exploration and lease signings in Pennsylvania and New York. 
At this point, both properties in Pennsylvania and New York will begin to capitalize 
expectations about the benefits and costs to hydraulic fracturing, but have yet to 
experience it. We use 2011 as a cutoff because local resolutions begin to be passed in 
early 2012. With these cuts, we are left with a sample of 4,976 transactions.  
While choosing counties along the border goes a long way towards removing 
unobservable differences between New York and Pennsylvania observations, we 
develop four samples that further restrict observations. First, in the vein of a border 
discontinuity design, two samples are created that limit observations to be within 15 
miles of the border and then within five miles of the border. These samples are intended 
to further minimize possible bias stemming from unobservable, time-varying processes 
                                                          
13 While mobile homes are often excluded in hedonic analyses such as this, we chose to include them 
because a substantial proportion is located on lots greater than half an acre. We present robustness checks 
in Section 6 removing mobile homes and results are similar. 
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that differentially affect housing prices across the state boundary. Second, we further 
restrict the 15- and 5-mile samples to only include properties that have similar shale 
geology. Figure 3 shows the thickness of shale deposits, which is a key driver of 
extraction potential.14 On average, our Pennsylvania counties have thicker shale 
deposits than in New York, with thickness increasing towards the southeast. In order to 
ensure that expectations about SGD are similar on either side of the border, we restrict 
observation to be in the 100-200 feet range of thickness. Our preferred sample, shown 
by the dashed region of Figure 3, satisfies both the 5-mile border restriction and shale 
thickness restriction and includes 1,018 observations. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for several variables of interest. The first 
column gives the means for all private water observations in our five counties. The 
second and third columns give differences in means for New York versus Pennsylvania 
for pre-moratorium samples for all counties (Column 2) and the preferred sample of 
observations within 5 miles of the border and of similar shale thickness (Column 3). The 
purpose of examining these differences is to determine the comparability of New York 
and Pennsylvania. Following Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), we divide the difference in 
means by the combined standard deviation to test for substantial differences and mark 
differences for which this statistic exceeds 0.25 with an asterisk. Table 1 shows there is 
strong statistical overlap between the samples, lending credence to the research design. 
We note that the only significant difference is in shale thickness between the samples 
which is dramatically reduced by using the restricted sample. There is also convergence 
of socioeconomic characteristics as we restrict our sample to tracts just along the border 
                                                          
14 Based on a Marcellus Shale thickness map from the Marcellus Center for Outreach and Research at 
Pennsylvania State University. 
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in our study counties, as shown in Appendix Table A4.  
As discussed in Section 4, the critical assumption for our difference-in-differences 
design to be valid is Pennsylvania must a good counterfactual for New York. The most 
common way to support this assumption this is to compare pre-treatment price trends, 
and now having introduced the data, we can do just that. Figure 4 displays price trends 
for 2006 through July 2008 for the preferred sample. Price trends are similar between 
New York and Pennsylvania for private water properties, which further bolsters our 
confidence that the counterfactual created by the control counties is appropriate. In 
contrast, the pre-moratorium price trends for public water properties do not coincide, 
which motivated us to not use these properties in our difference-in-differences design. 
One reason for the non-parallel trends could be the small number of Pennsylvania 
public water properties near the border. We could expand the sample in order to include 
more public water properties (and this does indeed improve the alignment of pre-
treatment trends), but that would defeat the purpose of the border discontinuity. In 
addition, we tested whether characteristics of transacted properties were different across 
states after the moratorium. The results presented in Table A3 of the online appendix 
show that most characteristics, most importantly lot size, are not statistically different 
across states. 
 
6. RESULTS 
6.1 The effect of the statewide moratorium 
 Table 2 presents the main results of our analysis of the effect New York’s 
statewide moratorium on housing prices (Equation 3). We present the double difference 
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coefficients from five models, each with the same specification, but with progressively 
more stringent sample criteria. As controls, all models include a variety of property-
specific characteristics, year fixed effects and township fixed effects. Column 1 includes 
all transactions in each of our five sample counties. Column 2 restricts transactions to be 
within 15 miles of the border, while Column 3 further restricts transactions to be within 
the 100-200 foot shale thickness band. Column 4 requires transactions to be within five 
miles of the border, while Column 5 further restricts transactions to be within the 100-
200 foot shale thickness band. Column 5 is our preferred specification as differences in 
unobservable characteristics will be minimized with the border restriction and 
expectations about SGD should be very similar due to the common thickness.  
The coefficient on NY*PostMoratorium in Column 1 is -0.101, which indicates 
that private well water properties declined in price 10.1% after the moratorium relative to 
similar properties in Pennsylvania. Restricting the sample to within 15 miles of the border 
increases the magnitude of the coefficient to -0.13, and the coefficient grows again to -
0.151 when restricting for shale thickness. For the 5 mile sample, the coefficient is -
0.209, and adding shale thickness the coefficient is -0.231. The results present a clear 
pattern that coefficients increase in magnitude as sample restrictions are imposed. This 
pattern indicates that both the border distance restrictions and the shale thickness 
restriction are important for minimizing unobservable variation and aligning expectations 
across the border.  
Our estimates imply that taking away the expectation of SGD reduces property 
values and thus indicates a positive valuation of SGD for areas most likely to experience 
both the financial benefits and environmental consequences of SGD. Combining our 
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preferred estimate of -0.231 and the average, pre-moratorium, New York house price in 
our preferred sample ($110,526 in $2011), the moratorium reduced house values by 
$25,531 on average relative to Pennsylvania. In turn, we interpret this number as the net 
present value of an expected stream of costs and benefits of SGD. If we annualize this 
present value for a 30-year productive well life with 5% interest, this result translates into 
an annual net benefit of $1,649. One assumption underlying this interpretation is that the 
probability goes from 1 to 0 with the moratorium. Instead, if subjective probabilities were 
within the bounds of 1 and 0, then the net value would be larger and equal to $25,531 
divided by the change in probability. For example, if the probability of SGD changed 
from 0.9 to 0.4, then the estimated net present value of SGD would be $25,531/(0.9-
0.4)=$51,062.15 The second assumption necessary for our interpretation is that 
households have accurate expectations about the benefits and costs that will result from 
SGD. For instance, if households are accurate in their assessment of financial benefits, 
but discount the possibility of adverse health or environmental consequences, then our 
estimate may reflect lost benefits more than the net value. However, in Sections 6.2 and 
6.3, we present results that bolster our confidence in these two assumptions.  
 
6.2 Robustness checks and extensions  
Table 3 provides a series of robustness checks that probe several key assumptions 
                                                          
15 Another way in which expectations can affect the calculation of net values is if households have a 
perceived duration of the moratorium. For example, many people (authors included) had the impression 
that the initial moratorium would last five years, and then the New York State government would make a 
decision. In this case, the house price reduction is not the lost value of SGD, but the cost of waiting five 
years for SGD. At a 5% interest rate, the annualized value of SGD would be $7,618. Given results in 
Section 6.2 that households do not seem to be updating their beliefs, we think the assumption that people 
believed the moratorium to be temporary is inconsistent with the data. However, future work could 
examine more recent data to determine if the permanent ban in 2014 led to any price change. 
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of our difference-in-differences model and our interpretation of the results as revealing 
net value of SGD.16 Each column builds on our main result of Column 5 Table 2, and 
thus uses both the 5 mile border and shale thickness restrictions. Columns 1 and 2 address 
the assumption of expectations changing from 1 to 0 with the moratorium. Column 1 
excludes transactions occurring in 2008. As there may have been a gradual slide from 
certainty of SGD to uncertainty to certainty of no SGD, removing the time period which 
this slide was likely to occur ensures a large discrete and complete change in 
expectations. The estimated coefficient is -0.244, which is nearly identical to the main 
result. Column 2 includes transactions from 2012, which were originally excluded 
because of the local resolution activity that occurred in New York in the spring and 
summer of 2012. The coefficient again stays consistent at -0.255, which suggests that 
expectations changed with the moratorium and did not change much after that with the 
multiple extensions.  
Columns 3 and 4 return to the 2006-2011 timespan and test whether alternative 
shale geology characteristics may better match expectations across the border. Column 3 
restricts the data set to only include those transactions that overlay shale that is 150 to 
200 feet thick. The resulting parameter estimate -0.260 is similar to our Table 2 estimate. 
Column 4 additionally requires transactions to overlay shale with similar depth.17 Low 
depth areas of the shale have relatively lower reservoir pressure and higher water content, 
which may reduce potential oil and gas recovery. However, high depth areas of the shale 
                                                          
16 In the appendix, we present additional robustness checks. Table A5 shows the set of control variables. 
Table A7 estimates models similar to Table 2, but using the level of prices and results are similar. Table A8 
tests for robustness of only including single family homes and using propensity score matching to trim the 
sample for covariate balance, and results are similar. Table A9 tests supports the robustness of our 15 mile 
border and shale thickness model estimate using models similar to those used in Table 3.  
17 Depth is measured based on a Marcellus Shale depth map from the Marcellus Center for Outreach and 
Research at Pennsylvania State University.  
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may be less permeable and have higher drilling costs than low depth areas (Advanced 
Resources International, 2013). Though ambiguous, it could have an impact on 
expectations. The estimate from Column 4 is -0.240, very similar to our estimate without 
this additional requirement. 
Our research design also assumes that environmental spillovers across the border 
are minimal. In Column 5, we remove observations within 1 mile of the border in hope 
that any expected or actual spillover is contained to that distance. The estimated 
coefficient is -0.231, identical to the main result.18  
Our final robustness check, Column 6 in Table 3, further probes how well 
Pennsylvania serves as a counterfactual in terms of house price trends. Here, we use a 
triple difference specification and include properties that are served by municipal water 
supply. These properties are in towns and are unlikely to receive either the financial 
benefits or the main environmental damages associated with water contamination. Their 
purpose is to serve as an additional control for differential market trends in New York 
and Pennsylvania. However, our border discontinuity with a five mile distance 
requirement is designed to mitigate these types of unobservable variables. In addition, the 
pre-treatment trends did not run parallel (Figure 4), and there are very few public water 
properties on the Pennsylvania side (Appendix Figure A4). Thus, we do not believe this 
is the best research design, but investigate it as a robustness check. The triple difference 
term NY*PostMoratorium*Private, which is now the coefficient of interest, is interpreted 
as the change in price due to the moratorium for New York private water supply 
                                                          
18 If instead of a 1 mile exposure buffer of environmental effects, there is a 5 or more mile exposure buffer, 
all New York properties in our preferred sample would be exposed. Under this (extreme) assumption, our 
estimates would recover the option value of mineral rights.  
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properties, relative to Pennsylvania private water properties, and relative to the 
differential change between public water properties in New York and Pennsylvania. The 
coefficient estimate is -0.179, which is smaller than the main result and less statistically 
significant. While this result is broadly consistent with the main result, the reduced 
magnitude is consistent with a pre-moratorium downward trajectory of municipal water 
properties in New York relative to Pennsylvania. In sum, the range of estimates from 
Table 3 support our assumptions and suggest that the moratorium reduced property 
values between 18% and 26% for New York properties overlaying high-quality shale 
deposits. 
In Table 4, we extend our analysis of the effect of the statewide moratorium by 
examining whether there were heterogeneous price impacts based on lot size and future 
resolution status of a property’s township.19 Instead of using our preferred 5 mile distance 
band in this analysis, we apply a border distance band of 15 miles in order to include 
more towns that ultimately passed resolutions in 2012. Larger lots may be able to capture 
more financial benefits through leases and royalties. Owners and potential buyers may 
expect these financial benefits and so the price decline post-moratorium will be amplified 
for larger properties. The first column in Table 4 presents results from a specification that 
builds on our double difference framework by interacting lot size (log acres) with each of 
the three double difference variables. Resulting parameter estimates indicate that the 
double difference coefficient of interest is similar in magnitude to the results from Table 
2, Column 3. The interaction with lot size is negative (as expected), but is statistically 
                                                          
19 We also estimate a model with only properties smaller than 10 acres to control for properties that have 
substantial differences in values due to quality and size of the land (due to being used for agriculture). We 
find our results do not qualitatively change with this restriction. 
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indistinguishable from zero.20 We interpret these results as indicating that there is no 
heterogeneity across lot sizes, which we may be due to the high degree of uncertainty in 
financial benefits. 
The second column of Table 4 explores whether the future resolution status of a 
town affects price impacts. As noted above, the statewide moratorium was unpopular in 
certain parts of New York. Towns that eventually pass resolutions likely supported SGD 
in the 2006-2008 range. Residents and homebuyers may have had larger expectations 
about the financial benefits, and thus may have a larger price decrease post-moratorium. 
We estimate a specification that is similar to the preferred specification, but additionally 
interacts ResolutionTown (= 1 if a property is located in a town that passes a resolution in 
2012) with the double difference variable NY*PostMoratorium. The results indicate that 
residential property prices declined -12.8% post-moratorium, similar to the estimate 
found in Table 2, Column 3. However, we find that this effect does not change in 
resolution towns. Although the parameter estimate on the triple difference term is 
negative (-9.8%), it is not statistically significant. This result suggests that the underlying 
likelihood of SGD as viewed by homeowners and prospective buyers is no different in 
resolution towns versus other towns. However, this modeling approach is focused on 
selection and underlying characteristics, not the effect of the resolution itself. In the 
appendix, we present an analysis of the property value impacts of passing a resolution. 
Our results suggest no effect.  
 
6.3 Proximity analysis 
                                                          
20 We also estimated models with different assumptions about the functional form for lot size and results 
were similar. 
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In this section we develop a more traditional model that estimates the effect of 
proximity to drilling on house prices. Similar to Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber (2014), we 
estimate variations on the following model:  
ln(𝑝𝑖) = 𝛽1𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖
′𝛿 + 𝜀𝑖                    (4) 
where 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖 is the number of wells within a given distance of a property, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 is a 
binary variable equal to one if the property depends on well water, and 𝑋𝑖 is a set of 
housing, location, and temporal controls. Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber (2014) estimate 
several specifications varying distance cutoffs and time windows, and we follow suit. 
We implement both a one mile and two mile cutoff for the measure of proximity, and 
estimate the impact of new wells six and 12 months prior to transaction, as well as any 
time prior to transaction. We interact the binary variable 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 with 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖 to allow 
for heterogeneous effects of proximity over private versus public water. We use all 
observations in our threes counties of Pennsylvania from 2006 to 2012. Identification 
comes from comparing houses within a given distance band of a drilled shale well to 
houses further away and houses that predated the drilling.  
 While this model has a traditional interpretation of valuation of proximity, this 
model also estimates the accuracy of households’ pre-drilling expectations. Because all 
transactions in this analysis occurred after households began signing leases with gas 
companies, we claim that expectations of SGD net benefits had already been capitalized 
into sales prices. Under this interpretation, a post-drilling change in house prices would 
suggest that expectations were incorrect. Specifically, if prices decline post-drilling, as 
is the case in prior studies, this would indicate that households’ expectations had either 
overvalued the financial benefits or undervalued the environmental costs.  
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 The results presented in Table 5 suggest that proximity to wells has no effect on 
house prices. Across all six specifications, neither the public nor private well water 
coefficients are statistically different from zero. These results are qualitatively robust to 
changes in functional form. We interpret this to mean that ex ante expectations 
established in the initial expansion of SGD in Pennsylvania were on average accurate ex 
post. In turn, these results support our claim that New York households near the border 
have accurate expectations about SGD. However, an alternative interpretation is there is 
no economically significant benefit or cost of living in proximity to drilling. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
This paper proposes to view hedonic analysis through a different lens by focusing 
on the formation, realization, and change of expectations to inform environmental policy. 
We provide area-level impacts of the statewide moratorium on SGD for households 
living in New York. Under assumptions of rational expectations of benefits and costs of 
SGD and the statewide moratorium causing a 100% change in expectations about the 
probability of SGD, the results are interpreted as the net valuation of the local impacts 
of SGD. If expectations did not change 100%, then the estimates could be seen as a 
lower bound of SGD value. With loss of the rational expectations assumption, we are 
still recovering the effect of the moratorium on property values, which is driven by 
expectations over financial benefits and environmental externalities of SGD, and this is 
an important estimate for areas considering bans on hydraulic fracturing. Our preferred 
model suggests that the moratorium causes a 23.1% price decline for New York 
properties most likely to experience SGD, which indicates a positive and substantial 
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valuation of SGD. Our results measuring proximity effects of drilling in Pennsylvania 
suggest no price movement after drilling begins. This finding supports the rational 
expectations assumption, in that expectations of SGD are formed prior to drilling and 
ex post expectations were accurate in regard to the costs and benefits of SGD.  
For our preferred border discontinuity sample, our point estimate translates into 
a $25,531 loss in equity per house and an annualized loss of $1, 649 per house. In order 
to estimate the total property market impact to these three counties, we performed the 
following back-of-the-envelope calculation. The average sales price 2006-2008 for a 
private water property in our three study counties in New York was $117,283 (in $2011). 
Using our -10.1% estimate derived using all properties, the average house lost $11,846 in 
value due to the moratorium. From the 2000 Decennial Census, these three counties have 
a total of 99,402 housing units. Based on our transactions data, 30% (or 29,848) of these 
are likely to have private water supply. Putting these together, we estimate the total net 
loss in value for these three New York counties from the moratorium was $354 million. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: Timeline of New York policies on shale gas development and the number of 
wells drilled in Pennsylvania from 2006 to 2014 
 
Notes: NY DEC and DOH refer to the Department of Environmental Conservation and Department of 
Health, respectively. * 5 Wells were drilled in our PA study area in 2008 before the moratorium was 
implemented in NY on July 23rd, 2008 
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Figure 2: Unconventional well development in Bradford and Tioga counties from 2006 to 
2011 
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Figure 3: Shale thickness and border restrictions across sample counties 
 
Notes: Geological thickness data is digitized from maps from Pennsylvania State University’s Marcellus 
Center for Outreach and Research (MCOR). 
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Figure 4: Pre-moratorium sale price trends 
 
Notes: This sample includes all 1,225 single family residences and mobile homes sold from $10,000 to 
$1,000,000 (in 2011 CPI-adjusted dollars) from 2006 to the NY de facto moratorium on SGD (July 23, 2008). 
Observations are located within 5 miles of the NY-PA border, overlay Marcellus Shale that is 100 – 200 feet 
thick, and are not within two miles of a spud unconventional well.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable Full Sample 
Pre-Moratorium Differences: NY - PA 
Full Sample 
 < 5 Mile Border & 
Shale Trim 
Restrictions 
        
Price (000s) 108.09 24.18 25.67 
Lot size (acres) 3.06 -0.54 -0.60 
# of beds 2.79 0.17 0.20 
# of baths 1.41 0.07 -0.12 
Finished squared feet (000s) 1.52 0.10 0.01 
Age at time of sale (years) 51.20 4.34 7.40 
# of spud wells: 0 - 3 miles 2.33 -0.01 -0.004 
Shale thickness (feet) 190.07 -63.54* 8.10* 
% of mobile homes 0.08 -0.05 -0.08 
    
Observations 4,976 2,349 449 
Notes: Observations are single family residences and mobile homes located outside of public 
water supply areas. Housing prices are CPI-adjusted to 2011 levels. The 5 mile border restrictions 
includes only those observations that are located within 5 miles of the NY-PA state border. The 
shale trim restriction includes only those observations that overlay shale that is 100 - 200 feet 
thick. * if the differences in means divided by their combined standard deviation is greater than 
0.25. 
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Table 2: Double difference estimates of the impact of the NY shale gas development moratorium on 
housing prices 
 (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) 
 
Full Sample 
15 Mile Border 
Restriction  
5 Mile Border 
Restriction 
Full Shale Trim   Full Shale Trim 
             
NY * PostMoratorium 
-0.101*** -0.130*** -0.151***  -0.209*** -0.231*** 
(0.036) (0.039) (0.045)  (0.074) (0.077) 
              
Property Variables Y Y Y  Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y  Y Y 
Township Fixed Effects Y Y Y   Y Y 
Observations 4,976 2,829 2,260  1,072 1,018 
R-squared 0.385 0.402 0.395   0.354 0.354 
Note: Observations represent single family residence and mobile home property transactions from 2006 
to 2011. All observations are located outside of public water supply areas and, thus, rely on private well 
water. The dependent variable is the natural log of sale price, CPI-adjusted to 2011 values. Property 
variables include number of beds and bathrooms, a quadratic in square feet of living area, a quadratic in 
property acreage, a cubic in property age, an indicator variable for mobile home, and an indicator 
variable for whether some property characteristics were imputed. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses and are estimated using township-level cluster-robust inference. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
49 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Robustness checks for the 5 mile border restriction and shale thickness model 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exclude 
2008 
Include 
2012 
Thickness 
Trim 
Thickness  
& Depth 
Restrictions 
1 Mile 
Border 
Cut 
Triple 
Difference 
Approach 
              
NY * PostMoratorium 
-0.244*** -0.255*** -0.260** -0.240** -0.231*** -0.050 
(0.084) (0.078) (0.088) (0.088) (0.063) (0.061) 
       
NY * PostMoratorium * 
Private 
     -0.179* 
     (0.100) 
              
Property Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Township Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 856 1,193 826 817 805 2,353 
R-squared 0.379 0.364 0.356 0.359 0.356 0.414 
Note: Unless otherwise noted, observations represent single family residence and mobile home property 
transactions from 2006 to 2011. All observations are located outside of public water supply areas and, 
thus, rely on private well water. All observations are located within 5 miles of the border and overlay 
shale from 100 to 200 feet thick. The dependent variable is the natural log of sale price, CPI-adjusted to 
2011 values. Property variables include number of beds and bathrooms, square footage of finished living 
area and its squared term, a quadratic in property acreage, and a cubic in property age. Model 1 excludes 
observations from 2008 for a cleaner break in expectations. Model 2 tests for the robustness of the results 
with an additional year's worth of sales data from 2012. Model 3 drops all observations in the shale 
thickness band from 100 - 150 feet, thus only leaving those in the 150 - 200 feet thickness band. In Model 
4, we add shale depth trim to our main model (4,000 - 5,000 feet of shale depth) to better control for 
potential geological differences between the two states. Model 5 drops all properties that are located 
within a mile of the state border. Model 6 applies a triple difference approach, using properties in both 
private and public areas. Private is a variable that indicates whether a property is located in a private 
water supply area. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using township-level 
cluster-robust inference. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Heterogeneous impacts of the moratorium by acreage and for resolution 
towns 
  
(1) (2) 
Acreage Interaction 
Local Resolution 
Interaction 
      
NY * PostMoratorium 
-0.120** -0.128*** 
(0.055) (0.046) 
   
NY * PostMoratorium * 
ln(Acreage) 
-0.031  
(0.040)  
   
NY * PostMoratorium * 
ResolutionTown 
 -0.098 
 (0.064) 
      
Property Variables Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y 
Township Fixed Effects Y Y 
Observations 2,260 2,260 
R-squared 0.400 0.395 
Note: Observations represent single family residence and mobile home property 
transactions from 2006 to 2011. All observations are located outside of public water 
supply areas and, thus, rely on private well water. All observations are located 
within 15 miles of the border and overlay shale from 100 to 200 feet thick. The 
dependent variable is the natural log of sale price, CPI-adjusted to 2011 values. 
Property variables include number of beds and bathrooms, square footage of 
finished living area and its squared term, a quadratic in property acreage, and a 
cubic in property age. The first model interacts the DD with the natural log of 
acreage and replaces the quadratic in property acreage with the natural log of 
acreage. The second model interactions the DD with a binary variable that indicates 
whether an observation was located in a town that passed a local resolution in 
support of shale gas development in 2012. Standard errors are shown in parentheses 
and are estimated using township-level cluster-robust inference. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Impact of unconventional well density on residential property prices in Pennsylvania 
 Model Specification - Spatial-Temporal Buffers 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
One Mile Buffer  Two Mile Buffer 
Six 
Months 
Twelve 
Months 
All Pre-
Sale 
  
Six 
Months 
Twelve 
Months 
All Pre-
Sale 
        
# of Spud Wells 
-0.020 -0.013 -0.015  0.002 0.009 0.002 
(0.029) (0.024) (0.019)  (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) 
# of Spud Wells * 
Private 
0.036 0.027 0.020  0.009 0.0004 -0.001 
(0.034) (0.027) (0.019)  (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) 
                
Property Variables Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Year * Town FE Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Observations 6,248 6,248 6,248  6,248 6,248 6,248 
R-squared 0.402 0.402 0.402  0.403 0.403 0.402 
Notes: All observations are single family residences and mobile homes sold in Pennsylvania 
from 2006 to 2012 for $10,000 to $1,000,000 (in 2011 CPI-adjusted dollars). Property 
characteristics include # of beds, # of baths, quadratics for acreage and finished square 
footage, a cubic in age, and binary variables that indicate whether or not the property is in a 
private water supply area, whether it is a mobile home, and whether it is missing values for 
beds, baths, finished square footage, or age. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are 
estimated using township-level cluster-robust inference. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 This appendix provides information, data, and results that supplement, but are not 
critical to, the analysis in our main paper.  
Tables A1 and A2 provide information regarding the monetary benefits and 
environmental costs, respectively, which may accrue to landowners in areas with active 
shale gas development. These supplement the discussion in Sections 2.1-2.2 of the main 
text. Although we focus on environmental costs, other costs from SGD could be social in 
nature, such as increased inequality and vulnerability of poor community members 
(Schafft et al., 2014), strains on local road infrastructure (Miller and Sassin, 2014), and 
community cultural changes (Jacquet and Kay, 2014). 
Table A3 gives summary statistics for housing characteristics post-moratorium. 
This table is identical in structure to Table 1 from the main text. The purpose of this table 
is to test whether characteristics of transacting properties differed after the moratorium. If 
the types of properties did change, then this would discredit our main difference-in-
differences estimates. The table shows that transacting New York properties are older 
than Pennsylvania properties. The table also shows that shale thickness is greater in the 
New York sample, as it is pre-moratorium, and the distance to spud wells is greater in 
New York than in Pennsylvania, which is expected. Most importantly, lot size is not 
significantly different between the states. Thus, we see no reason to believe that changes 
in the types of properties that transact will affect our estimates. 
Table A4 highlights differences in means for a variety of census tract-level 
variables between New York and Pennsylvania (U.S. Census 2000). The table tests for 
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whether New York and Pennsylvania are significantly different from each other in terms 
of demographic, economic, and social characteristics. We break up the states into three 
subsets: (i) full state, (ii) study counties, and (iii) all census tracts in our study counties 
that are adjacent to the state boundary. By testing for statistical differences across 
different subsets of the states, we identify whether these characteristics converge as we 
move closer to our primary study area adjacent to the border. Results indicate that there 
are significant differences in demographic, economic, and social characteristics between 
New York and Pennsylvania at the state level. Although the absolute differences start to 
decrease when we restrict the census tract subset to only include those within our five 
study counties, we still observe significant differences in racial characteristics, rental 
occupancy percentage, and the unemployment rate. Once we restrict our sample to 
include only those census tract observations along the state border, we find that the only 
statistically-significant difference between the two states is median age. This is an 
important result, as it strengthens our argument that by focusing our analysis along the 
state border, we improve the comparability between our treatment and control groups.   
Table A5 uses our preferred sample from Column 5 of Table 2 (properties within 
five miles of the border with shale geology overlap) and tests how functional form 
assumptions affect estimates. Results are consistent across specifications. 
Table A6 provides our comprehensive model results including parameter 
estimates on all covariates included in our models. All estimates have the expected sign.  
In Table A7, we estimate Table 2 from the main paper using Linear-Linear 
models with the understanding that the value of shale development is likely to be similar 
across the spectrum of sale prices. Our model estimates indicate that New York 
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properties that are most likely to experience shale development value it in the range of 
$10,000 to $28,000. Given mean sale price values for our subsample, the results are 
qualitatively similar whether you use a Log-Linear or Linear-Linear, making the average 
effect of the moratorium the same regardless of using logs or levels.  
Table A8 provides a series of robustness checks on our results from Table 2, 
Column 5 (additional to those found in Table 3), while Table A9 tests the robustness of 
our results from Table 2, Column 3 (by estimating a similar series of models from Table 
3). Results from both tables provide additional support to those found in the main text.  
Figure A1 examines household movement across the border. One threat to our 
identification strategy is spillovers across the border caused by the moratorium. Using 
IRS migration data from our five sample counties, we compare the number of people 
moving from New York to Pennsylvania and vice versa. Figure A1 shows parallel trends 
both before and after the moratorium, giving credence to our identification assumptions. 
Figure A2 shows the locations of residential property sales in our study area from 
2006 to 2011 by water type.  
Figure A3 shows the locations of towns in our study area that have passed SGD-
supporting townships, while Figure A4 shows shale depth across our study area with an 
outlined 5-mile state border restriction buffer.  
 
Analysis of Property Price Impacts of Local Resolutions in Favor of SGD 
 In addition to examining the effect of the statewide moratoria, we explore the 
effect of town-level resolutions in support of SGD on housing prices. While local 
resolutions had no direct effect on actual drilling activity, it is possible that passing a 
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resolution did affect expectations about the future likelihood of local SGD, especially in 
light of the state’s position on home rule authority and the proposal floated in 2012 that 
would allow drilling only in communities that support it. In addition, bans were more 
popular in New York as a whole and towns in several counties north of our sample 
counties were very active with bans and moratoria (e.g., Livingston, Ontario, Tompkins 
and Yates counties). 
Similar to the moratorium, these resolutions mark a potential change in 
expectations, especially when seen in the context of the greater number of local bans 
occurring elsewhere in the state and the floated policy to allow SGD in southern NY 
counties that expressed support, and this change in expectations could be capitalized into 
housing prices. Figure A3 shows the geographic distribution of local resolutions in our 
sample counties. 
Like our moratorium analysis we work in a difference-in-differences framework, 
but now we use only transactions occurring in New York after the statewide moratorium, 
still restricting the sample to private well water properties. The dimensions of comparison 
now are location within a town that passes a local resolution versus location within a 
town that did not pass a local resolution and pre- versus post-resolution passage. 
Treatment is passage of the local resolution. Equation 4 is the model we estimate: 
 
ln(𝑝𝑖) = 𝛾1𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖                       
                              +𝛾3𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖
′𝜃 + 𝜇𝑖                 (1) 
 
where 𝑝𝑖 is sales price, 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖 is a binary variable equal to one if the property 
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is located in a town that passes a resolution in support of SGD, and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is a 
binary variable equal to one if the transaction occurs after July 31, 2012. Because 
resolutions were being passed at various times March – July 2012 and it often took 
multiple meetings of discussion before passing, we exclude observations January – July 
2012 so that the pre-post comparison is clean. 
The coefficient of interest in Equation 1 is 𝛾3, which is the double difference 
estimate. This term identifies the average change in prices for properties in resolution 
towns from before to after the resolution, relative to price changes for other New York 
properties located in towns that do not pass a local resolution. As discussed above, we 
expect this coefficient to be either zero or positive. It could be zero if passing a resolution 
does not change expectations about the likelihood of SGD in these areas. 𝛾3 will be 
positive if expectations do change and residents of the resolution towns feel the net 
benefits of SGD are positive, which seems likely since the residents passed the resolution 
in the first place.  
The assumption of exogeneity may not hold with local resolutions as it does with 
the statewide moratoria. There could be characteristics of towns that pass resolutions that 
are correlated with house price changes.21 While estimates from Equation 4 cannot be 
interpreted as causal, we still feel there is value in investigating the correlation of prices 
and resolution decisions.  
For the analysis of local resolutions, we use FracTracker Alliance maps to 
determine which townships have passed resolutions in support of SGD (FracTracker 
                                                          
21 Of the seven wells permits submitted (but never drilled) in our three NY Counties pre-moratorium, four 
occurred in Candor, NY, which passed a resolution. The other two permitted wells were outside of towns 
that passed resolutions (Erin in Chemung County; Tuscarora in Steuben County). 
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2014). We contacted township administrators regarding resolution dates.  All confirmed 
dates range from early spring to the middle of summer of 2012. For the townships that 
we could not confirm timeline data, we assume the resolutions were passed in the same 
time frame as the others.  
 We use sales in the time span from July 24, 2008 to December, 31 2013 in New 
York. Further, we drop transactions occurring January-July 2012, as this was the period 
during which resolutions were being proposed, considered, and passed.22 There are very 
few properties in our preferred sample for the moratorium analysis that are located in 
towns that pass resolutions. Thus, we pull back from the 5-mile restriction and estimate 
models using 1) all New York observations, 2) only transactions in the 100-200 feet 
range of shale thickness, 3) within 15 miles of the border, and 4) within 15 miles of the 
border and shale thickness in the 100-200 feet range.  
Table A10 presents results using the four different samples of data from estimates 
of Equation 4, which examines the house price impact of passing a resolution in support 
of SGD. Across the four models, coefficients are statistically insignificant and switch 
signs. We hypothesize that much of this noise could be due to the importance of 
covariates, especially town fixed effects as a result of self-selection into treatment. In 
Model 1, the double difference coefficient estimate is 0.094. This estimate implies that 
private water properties in towns that passed resolutions appreciated after resolutions 
were enacted. In conjunction with the earlier statewide moratorium results, this estimate 
suggests that the resolutions may have increased expectations about future SGD among 
buyers, which led to a subsequent price rebound. This result is consistent with the 
                                                          
22 From interviews with local clerks and township board representatives, it appears that the decision to ratify 
a local resolution in support of SGD was discussed across multiple township board meetings. 
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moratorium results in that it indicates positive valuation of SGD. Again, as argued in 
Section 2.3, these resolutions occurred in the backdrop of the more popular local bans 
and moratoria. While the resolutions are meaningless in that they do not affect SGD, they 
may influence expectations about what will happen in the town in the event that the 
statewide moratorium is eventually lifted.    
However, restricted subsets of the data indicate negative double difference 
coefficient estimates in the range of -0.074 to -0.183. With the caveat that these 
coefficients are not statistically different than zero, the point estimates suggest that 
properties located within resolution towns depreciated post-resolution, relative to similar 
properties elsewhere. The contradiction in results between Model 1 and Models 2-4 and 
large standard errors suggest that the relationship either is ambiguous or cannot be 
measured with our sample counties.  
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Figure A1: Household movement across the NY-PA border 
 
Notes: Data are from IRS county-to-county migration records. Only our five sample 
counties are included. 
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Figure A2: Observed transactions from 2006 to 2011 in sample counties 
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Figure A3: New York townships that have passed pre-emptive resolutions in support of 
shale gas development 
 
 
 
Note: Townships classified as having passed pre-emptive resolutions in support of shale 
gas development are based on information provided by the Joint Landowners Coalition of 
New York. 
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Figure A4: Shale depth and border restrictions across our study area counties 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Geological depth data is digitized from maps from Pennsylvania State 
University’s Marcellus Center for Outreach and Research (MCOR). 
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Table A1: A review of potential landowner monetary benefits from shale gas 
development 
Benefits Description Monetary Range 
Production-Related Benefits 
Lease Signing 
Bonus 
An initial payment, based 
on acreage, for signing a 
gas lease contract 
(Weidner, 2013); Most 
important element of lease 
given uncertainty of 
natural gas production 
(Hefley et al., 2011) 
$2700 per acre is average signing 
bonus amount, though this can 
vary considerably (Hefley et al., 
2011); Average per acre payments 
can range from $50 to almost 
$6,000 (Green, 2010; Eichler, 
2013; Riely, 2014) 
Royalty 
Payments 
Recurring payments on a 
proportion of natural gas 
extracted from the 
property (Weidner, 2013) 
State law guarantees minimum 
12.5% royalty rate, though the 
negotiated rate may be higher 
(Weidner, 2013); Royalty rates can 
range from 12.5% to 25%; 
Estimated average values of a 
landowner's share of royalties, per 
well, is $2.5 million (Kelsey and 
Murphy, 2011) 
Improved 
Public 
Services 
Financed through tax and 
fee mechanisms on 
production or well 
development (e.g., Impact 
Fee in Pennsylvania, 
enacted in 2012) 
In 2012, Pennsylvania received 
over $200 million from an impact 
fee, some of which was distributed 
to local townships impacted by 
development (Rabe and Hampton, 
2015) 
Infrastructure-Related Benefits 
Pipeline 
Easement 
Payment 
One-time contract 
payment to allow pipeline 
development on property; 
Based on length of 
constructed pipeline 
(Messersmith, 2010) 
$5-25 per linear foot 
(Messersmith, 2010) 
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Compressor 
Station 
Payment 
One-time contract 
payment, potentially 
including an early 
exploration payment to 
allow the firm to assess 
the suitability of the land 
for the infrastructure 
(Attorney Douglas Clark, 
personal communication, 
2014) 
Range of compensation varies 
considerable, from hundreds of 
thousands into potentially millions 
of dollars (Attorney Douglas 
Clark, personal communication, 
2014) 
Water 
Impoundment 
Payment 
Structure of payment 
varies, as the infrastructure 
could be a part of a well 
site agreement or a 
separate contract 
(Attorney Douglas Clark, 
personal communication, 
2014) 
Typical payment ranges from 
$40,000 to $70,000, though 
payment could be lower or higher 
(Attorney Douglas Clark, personal 
communication, 2014) 
 
  
65 
 
 
Table A2: A review of potential environmental impacts of shale gas development 
Description Spatial Range of Impact 
Expected 
Sign 
Air Quality Impacts 
Conventional air pollution increases 
associated with shale gas extraction 
and processing (e.g., Litovitz et al., 
2011) 
Local, Regional - 
Changes in overall greenhouse gas 
emissions due to natural gas 
displacement of coal use in energy 
production (e.g., Howarth et al., 2011; 
Cathles et al., 2012) 
Global N/A 
Water Impacts 
Groundwater pollution due to shale gas 
development activities (e.g., Osborn et 
al., 2011; Jackson et al., 2013) 
Local, Regional - 
Surface water contamination due to 
shale gas development waste disposal 
and management processes (Olmstead 
et al., 2013) 
Local, Regional - 
Significant pressure on wastewater 
management capacity (e.g., Rahm et 
al., 2013) 
Local, Regional - 
Miscellaneous Effects 
Shale gas infrastructure-driven forest 
and farmland fragmentation (e.g., 
Racicot et al., 2014) 
Local, Regional - 
Decreases in wildlife habitat 
availability and quality in and around 
shale gas infrastructure (e.g., Kiviat, 
2013) 
Local, Regional, Global - 
Increased seismicity in and around 
unconventional wells and wastewater 
injection sites (Frohlich, 2012) 
Local, Regional - 
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Table A3: Summary statistics 
Variable Full Sample 
Post-Moratorium Differences: NY - PA 
Full Sample 
 < 5 Mile Border & 
Shale Trim 
Restrictions 
        
Price (000s) 108.09 14.16 -5.56 
Lot size (acres) 3.06 -0.12 -0.43 
# of beds 2.79 0.10 0.16 
# of baths 1.41 0.06 -0.10 
Finished squared feet (000s) 1.52 0.07 0.05 
Age at time of sale (years) 51.20 2.80 16.18* 
# of spud wells: 0 - 3 miles 2.33 -7.78 -2.44* 
Shale thickness (feet) 190.07 -64.06* 9.05* 
% of mobile homes 0.08 -0.02 -0.05 
    
Observations 4,976 2,627 567 
Notes: Observations are single family residences and mobile homes located outside of 
public water supply ares. Housing prices are CPI-adjusted to 2011 levels. The 5 mile border 
restrictions includes only those observations that are located within 5 miles of the NY-PA 
state border. The shale trim restriction includes only those observations that overlay shale 
that is 100 - 200 feet thick. * if the differences in means divided by their combined standard 
deviation is greater than 0.25. 
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Table A4 - Demographic, Economic, and Social Characteristics 
Variables 
New York - Pennsylvania 
Full 
State 
Study Counties 
Border Census 
Tracts 
    
Median Age (Years) -2.5*** -1.0 -1.6** 
% of Population - Black 6.5*** 3.4*** 1.2 
% of Population - Hispanic 11.5*** 0.8** 0.7 
Household Poverty Rate (%) 3.5*** -0.3 -0.7 
Household Rental Occupancy (%) 16.6*** 1.5* -0.6 
Median Household Income (000s) 3.9*** 2.9 3.7 
Unemployment Rate (%) 1.0*** 0.7** 0.7 
Bachelor Degree or Higher (%) -3.5*** 0.1 0.4 
    
Notes: Data is from the U.S. Census 2000 and indicate differences in variable values 
between New York and Pennsylvania. The Border Census Tracts column includes data 
from census tracts that are adjacent to the NY-PA border. *** indicates significant 
difference at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 1% level using a two-tail T-Test 
assuming unequal variances. 
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Table A5: Robustness checks (5 mile border & shale trim restrictions) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
NY * PostMoratorium 
-0.256** -0.233*** -0.236*** -0.236*** -0.230*** -0.238*** 
(0.102) (0.074) (0.073) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) 
              
Property Characteristics N Y Y Y Y Y 
County FE N N Y N N Y 
Year FE N N N Y N Y 
Town FE N N N N Y N 
Observations 1,018 1,018 1,018 1,018 1,018 1,018 
R-squared 0.023 0.320 0.322 0.325 0.350 0.327 
Note: Unless noted, observations represent single family residence and mobile home property transactions 
from 2006 to 2011. All observations are located outside of public water supply areas and, thus, rely on 
private well water. The dependent variable is the natural log of sale price, CPI-adjusted to 2011 values. 
Property variables include number of beds and bathrooms, square footage of finished living area and its 
squared term, a quadratic in property acreage, and a cubic in property age. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses and are estimated using township-level cluster-robust inference. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table A6: Comprehensive results from Table 2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Full Sample 
15 Mile 
Border  
15 Mile 
Border & 
Thickness  
5 Mile 
Border  
5 Mile 
Border & 
Thickness  
            
NY 
0.275*** 0.268*** 0.273*** 0.096 0.128 
(0.025) (0.032) (0.038) (0.087) (0.096) 
PostMoratorium 
0.071 0.075 0.098 0.264** 0.293*** 
(0.047) (0.062) (0.069) (0.099) (0.102) 
NY * PostMoratorium 
-0.101*** -0.130*** -0.151*** -0.209*** -0.231*** 
(0.036) (0.039) (0.045) (0.074) (0.077) 
Acres 
0.059*** 0.059*** 0.055*** 0.049** 0.051** 
(0.011) (0.014) (0.017) (0.022) (0.024) 
Acres ² 
-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002** -0.001 -0.001 
(0.0005) (0.000659) (0.000786) (0.001) (0.001) 
LivingArea 
0.485*** 0.441*** 0.414*** 0.523** 0.529** 
(0.075) (0.099) (0.121) (0.193) (0.209) 
LivingArea ² 
-0.053*** -0.039* -0.033 -0.050 -0.051 
(0.019) (0.023) (0.028) (0.051) (0.055) 
Beds 
-0.017 0.005 0.012 -0.0001 0.003 
(0.014) (0.017) (0.020) (0.030) (0.032) 
Baths 
0.200*** 0.170*** 0.188*** 0.150*** 0.156*** 
(0.022) (0.027) (0.028) (0.049) (0.051) 
Age 
0.0144*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.014** 0.015*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age ² 
-0.000228*** -0.000179*** -0.000202*** -0.000218*** -0.000227*** 
(3.07e-05) (3.86e-05) (3.96e-05) (5.47e-05) (5.54e-05) 
Age ³ 
8.39e-07*** 6.70e-07*** 7.33e-07*** 7.66e-07*** 7.89e-07*** 
(1.09e-07) (1.34e-07) (1.37e-07) (1.72e-07) (1.73e-07) 
Mobile 
-0.340*** -0.391*** -0.374*** -0.332* -0.272 
(0.055) (0.093) (0.101) (0.189) (0.208) 
Imputation 
0.005 0.045 0.136 0.144 0.158 
(0.064) (0.107) (0.127) (0.211) (0.232) 
Observations 4,976 2,829 2,260 1,072 1,018 
R-squared 0.385 0.402 0.395 0.354 0.354 
Note: All models include property characteristics, year fixed effects, and township fixed effects. 
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Table A7: Double difference estimates of the impact of the NY shale gas development moratorium 
on housing prices, Linear Model 
  (1) (2) (3) (6) (7) 
Variables 
Full Sample 
15 Mile 
Border  
15 Mile 
Border & 
Thickness  
5 Mile 
Border  
5 Mile 
Border & 
Thickness  
            
NY * PostMoratorium 
-10,696*** -16,945*** -19,029*** -23,988*** -25,917*** 
(3,889) (4,553) (5,183) (8,532) (8,851) 
            
Property 
Characteristics Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Township Fixed 
Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 4,976 2,829 2,260 1,072 1,018 
R-squared 0.426 0.509 0.506 0.442 0.446 
Note: Observations represent single family residence and mobile home property transactions from 
2006 to 2011. All observations are located outside of public water supply areas and, thus, rely on 
private well water. The dependent variable is the natural log of sale price, CPI-adjusted to 2011 
values. Property variables include number of beds and bathrooms, square footage of finished living 
area and its squared term, a quadratic in property acreage, and a cubic in property age. The Shale 
Thickness restriction includes only those observations that overlay Marcellus Shale that is 100 - 200 
feet thick. The Shale Depth restriction includes only those observations that overlay Marcellus Shale 
that is 4000 - 5000 feet below the surface. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are 
estimated using township-level cluster-robust inference. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table A8: Robustness checks for the 5 mile border restriction and shale thickness model 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Single 
Family 
Only 
PSM 
1 Mile Border Cut Shale 
Depth 
Restriction NY PA 
            
NY * PostMoratorium 
-0.236** -0.211** -0.272*** -0.192*** -0.206** 
(0.092) (0.095) (0.076) (0.065) (0.081) 
            
Property Characteristics Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Township Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 900 918 924 899 870 
R-squared 0.309 0.366 0.351 0.360 0.358 
Note: Unless otherwise noted, observations represent single family residence and mobile 
home property transactions from 2006 to 2011. All observations are located outside of 
public water supply areas and, thus, rely on private well water. All observations are 
located within 5 miles of the border and overlay shale from 100 to 200 feet thick. The 
dependent variable is the natural log of sale price, CPI-adjusted to 2011 values. Property 
variables include number of beds and bathrooms, square footage of finished living area 
and its squared term, a quadratic in property acreage, and a cubic in property age. Model 
1 includes only observations classified as single family residences (no mobile homes 
included). Model 2 applies propensity score matching, where we use a probit model of all 
property characteristics listed above and 100-150 v. 150-200 shale thickness bins to 
predict NY. We then cut all observations outside of the 5% and 95% of the distribution of 
the propensity score. We then run our main specification on the reduced dataset. In 
Models 3 and 4, we cut all observations within a mile of the border from NY and PA, 
respectively. This is done to test for the effect of environmental spillovers (see Model 6 in 
Table 3 in the main text for an analogous regression where both sides are cut from the 
model).  Instead of using a shale thickness restriction, Model 5 keeps only those 
observations that are 4,000 - 5,000 feet below the surface, which is in the common 
support of both states (see Marcellus Center for Outreach and Research at Pennsylvania 
State University for maps). Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated 
using township-level cluster-robust inference. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table A9: Robustness checks for the 15 mile border restriction and shale thickness model 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exclude 
2008 
Include 
2012 
Shale 
Thickness 
Trim 
Shale 
Depth 
1 Mile 
Border 
Cut 
Triple 
Difference 
Approach 
              
NY * PostMoratorium 
-0.184*** -0.171*** -0.157** -0.183*** -0.140*** -0.064 
(0.044) (0.045) (0.058) (0.063) (0.043) (0.044) 
       
NY * PostMoratorium * 
Private 
     -0.086 
     (0.064) 
              
Property Characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Township Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,926 2,623 1,486 1,361 2,047 5,807 
R-squared 0.399 0.399 0.322 0.366 0.400 0.499 
Note: Unless otherwise noted, observations represent single family residence and mobile home property 
transactions from 2006 to 2011. All observations are located outside of public water supply areas and, 
thus, rely on private well water. All observations are located within 15 miles of the border and overlay 
shale from 100 to 200 feet thick. The dependent variable is the natural log of sale price, CPI-adjusted to 
2011 values. Property variables include number of beds and bathrooms, square footage of finished 
living area and its squared term, a quadratic in property acreage, and a cubic in property age. Model 1 
excludes observations from 2008 for a cleaner break in expectations. Model 2 tests for the robustness of 
the results with an additional year's worth of sales data from 2012. Model 3 drops all observations in the 
shale thickness band from 100 - 150 feet, thus only leaving those in the 150 - 200 feet thickness band. 
In Model 4, we use a shale depth trim instead of a shale thickness trim (4,000 - 5,000 feet of shale 
depth). Model 5 tests for the impact of environmental spillovers by cutting all NY and PA observations 
that are located within a mile of the state border. Model 6 applies a triple difference approach, using 
properties in both private and public areas. Private is a variable that indicates whether a property is 
located in a private water supply area. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using 
township-level cluster-robust inference. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table A10: The effect of local resolutions in support of SGD on housing prices 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Full Sample 
Shale 
Trim 
15 Mile Border  
Shale Trim + 
15 Mile Border 
          
ResolutionTown * 
PostResolution 
0.0939 -0.074 -0.079 -0.183 
(0.627) (0.770) (1.102) (1.192) 
          
Property 
Characteristics Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Township FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,834 1,338 1,170 998 
R-squared 0.244 0.190 0.246 0.216 
Note: Observations represent single family residence and mobile home property transactions 
sold in NY from the NY moratorium in 2008 to late 2013. All observations are located 
outside of public water supply areas and, thus, rely on private well water. Due to the 
uncertainty of actual resolution dates, we cut all observations from January to July of 2012, 
which is in the range of all resolution passages that we have information on. The dependent 
variable is the natural log of sale price, CPI-adjusted to 2011 values. Property variables 
include number of beds and bathrooms, square footage of finished living area and its 
squared term, a quadratic in property acreage, and a cubic in property age. ResolutionTown 
indicates whether a sold property was located in a township that eventually passed in a 
resolution, while PostResolution indicates whether the property was sold after July 2012. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using township-level cluster-
robust inference. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Abstract 
This paper seeks to quantify the negative externalities associated with unconventional 
extraction of oil and gas using hedonic valuation and residential property transactions. 
One complication in determining local impacts is the fact that some but not all properties 
are tied with mineral rights, which enable the residents to benefit financially from nearby 
drilling. To overcome this issue, we exploit the mineral severance legacy of the Stock-
Raising Homestead Act of 1916 to identify properties in Western Colorado that with 
certainty do not have mineral rights and thus are only impacted negatively by proximate 
drilling. Our regression results suggest that housing prices decline about 35% when 
drilling occurs within one mile. This estimate of local costs is substantially larger than 
prior results found elsewhere in the literature, which demonstrates the critical importance 
of mineral ownership.  
 
Keywords: unconventional oil and gas development; hydraulic fracturing; horizontal 
drilling; federal mineral ownership; mineral severance; hedonic valuation 
JEL codes: Q3, Q5 
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1. Introduction 
 
Shale and tight oil and gas basins have emerged as important sources of energy in 
the United States through innovations in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling. This 
development has led to significant impacts on residents and landowners that are close to 
drilling activities. There are environmental and health risks associated with 
unconventional oil and gas development related to groundwater contamination (Osborn et 
al., 2011), surface water pollution (Olmstead et al., 2013), wastewater management 
(Rahm and Riha, 2012), and infant health (Hill, 2013; McKenzie et al., 2014). However, 
there are positive impacts as well, especially for those residents that lease their mineral 
rights to drilling companies in return for royalty payments and lease signing bonuses 
(Fitzgerald, 2014; Hardy and Kelsey, 2015).1 Royalty payments can be paid as high as 
20% of the value of production and lease signing bonuses can reach into the thousands of 
dollars per acre leased (e.g., Brasier et al., 2011; Kelly-Detwiler, 2013).   
There is a growing body of literature in economics that seeks to estimate the local 
impacts of unconventional oil and gas development through hedonic valuation, with 
remarkable variation in estimates.  Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber (2014) examine price 
responses in southwestern Pennsylvania and find that prices can decline by as much as 
22% for private well-water dependent properties, but generally are smaller and short 
lived. Muehlenbachs et al. (2015) use data from across Pennsylvania and find that shale 
development can lead to depreciation as high as 17% for well water properties within 1.5 
                                                          
1 The United States is unique in that private citizens can own the minerals underneath their property. In 
most countries, it is the government or the crown that owns all subsurface rights (Kulander, 2013). Since 
U.S. citizens can own their properties’ minerals, they can financially benefit from drilling through leasing.  
The possibility of financial benefits has led to more public support for unconventional oil and gas 
development in the United States than in other countries (e.g., Stevens, 2010; Gény, 2010). Private mineral 
rights ownership has been crucial in driving development in the United States (Wang and Krupnick, 2013). 
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kilometers of an unconventional drill site. They also find that drilling can have a small 
positive impact on property sale prices in public water supply areas. Delgado et al. (2016) 
use data from Northeastern Pennsylvania and find no robust impact of nearby drilling. 
Boslett et al. (2016) examine the impact of the New York State moratorium on 
unconventional drilling and find New York properties most likely to be impacted by 
shale gas development declined 24% in value relative to comparable Pennsylvania 
properties after the moratorium. They interpret this finding as a positive expected value 
of shale gas development. Weber and Hitaj (2015) find evidence of appreciation in farm 
property values in both Pennsylvania and Texas, especially during leasing periods. 
Importantly, their estimates are attenuated in areas with significant mineral severance. In 
Colorado, Bennett and Loomis (2015) find mixed results that are often not statistically 
significant. Also in Colorado, James and James (2015) find that a one kilometer decrease 
in distance away from an unconventional well is associated with a 7 to 20% decrease in 
sale price. However, this effect can be mitigated if the property is above a horizontal well 
lateral, which suggests royalty payments from leasing are capitalized into prices. Using 
zip code level aggregate data from Texas, Weber et al. (2016) find evidence of both 
appreciation and depreciation due to shale development.  There remain large variations in 
estimates of shale gas development on property prices without sufficient explanation. 
One potential reason for the contrasting results is that mineral right ownership is 
not accounted for explicitly in these studies. Mineral ownership is important because it 
firmly demarcates property owners who financially benefits from unconventional gas 
development versus those who do not.  Without mineral ownership information, it is not 
known whether the recovered valuation is a net impact of financial positives and 
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environment/health negatives, purely the negatives, or a weighted average of the two. In 
Pennsylvania, which is the focus of several of the above studies, mineral right ownership 
varies substantially and systematically across the state. In Western Pennsylvania, where 
there is a legacy of energy extraction, mineral rights are more often severed from surface 
rights than in northeastern Pennsylvania, where energy extraction only started recently 
(Kelsey et al., 2012). The valuation studies focused on Eastern Pennsylvania estimate less 
negative (or even positive) impacts of shale gas.2 While the important distinction between 
private well water and public water properties has been identified by the existing hedonic 
valuation literature, the critical issue of mineral rights ownership has not been resolved. 
This has not been a lack of foresight or understanding by researchers of the importance of 
mineral ownership in how people are impacted by drilling. Rather, this information is 
extremely difficult for researchers to obtain.3  
In this paper, we resolve the issue of unknown mineral rights by exploiting a 
historical severance in mineral rights ownership, the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 
1916 (SRHA1916). Over the course of the 19th century, the United States expanded its 
boundaries through territorial acquisition, often exchanging land rights for homesteading 
starting with the Homestead Act of 1862. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, the federal 
                                                          
2 Consistent with this interpretation of the valuation results, homeowners that do not own mineral rights 
have an increased perception of environmental risk (Brasier et al., 2013) and frustration (Collins and 
Nkansah, 2015). 
3 Mineral right ownership information is held in county deeds offices and is not commonly included in 
property deeds. The chain of title can be unclear, especially when the mineral estate was historically 
separated from the surface estate. One may need to go back to the original land grant to confirm the title of 
the mineral estate. Charting mineral rights ownership over time is the full-time job of a title abstractor 
(Wilson, 2014). Suffice it to say, it would be difficult for researchers to successfully obtain mineral rights 
ownership information for a large property transaction database. One of the authors of this study spent a 
day at Pennsylvania’s Bradford County’s Register and Recorder office researching mineral rights transfers 
and can attest to this. See Table 1A in the Appendix on a review of the previous literature and how each 
paper contextualized the issue of mineral rights ownership. 
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government recognized both the increasing value of energy for economic growth and the 
government’s inability to properly identify “mineral” lands, which they kept in federal 
ownership, and “nonmineral” lands, which they disbursed for homesteading. In response, 
the federal government passed the SRHA1916, which continued the tradition of land 
disbursement, but the federal government retained ownership of minerals in all land 
disbursed after 1916 (Gates, 1977; Harrison, 1989).  
To build our dataset of transactions, we identify residential properties in Colorado 
located on land originally distributed under the SRHA1916. Thus, the federal government 
owns the mineral rights for each of these properties and current residents do not benefit 
financially from lease and royalty payments. Our study area is on the western slope of 
Colorado, centered in Garfield, Mesa, and Rio Blanco counties. Western Colorado was 
one of the major areas of post-1916 homesteading and this region is one of the primary 
locations of unconventional oil and gas development in the state.  
Our hedonic analysis suggests that houses within one mile of an unconventional 
drill site sell for 34.8% less than comparable properties without proximate drilling. This 
result is robust across various subsets of the data and alternative regression specifications, 
including a repeat sales model and a matching model. When multiplied by the average 
house price of $183,300, this discount translates to a price reduction of $63,788, which 
equals $3,952 when annualized by a 30-year mortgage and a 5% interest rate. We 
interpret this price difference as the household valuation of the external environmental 
and health costs associated with proximity to unconventional oil and gas development.  
Our findings corroborate the negative valuations found in other papers, but are 
much larger – 60% larger in magnitude than the largest existing negative estimate. This 
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disparity demonstrates the importance of understanding mineral rights, as financial 
benefits of drilling are capitalized into housing prices and can adulterate estimates of 
external costs. Supporting this conclusion, we also estimate hedonic models using 
Western Colorado properties with unknown mineral rights ownership, mirroring the setup 
of prior studies, and find much smaller and statistically insignificant impacts of 
proximity.    
Our paper is structured as follows. We start in Section 2 with a conceptual 
framework that discusses the issue of mineral rights ownership in valuation of 
unconventional oil and gas development. In Section 3, we outline the history of 
SRHA1916. In Section 4, we discuss our data set and how we obtained it. We then follow 
with a discussion our methodological approach and the assumptions we use in our 
interpretation of our model results. In Section 5, we present our results, and Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
 
In this section, we outline the potential biases in hedonic valuation of 
unconventional oil and gas development. The net benefits and costs of oil and gas 
development vary across mineral estate classifications. Only residential properties that 
are unified with their property’s mineral estate can receive direct financial benefits, such 
as a lease signing bonus and production-based royalties. However, all properties receive 
the environmental costs of nearby oil and gas development. Previous hedonic valuation 
work has not incorporated the ownership of mineral rights into valuation frameworks due 
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to the lack of data. Thus, these studies have typically contextualized their estimates as net 
valuations of local oil and gas development. 4  
We define the price of property i as )(iP , a function of environmental 
characteristics
iE , the financial benefits of oil and gas development iF , and structural 
characteristics. The environmental quality of the property is influenced by the presence of 
local oil and gas development, 
iD . These impacts could be associated with diminished 
water quality, air quality, forest and habitat fragmentation, or visual or noise 
disamenities. Additionally, the financial benefits of owning the property are impacted by 
the presence of local oil and gas development,
iD .  
In this framework, mineral ownership is defined as a binary variable,
iM , equal to 
1 if the property’s surface estate is connected with its mineral estate and equal to 0 
otherwise. The net valuation of unconventional oil and gas development for property i 
can be decomposed as follows:  
(1) 
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
D
F
F
P
M
D
E
E
P
Valuation











  
Thus, the valuation of development, as capitalized by housing prices, is a net valuation of 
the environmental impacts of development (first term) and the financial benefits of 
development, contingent on ownership of the property’s mineral estate (second term). For 
the sake of simplicity, we re-write the equation as: 
(2) BMCValuation ii  , 
                                                          
4 Muehlenbachs et al. (2015) note that their estimate of the adjacency effect is an overall effect of the 
financial benefits of nearby drilling minus its environmental costs, while Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber 
(2014) remark that their negative valuations are likely understated due to the fact that they cannot control 
for the potential benefits of mineral leasing.   
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where C and B refer to the true values of the capitalization of the financial benefits and 
environmental costs (Table 1). If a property has mineral rights, then the estimated 
valuation will be the net impact, BC  . However, if a property is a split estate, then the 
estimated valuation will be the external costs of being proximate to drilling.  
In order for researchers to estimate valuation with real data, a residential property 
market level analysis is required. We define   as the proportion of properties unified with 
their minerals. Using the terminology from Table 1, we have: 
(3)  )1()(   CBCValuationEstimated  
The estimated valuation is conditional on the proportion of treated properties with 
mineral rights, which is unknown to the researcher. Knowing either BC   or C  is useful 
for understanding local impacts and for guiding policy. But a weighted average of the 
two with an unknown weight yields imprecise guidance.   
In this paper, we take advantage of the historical split in mineral rights from 
surface rights caused by SRHA1916, which is detailed in the next section. Thus, in our 
sample,   = 0 and we can isolate the negative environmental costs, C, from the financial 
benefits of development.  This framework assumes there are no area level impacts of oil 
and gas development on properties which differ by mineral rights ownership, which 
would impact the estimate of proximity to wells.  This potential issue is easily addressed 
with information about mineral rights ownership over the entire population of sale, or 
restricting the sample to only those properties without mineral rights ownership, i.e.   = 
0, as we do in this study. 
 
3. The Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 
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In the late 1800s and early 1900s, the federal government passed a series of 
homestead acts that encouraged immigration and development in the western United 
States. The exact mandate varied across the acts; typically, settlers received 160-640 
acres in return for a promise of ranching, cropping, or timber management on the 
property (Bureau of Land Management, 2006).  
Early homestead acts apportioned both surface and subsurface rights to 
homesteaders. This was the case for the original Homestead Act of 1862, signed by 
President Abraham Lincoln after the separation of the Confederacy from the United 
States. These lands were selected for disbursement due to their perceived “nonmineral” 
character, as delineated by General Land Office’s entrymen and surveyors. All lands with 
mineral potential were retained by the federal government; however, demarcation was 
imperfect due to technology limitations (Leshy, 1987).  
Recognizing its limitations in mineral assessment, the federal government passed 
the SRHA1916. This policy effectively discontinued the mineral-nonmineral 
classification system (Harrison, 1989). Homesteading individuals were granted no more 
than a section of land for ranching and forage crop production, conditional on making 
permanent improvements on the land within three years of the entry date. However, the 
federal government would retain mineral ownership of all lands disbursed through the 
Stock-Raising Homestead Act:  
 
“That all entries made and patents issued under the provisions of this Act shall be 
subject to and contain a reservation to the United States of all coal and other 
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minerals in the lands so entered and patented, together with the right to prospect 
for, mine, and remove the same.”5  
 
In addition, homesteaders and other later surface right owners had to allow access 
to the land for subsurface exploration and production:  
 
“Any person who has acquired from the United States the coal or other mineral 
deposits in any such land, or the right to mine and remove the same, may reenter 
and occupy so much of the surface thereof as may be required for all purposes 
reasonably incident to the mining or removal of the coal or other minerals, first, 
upon securing the written consent or waiver the homestead entryman or patentee; 
second, upon payment of the damages to crops or other tangible improvements to 
the owner thereof…or, third, in lieu of either of the forgoing provisions, upon the 
execution of a good and sufficient bond…to secure the payment of such damages 
to the crops or tangible improvements of the entryman or owner.”6  
 
This condition precludes the surface owner from preventing mineral exploration. 
The intent of the act was to continue the practice of homesteading and agricultural 
development of the west without compromising the federal government’s interest in 
mineral exploration (Tanke and Putz, 1982). If the surface owner had the right to prevent 
production from the property, the mineral estate would have no value. More recent 
                                                          
5 The Statues at Large of the United States of America from December, 1915 to March, 1917. Session 2. 
Chapter 9. Section 9. Page 864. 
6 The Statues at Large of the United States of America from December, 1915 to March, 1917. Session 2. 
Chapter 9. Section 9. Page 864. 
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legislation has maintained surface use access for mineral rights interests while providing 
some limited protection to surface owners through accommodation doctrine. This 
principle allows only “reasonable” use of the surface by the mineral owner. The mineral 
owner may only access the surface if there are no other alternatives that could avoid 
interference with the present surface uses (Johnson, 1998). However, mineral rights 
dominance has largely been kept in place, as it is difficult for surface owners to prove 
that the use of the surface by the mineral owner is not reasonable (Kulander, 2013).  
On privately-owned lands with federal mineral ownership, the mineral lessee 
must make a “good faith effort” to secure surface owner consent to access the property 
(Bureau of Land Management, 2007). However, the surface estate owner is only entitled 
to compensation associated with damages to crops and agricultural-related improvements. 
Thus, in the context of shale gas extraction, a homeowner may be exposed to water 
contamination, air pollution, noise, and visual disamenities, but not be entitled to 
compensation.7  
The SRHA1916 led to a significant amount of private land with federal mineral 
ownership in the western United States. Out of approximately 300 million acres 
conveyed to private individuals through the various homesteading acts (Loomis, 2002), 
nearly 60 million acres have been split from their underlying subsurface estates as a result 
of the SRHA1916. In Colorado alone, these lands total 5.2 million acres. Figure 1 shows 
lands with federal mineral ownership across Colorado.  
In a split estate, the surface property owner cannot financially benefit from 
                                                          
7 If the mineral lessee cannot come to a surface use agreement with the land owner, the company must rely 
on a performance bond to indemnify against unforeseen damages to crops and agricultural improvements. 
However, this bond does not cover all damages that a surface owner may face from drilling. 
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drilling. This situation is common in areas of the country that have experienced historical 
energy development and mining (e.g., Kelsey et al., 2012; Pender et al., 2014; Railroad 
Commission of Texas, 2015). Surface ownership can be split from its mineral rights 
through the issuance of a severance deed, in which a private landowner sells the land but 
retains the minerals. This situation is analogous to mineral ownership law in other 
countries: private land owners neither control the course of oil and gas development, nor 
financially benefit from it. The mineral estate is essentially dominant, which means that 
the surface owner must allow access to the mineral owner for exploration.   
 
4. Empirical Setting and Data 
 
Colorado has a long history of oil and gas development. According to data from 
the U.S. Geological Survey (Biewick, 2008), most Colorado counties have experienced 
oil and gas exploration since the early 1900s. Some counties, especially those outside of 
the intermountain areas, have seen a large increase in oil and gas development since the 
1940s.  
More recently, the new technologies of horizontal drilling and hydraulic 
fracturing have been used for extraction in Colorado. According to Drillinginfo, over 
11,000 horizontal wells were drilled in Colorado between 2000 and 2014.  Figure 1 
displays the spatial distribution of this drilling. There are generally three drilling 
hotspots: northwestern Colorado, Weld County on Colorado’s Front Range, and La Plata 
and Montezuma counties in southwestern Colorado. Our study focuses on northwestern 
Colorado because there is extensive federal mineral ownership in this area. Bennett and 
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Loomis and (2015) and James and James (2016) examine impacts in Weld County, which 
is more densely populated, but has much less federal mineral ownership that 
northwestern Colorado. Montezuma County contains many tribal lands, which 
complicates analysis due to jurisdictional complexity of mineral development and policy 
(West, 1992). 
In this study, we use residential property transaction data from Garfield, Mesa, 
and Rio Blanco counties in western Colorado. We received this data from each county 
assessor’s office. All transactions in our analyses occurred from 2000 to the end of 2014. 
All transaction data contains property characteristic information including the number of 
bedrooms and bathrooms, living area, age of the property, and its classified property or 
land use. We include only those transactions that are defined as residential or agricultural 
with a residential building (N = 55,114). All mobile homes are dropped from the analyses 
(N = 2,819).8 The data allow us to observe multiple sales per property, not just the most 
recent. All transactions that had more than seven bedrooms were dropped out of concern 
that the properties were apartment buildings (N = 16).  
In order to focus on properties without mineral rights, we use the federal mineral 
ownership data from the Bureau of Land Management’s Colorado GIS office.9 We 
overlay federal oil and gas ownership data layers with parcel boundaries. We include 
properties in our final sample that are completely contained within the federal mineral 
ownership boundaries (N = 871).10 While this cuts 98% of the transactions in our 
                                                          
8  Results from our main models are robust to including mobile homes and are available in the online 
appendix.  
9 “Statewide Federal Mineral Ownership” data product.  
10 There were data scale and alignment issues between our parcel data and our mineral ownership data. As a 
result, our restriction is conservative. There are likely other properties that are severed from their oil and 
gas rights by the SRHA but are not fully within the federal mineral ownership extent. We test our results 
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database, this restriction is necessary to identify the subset of properties that do not 
benefit financially from nearby drilling. It is almost certain that some properties outside 
of the federal mineral ownership boundary do not own mineral rights, but it is unknown 
on a property basis. Thus, this is the sample that provides the best estimate of the external 
costs of local oil and gas development. As shown in the results section, our coefficient 
estimates change considerably when we include properties with unclear mineral rights 
ownership. Lastly, we cut all observations in the below the 5th and above the 95th 
percentile of the sale price distribution to remove the influence of outliers. Our final 
sample is 783 transactions.  
We received directional and horizontal well development data from Drillinginfo. 
In our three counties, there were 4,374 horizontal wells drilled from 2000 to 2014. Figure 
2 maps the distribution of these wells relative to federal mineral ownership. In ArcGIS, 
we calculate the distance to the closest well at the time of sale. In addition, we calculated 
additional spatial statistics associated with distance to the closest municipality (U.S. 
Census definition) and the percentage of the property in an agricultural use from the 
National Land Cover Dataset 2001 to use as control variables in our regression model.  
Table 2 provides summary statistics for our preferred sample of split estate 
properties, as well as the complete set of properties. Properties with federal mineral 
ownership are less expensive, relative to the population of properties. Split estate 
properties typically are less expensive, are larger in lot size, and have relatively less 
agricultural land. Interestingly, split estate properties are also more likely to have a 
                                                          
using less restrictive definitions of a split estate (i.e., 75 and 90% of property within federal mineral 
ownership boundary) and find robust results (available in the online appendix). 
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nearby horizontal well.11  
As discussed in the introduction, prior hedonic valuation papers have focused on 
differences in impacts between municipal water and private well water properties 
(Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber 2014, Muehlenbachs et al. 2015, Boslett et al. 2016). In 
Colorado, data does not exist on which properties have private vs. public water supply. 
However, our primary sample of split estate properties are typically outside of municipal 
boundaries, which is the best proxy for public water supply.12 Therefore, our estimates 
are applicable to households that face the risk of groundwater contamination and are 
comparable to studies that focus on private water properties.  
 
5. Methodology 
 
We use the hedonic price method to estimate the effect of drilling proximity on 
housing prices. Our basic specification is: 
(4)  isttsististist XWellp  
')ln( . 
istp  is the sale price of property i in spatial unit s in year t. Prices are adjusted to 2015 
levels using the Consumer Price Index. istWell  is a binary variable that indicates whether 
property i has an unconventional well within a given distance buffer at the time of sale. 
'
istX  is a vector of structural, locational, and environmental explanatory variables. s  are 
spatial fixed effects; we present specification using both county and census tract as the 
                                                          
11 This may suggest that there is a relationship between well development and mineral right severance, but 
that is beyond the scope of this paper.  
12 Phone conversation with Scott McGowan, GIS Coordinator with the Colorado Department of Public 
Health and Environment). 
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spatial unit. 
t  are year fixed effects. Collectively, these fixed effects control for 
unobserved price determinants across space and time. ist  is the error.  
  is our coefficient of interest and is interpreted as the impact of having an 
unconventional well within r miles of the property on residential sale prices. Since we are 
only analyzing properties with federal mineral ownership, it reflects the marginal value of 
the environmental costs of having an unconventional well within the given spatial buffer.  
Our goal is to define the radius r so that it captures the full spatial extent of 
negative externalities, but this is a priori unknown. Following Linden and Rockoff 
(2008) and more recently Muehlenbachs et al. (2015), we estimate a version of Equation 
(4) that includes a series of binary variables for different distance bands and seek to 
determine empirically at what distance the impact is statistically zero.  
Figure 3 graphically presents results of a model that regresses log sales price on 
half mile distance bandwidths out to two miles, as well as property characteristics, year 
fixed effects, and census tract fixed effects. Results suggest that parameter estimates for 
the 0-0.5 mile bin and 0.5-1 mile bin are negative and statistically significant. Coefficient 
estimates are statistically insignificant beyond one mile. This finding is robust across 
alternative distance bin classifications and similar to findings from Gopalakrishnan and 
Klaiber (2014) and Muehlenbachs et al. (2015), who use a one mile and a two kilometer 
buffer, respectively, in their analyses. The similarity in coefficient estimates between the 
0-0.5 mile and 0.5-1 mile bins is at first surprising because we would expect greater 
externalities closer to the drill sight. However, Figure 3 also displays the frequency of 
observations by distance and we see clustering of observations around 0.5 miles, which is 
why it is difficult to discern differential impacts less than and greater than 0.5 miles. 
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Going forward, we define r equal to one, and hence 
istWell is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
there was a well drilled within one mile of the property before its sale. 
 
5.1 Assumptions 
 
There are a number of assumptions needed to interpret our estimates as the 
valuation of the environmental costs of unconventional oil and gas development. First, 
we assume that the assignment to treatment – in this case, close proximity to a horizontal 
well – is exogenous. It is unlikely that split estate owners can strongly dictate whether 
drilling happens, as the surface owner cannot prevent the mineral estate owner from 
accessing subsurface resources. Impacted parties can protest the inclusion of a parcel in 
an oil and gas lease sale (Bureau of Land Management Regulation 43 CFR 3120.1-3), but 
we were unable to find any protests directly from homeowners in our three study 
counties.13 A potential concern is that early oil and gas development could influence the 
likelihood of severance. In our case, the likelihood of severance is not a concern because 
of our study area’s historical severance of mineral rights.  
Second, we assume that property buyers and sellers have full information about 
local drilling activity and its potential for environmental impact. This is reasonable given 
the scale of planning and land disturbance associated with well permitting and drilling 
(e.g., Moran et al., 2015) and significant local discussion regarding the impacts of drilling 
(e.g., Williams, 2008; Lustgarten, 2009; Harmon, 2014).  This region of Colorado has 
                                                          
13 There are examples of homeowners protesting the inclusion of a parcel in a 2012 lease sale in Delta 
County, outside of our study area. Most protests submitted to the Bureau of Land Management concerned 
environmental and social issues associated with drilling on publically-owned land, not split estate concerns 
on privately-owned land.  
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also been the primary site for multiple assessments of the health risks associated with 
unconventional development (e.g., Kassotis et al., 2013). As a result, home buyers are 
likely conscious of the potential benefits and costs of unconventional oil and gas 
development. 
Third, property buyers and sellers are informed of the property’s mineral right 
status and they understand its ramifications. There has been significant mineral 
development in western Colorado over the last century (Biewick, 2008). As a result, 
citizens are likely familiar with both oil and gas development and mineral ownership 
laws. The state legislature also passed a law in 2001 that required pre-transaction 
notification of the potential for a split estate (Garfield County Energy Advisory Board, 
2007). There has been much public discussion since 2000 regarding a law that would 
mandate disclosure of mineral severance prior to all real estate sales. Although this 
legislation has not been passed due to issues secondary to the disclosure requirement 
(Moreno, 2011), it has been a major point of policy discussion in the state legislature over 
the study’s time period. Additionally, federally-owned minerals were never disbursed 
with the land, so a title search is relatively quick and the information is publically 
accessible on the Bureau of Land Management’s website.  
Fourth, we assume that our estimates are not impacted by positive spillover 
effects of unconventional oil and gas development, including labor opportunities and 
improved public finances. Although these can be important benefits of local oil and gas 
development (e.g., Weber, 2012; Newell and Rami, 2015), these benefits are likely to be 
received at the regional level and are unlikely to be related to drilling adjacency or to 
mineral rights ownership.  
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Fifth, we assume that the financial benefits that a split estate owner can receive 
from local development are negligible. Landowners who do not own mineral rights are 
unable to receive lease or royalty payments from on-site production. However, 
landowners can receive compensation through a surface use agreement, which formally 
outlines where drilling and surface disturbances can happen on the property. Drilling 
companies must make a “good faith effort” to come to a surface use agreement with a 
landowner in a split estate situation. If the two parties are unable to come to an 
agreement, then the drilling company can rely on a performance bond (Bureau of Land 
Management, 2007). This alternative option does not cover all damages that a surface 
owner may face from drilling, such as contaminated drinking water, drilling-related 
noise, air pollution, and visual changes to the landscape. Additionally, performance 
bonds are typically meant to compensate for damages to cropland, but not pastureland 
(Fitzgerald, 2010). Since lands subject to SRHA1916 were originally intended for 
ranching and were deemed largely unsuitable for cropping, it is unlikely that property 
owners are reliant on a performance bond to indemnify them against damages related to 
drilling. It is more often than not that the surface owner will come to a surface use 
agreement with the drilling lessee (Hill and Rippley, 2004; BLM, 2006; Fitzgerald, 
2010). Anecdotal reports suggest that oil and gas developers have leverage in 
negotiations, as they can rely on a performance bond if they do not agree to the surface 
owner’s preferred terms (e.g., The Telluride Daily Planet, 2005; Powder River Basin 
Resource Council, 2010; Hancock, 2014). For these reasons, it is unlikely that the 
financial benefits accrued from signing a surface use agreement are significant.14  
                                                          
14 This was corroborated in an email conversation with Cameron Grant, a mineral law attorney (Lyons 
Gaddis Kahn Hall Jeffers Dworak & Grant, A Professional Corporation of Attorneys and Counselors). 
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5. Results 
 
5.1 Main Results 
 
In Table 3, we present results that estimate the parameters of Equation (4), 
defining 
istWell  as a binary variable equal to 1 if there was a well drilled within one mile 
of the property. We present four model specifications that sequentially add more control 
variables to the model. Column 1 only includes property and location variables (i.e., 
number of bedrooms, distance to closest municipality), Column 2 adds year fixed effects, 
Column 3 adds county fixed effects, and Column 4 replaces county fixed effects with 
census tract fixed effects. Across columns, the coefficient on proximity ranges from -
0.211 to -0.362 and is always statistically significant. The coefficient increases in 
magnitude substantially when year fixed effects are included, which is intuitive given that 
drilling (and hence treatment) is correlated with time. The coefficient is stable across 
Columns 2-4. Our preferred model is Column 4 that includes both year and tract fixed 
effects. This specification indicates that houses within one mile of an unconventional 
well sell for 34.8% less than houses further away, all else equal. This discount for 
proximity when multiplied by the average house price of $183,300 translates to price 
reduction of $63,788. Converting this into an annual impact using a 30-year mortgage 
and a 5% interest rate yields $3,952, which is our best estimate of the annual external 
impacts of unconventional oil and gas development. 
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5.2. Robustness checks 
 
In Table 4, we test for the robustness of this general result across alternative 
specifications and subsets of the data. In Column 1, we include an additional control 
variable, which is the number of vertical (conventional) oil and gas wells drilled within a 
mile of a property between 1980 and 1999. The concern is that past drilling is likely 
correlated with unconventional drilling, and thus if there is a negative impact on prices of 
past drilling, our estimates in Table 3 could be misattributing the variation from past 
drilling to current drilling. Since recent vertical well development may be an exploratory 
precursor to later horizontal well development, we use pre-2000 data to avoid potential 
endogeneity issues. In Column 2, we restrict our sample to only properties that are within 
20 miles of an eventual unconventional well site. One concern with our full sample used 
in Table 3 is that some observed sales are far from drilling and may be a poor control 
group. By restricting the spatial distance, we hope to mitigate any bias that results from 
distant control observations. Column 3 further restricts the sample to be within 10 miles 
of an eventual unconventional well site. In Column 4, we restrict observations to be 
within 2005 to 2014. No proximate drilling took place within one mile of any sample 
properties prior to 2005. In our full sample, these pre-2005 properties are purely control 
observations. If there are structural changes in the housing market not captured by year 
fixed effects, then these observations may not be a good control and our estimates may be 
biased. In Column 5, we exclude all observations that sold more than once over our time 
period. Although fifteen years is a long time, there may be unobservable differences in 
the price dynamics of properties that sold multiple times over the study’s period. In 
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Column 6, we estimate a repeat sales model and include only properties that sold more 
than once. Including property-level fixed effects better controls for unobservable property 
characteristics that could be correlated with proximity to drilling.  
The coefficient estimates across these six columns are largely consistent with the 
main results. Magnitudes range from -0.307 to -0.381 and all estimates are statistically 
significant. Table 4 indicates that our estimates of the effect of drilling with one mile of a 
residential property are largely robust to alternative specifications and subsets of the 
data.15  
 
5.3. Matching analysis 
 
In this section, we shift to a matching approach in order to better control for 
observable differences between our control and treatment groups (e.g., Abbot and 
Klaiber, 2013; Ghanem and Zhang, 2014; Ferraro et al., 2015). The main goal of 
matching is to avoid the issue of selection bias and to create valid treatment-control 
comparisons through pairing on observable covariates (e.g., Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2008; Angrist and Pischke, 2009). This occurs when the estimated relationship between 
treatment status and outcome is driven by inherent differences in covariate distributions 
between treatment and control groups.  
We use matching to further test the robustness of our regression model results. 
                                                          
15 In the Appendix, we provide additional robustness checks. In Tables 2A and 3A, we find qualitatively 
similar results when we define our treatment variable as the number of wells drilled within one mile of the 
property’s extent, or when we use a distance bin approach. At the suggestion of a reviewer, we estimate our 
models in levels, as opposed to logs, and find similar results (Table 3A). In line with the structure of Table 
4, we provide additional robustness check in Table 5A. All results from the Appendix support our main 
findings. 
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We first estimate a propensity score model of the probability of treatment as a function of 
property-specific variables:  
(5) ititit XWell  
'
 
where 
itWell is a dummy variable equal to 1 if property i has an unconventional well 
within r miles of the property. In this case,
'
itX  is a vector of structural and locational 
explanatory variables used in our regression models, along with the number of vertical oil 
and gas wells drilled within a mile of the property from 1980 to 1999, as in Column 1 of 
Table 4. Including year and tract fixed effects would be ideal to control for temporal price 
trends and spatial unobservables, but given our limited sample size these match criteria 
are infeasible.  
The propensity score is calculated using estimated coefficients from Equation (5). 
We then match treated observation to control observations using nearest neighbor 
matching with replacement. We match each treatment observation to its closest three 
control observations (3 -1 nearest neighbor matching). We apply a 0.05 caliper on the 
propensity score. Figure 4 provides the propensity score distributions for our control and 
treatment groups, pre versus post-matching, and shows that matching significantly 
reduces the difference between the distributions.16  
Table 5 presents estimates of the treatment effect for our matching models. In 
Column 1, we estimate the difference in means between our treated observations and our 
matched control observations. The estimated difference in log prices is -0.263 and is 
                                                          
16 Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), Sianesi (2004), and Kassie et al. (2011), we test the balancing 
between our matched treatment and control groups through mean standardized differences and the pseudo 
R² and likelihood ratio test of joint significance. We find that the mean standardized differences in our 
variables are reduced, our Pseudo-R² is reduced, and that the joint significance of the matching covariates is 
rejected, post-matching. These results are available in Table 8A in the Appendix. 
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statistically significant. In Columns 2-4, we use the matched sample to ensure covariate 
balance, but we return to a least squares framework to account for price dynamics and 
spatial unobservable variables. Control observations can be used more than once, so we 
weight each transaction proportional to the number of times it is used in the matching 
process using weighted least squares.17  
In Column 2, we control for the estimated propensity score in our regression. The 
coefficient on proximity is -0.241, quite similar to the matching estimate. In Column 3, 
we add year fixed effects. The coefficient here is -0.439, which is a substantial increase in 
magnitude over Columns 1-2. Adding year fixed effects had a similar impact on 
coefficient magnitude in Table 3. In Column 4, we lastly add tract fixed effects and the 
resulting coefficient is -0.353, nearly identical to the main results in Table 3. In 
conclusion, our matching model improves the similarity of our treated and control 
observations, but results are similar to the regression models.  
 
5.4. The effect of proximity when mineral rights ownership is unknown 
 
We now seek to understand how valuation estimates change when mineral rights 
ownership is unknown, as is the case in all prior papers in this literature. We now include 
properties that are not completely contained within the federal mineral ownership 
boundaries. It is uncertain whether the mineral rights are unified with the property or split 
and owned by another party. 
In Table 6, we estimate Equation (4) with our expanded sample (N = 47,073). 
                                                          
17 All transactions not matched to another observation are given zero weight. 
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Column 1 presents a specification identical to our preferred specification of Column 4 in 
Table 3, which includes property characteristics and year and tract fixed effects. The 
coefficient estimate is -0.057 and is statistically insignificant. This is substantially smaller 
in magnitude than estimates using only split estate properties. We interpret the disparity 
in coefficients as resulting from inclusion of properties that are tied to mineral rights and 
thus are able to financially benefit from nearby drilling, which offsets the negative 
impacts. However, we are unable to recover a comparison of benefits and costs using 
these estimates because the distribution of mineral estate ownership is unobserved.  
The second column in Table 6 estimates separate proximity effects for properties 
with federal mineral ownership (our main sample) and properties without federal mineral 
ownership. Federal mineral ownership is a binary variable equal to 1 if the property is 
completely contained within the federal mineral ownership boundaries. The estimated 
impact for properties with unknown mineral ownership is -0.031, similar to Column 1. 
The coefficient on the interaction between the indicator for within one mile and federal 
mineral ownership is -0.318, similar to the main result in Table 3. Further, the interaction 
coefficient and is statistically significant meaning that the impact of proximity is 
statistically different for properties without mineral rights than properties with unknown 
mineral rights, and these are all properties in the same three counties.18 
                                                          
18 We again estimate similar models using count and distance bin-based treatment variables. These results 
are available in the Appendix. In Table A6, our results suggest that the impact of nearby unconventional oil 
and gas development on housing prices is statistically significant and negative. We estimate that each well 
drilled within a mile decreases sale price by -0.7 to -0.2%. This is a significant attenuation relative to 
properties split from their mineral rights by the federal government, where we find a much higher estimate 
of -2.0%. In Table A7, we find that the effects of development within different spatial rings around the 
property varies across models. We generally find negative effects within two miles of development, though 
they are only strong and statistically significant when using county fixed effects. When using our preferred 
model with census tract fixed effects, our results indicate that having a well within one mile of the property 
reduces sale price by -4.3%.   
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6. Conclusion 
 
We seek to quantify the negative externalities associated with unconventional 
extraction of oil and gas using hedonic valuation of residential properties. We exploit the 
Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 to identify properties that do not have mineral 
rights, and thus cannot benefit financially from lease payments or royalties to isolate the 
external costs of unconventional oil and gas development. This approach resolves a 
significant issue in the valuation of unconventional oil and gas development, which has 
caused uncertainty in the interpretation of estimates from previous studies.  
The results of our hedonic analysis suggest that houses within one mile of an 
unconventional drill site sell for 34.8% less than comparable properties without 
proximate drilling. This discount translates to a price reduction of $63,788, which equals 
$3,952 when annualized by a 30-year mortgage and a 5% interest rate. We interpret this 
price difference as the household valuation of the external environmental and health costs 
associated with proximity to unconventional oil and gas development. Further, our 
findings are 60% larger in magnitude than the largest existing negative estimate. While 
there are differences across study areas and identification strategies across studies, we 
interpret the disparity resulting from our studies ability to identify split estate properties.  
The results of this paper can inform how the United States and other countries 
proceed with energy development. The suite of energy options available to consumers 
have benefits and costs that are received at global, regional, and local levels. Our 
estimates of the local external costs of unconventional oil and gas development should be 
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considered with respect to those incurred from other forms of energy production, 
including coal-fired power plants (Davis, 2011), wind turbines (Lang et al., 2014; 
Gibbons, 2015), and nuclear power facilities (Gawande et al., 2013).   
For those states that allow local regulation of oil and gas development, optimal 
local policy responses to unconventional oil and gas development should consider these 
results alongside others which find positive valuations of development (Boslett et al., 
2016).  Mineral rights ownership is clearly important to valuation of local energy 
development.  Policy-makers should account for mineral rights in policy development.  
They can then take measures to further support or regulate development (e.g., Zirogiannis 
et al., 2015) as a function of the level of local ownership of the minerals.  
Our findings are relevant and applicable to a broader geographic area than 
Colorado.  Prior hedonic valuation research provides great insight on local valuation of 
unconventional oil and gas development, especially on its perceived water quality risks. 
However, external validity outside of the United States is limited in these studies because 
private citizens in European and many other countries do not own subsurface minerals. 
Our study may provide a better metric for external costs of unconventional oil and gas 
exploration in these cases because it accounts for the critically important issue of mineral 
rights ownership.   
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Tables & Figures 
 
Table 1: Financial benefits and environmental costs of oil and gas development, 
differentiated by mineral estate ownership classification 
 Environmental Costs Financial Benefits Valuation 
Unified 
)1( iM  
C  B  BC   
Split )0( iM  C  0 C  
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
 Properties with Federal 
Mineral Ownership 
 
All Properties 
  
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Mean Std. Dev. 
  
      
Sale price ($000s) 183.3 81.4  250.6 109.9 
Lot size (acres) 6.4 26.7  1.4 8.0 
Property age (years) 17.8 16.4  18.3 24.1 
Bedrooms 3.0 0.7  3.2 0.7 
Bathrooms 2.0 0.6  2.0 0.6 
Living area (000s of sq. feet) 1.6 0.7  1.8 0.7 
Distance to municipality (in miles) 1.8 3.4  0.5 1.5 
% agricultural 3.0 14.4  7.4 23.3 
# of vertical wells < 1 mile 0.9 1.1  0.1 0.6 
      
% of properties with horizontal wells    
< 1 mile 12.5   2.2  
< 2 miles 34.6   7.4  
< 3 miles 38.2   10.6  
      
# of Observations 783     47,033   
Notes: We received residential property transaction, structural, and parcel data from Garfield, 
Mesa, and Rio Blanco county assessment and geographic information systems (GIS) offices. We 
received location data for all horizontal wells drilled from 2000 to 2015 and all vertical wells 
drilled from 1980 to 1999 in Colorado from Drillinginfo. We calculated the percentage of each 
property in an agricultural use using National Land Cover Dataset 2001 data. We calculated the 
distance to the closest municipality using U.S. Census Bureau TIGER data from 2010.  
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Table 3: The effect of unconventional development on residential properties with 
federal mineral ownership 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
= 1 if Wells < 1 Miles 
-0.211*** -0.343*** -0.362*** -0.348*** 
(0.033) (0.025) (0.064) (0.059) 
     
R-Squared 0.397 0.499 0.513 0.547 
Property & Location Vars. Y Y Y Y 
Year F.E. N Y Y Y 
County F.E. N N Y N 
Track F.E. N N N Y 
Notes: Observations represent single family residential properties sold from 2000 to 
early 2015 in Garfield, Mesa, and Rio Blanco counties (N = 783). We truncate the data 
set to exclude the 5 and 95 percentiles of sale price. The dependent variable is the 
natural log of sale price (CPI-adjusted to 2014 values). Property variables include 
quadratics of # of bedrooms and bathrooms, parcel acreage, property finished living 
area, and property age. Location variables include quadratics of distance to the closest 
municipality and the percentage of the property in an agricultural use. Census tracts 
are based on U.S. Census 2010 boundaries. Standard errors are shown in parentheses 
and are estimated using tract-level cluster-robust inference: *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Robustness checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Vertical 
well 
control 
Well Distance 
Restriction 
2005 - 
2014 
Sold 
Once 
Repeat 
Sales 
  20 miles 10 miles 
       
= 1 if Wells < 1 
Miles 
-0.348*** -0.350*** -0.333*** -0.308*** -0.307*** 
-
0.381*** 
(0.060) (0.064) (0.067) (0.072) (0.083) (0.101) 
       
# of Observations 783 771 616 523 241 545 
R-Squared 0.560 0.551 0.539 0.551 0.609 0.799 
Property & Location 
Vars. Y Y Y Y Y N 
Year F.E. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Tract F.E. Y Y Y Y Y N 
Notes: In Model 1, we include a control for the # of vertical oil and gas wells drilled from 1980 to 
1999. In Models 2 and 3, we restrict our analyses to only those observations that are within 20 and 
10 miles, respectively, of a well drilled pre or post-sale. In Model 4, we restrict our analysis to only 
those observations sold from 2005 to 2014. In Model 5, we only include those observations that 
were sold once between 2000 and 2015. In Model 6, we use a panel approach and only use those 
properties that were sold more than once from 2000 to 2015. We use property-level and year fixed 
effects. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using tract-level cluster-robust 
inference: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 5: The effect of unconventional development on split estate properties using 
matching techniques 
 Nearest Neighbor 
Matching 
 
Weighted Regression 
  
 
(3 - 1) 
 
Only P.S. + Year FE 
+ Property 
Variables   
  (1)   (2) (3) (4) 
      
= 1 if Wells < 1 
Miles 
-0.263***  -0.241*** -0.439*** -0.353** 
(0.051)  (0.049) (0.057) (0.137) 
      
R-Squared     0.074 0.410 0.618 
Notes: In Columns 1, we use nearest neighbor matching (3 - 1) and match on the # of 
bedrooms and bathrooms, living area, property age, and acreage, as well as the distance to 
the closest municipality, the percentage of the property in an agricultural use, and the 
number of vertical wells drilled within a mile from 1980 to 1999. We match with 
replacement and with a caliper of 0.05. In Column 2 through 4, we use our treatment 
observations and matched control observations from our Nearest Neighbor matching in 
Column 1 and estimate weighted regression models (in line with Equation 1 and Table 3). 
We weight based on the number of times each control observation was matched to a 
treatment observation. In Column 2, we only control for the estimated propensity score. In 
Column 3, we add year fixed effects. In Column 4, we add the structural and locational 
variables defined above. Census tracts are based on U.S. Census 2010 boundaries. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using tract-level cluster-robust 
inference: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 6: The effect of unconventional development on all residential properties 
(N = 47,139), binary treatment 
  (1) (2) 
   
= 1 if Wells < 1 Miles 
-0.057 -0.031 
(0.054) (0.051) 
   
Federal Mineral Ownership 
 0.054 
 (0.065) 
   
Wells < 1 Miles * Federal Mineral 
Ownership  
 -0.318*** 
 (0.080) 
   
R-Squared 0.446 0.447 
Property & Location Vars. Y Y 
Year F.E. Y Y 
Track F.E. Y Y 
Notes: Observations represent single family residential properties sold from 
2000 to early 2015 in Garfield, Mesa, and Rio Blanco counties. We truncate 
the data set to exclude the 5 and 95 percentiles of sale price. The dependent 
variable is the natural log of sale price (CPI-adjusted to 2014 values). Property 
variables include quadratics of the # of bedrooms and bathrooms, parcel 
acreage, property finished living area, and property age. Location variables 
include quadratics of distance to the closest municipality and the percentage of 
the property in an agricultural use. Federal Mineral Ownership is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the property is completely within the boundaries of 
federal mineral ownership. Census tracts are based on U.S. Census 2010 
boundaries. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using 
tract-level cluster-robust inference: *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1: Map of unconventional oil and gas development in Colorado 
 
Notes: Unconventional well location data was provided by Drillinginfo. Data on federal 
mineral ownership is from the Bureau of Land Management Colorado’s GIS department.  
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Figure 2: Map of Western Colorado 
 
Notes: Unconventional well location data was provided by Drillinginfo. Data on federal 
ownership of oil and gas is from the Bureau of Land Management Colorado’s GIS 
department. We created our private lands estate classifications using federal mineral 
ownership and statewide surface ownership data. Unknown Mineral Ownership is the 
intersection between “Private” surface ownership and mineral ownership categories that 
do not include the federal ownership of the oil and gas estate, while Federal Mineral 
Ownership is the intersection between “Private” surface ownership and federal mineral 
ownership categories that do include the oil and gas estate. Properties indicated as 
Unknown Mineral Ownership may be split estate properties if the mineral rights were at 
one point severed due to alternative mechanism (e.g., a severance deed).  
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Figure 3: Distance bin parameter estimates and histogram of well distance 
 
  
 
Notes: In the LHS graph, we highlight parameter estimates for distance bins in line with 
Equation 4. We define our treatment variable as a bin variable (see Equation 5). Each 
estimate reflects the impact of the closest well from the property drilled within the 
distance bin range, relative to the omitted category of having the closest well drilled 
beyond two miles. In the RHS graph, we highlight the distribution of distance to closest 
unconventional well. We only include those wells that were drilled before the sale of the 
home.  
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Figure 4: Propensity score distributions for one mile treatment, pre versus post matching 
(Nearest Neighbor 3 – 1) 
 
Notes: These graphs highlight the difference in propensity score distribution, pre versus 
post-matching. Variables included in the propensity score estimation include the # of 
bedrooms and bathrooms, parcel acreage, property finished living area, property age, 
distance to the closest municipality, the percentage of the property in an agricultural use, 
and the number of vertical oil and gas wells drilled within a mile from 1980 to 1999. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
K
e
rn
e
l 
D
e
n
s
it
y
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Treated Control
Propensity Score Distribution
Pre-Matching
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Treated Control
Propensity Score Distribution
Post-Matching
120 
 
Appendix 
 
This Appendix provides information that is supplementary but not critical, to the 
analyses that included in the main paper.  
Table 1A includes a brief literature review of the literature on hedonic valuation 
of unconventional oil and gas development. In this review, we focus on how mineral 
rights ownership was discussed in each of the papers, especially in respect to how it 
influenced their valuation. We do not summarize the results contained within each of 
studies. The literature is discussed in greater detail in the main paper and all References 
made in the table are listed in the Works Cited. 
Table 2A provides a more comprehensive list of our parameter estimates in our 
main specifications from Table 3 in the main text. The signs on the variables generally 
match our expectations. Property price increases in acreage and living area but with 
diminishing returns. Older houses sell for a discount. Property price decreases in the 
number of bedrooms and bathrooms. This is unexpected, but this is not a concern given 
correlation between both variables and living area. We generally find that property price 
decreases as one moves further away from municipalities, though at a diminishing rate. 
This is somewhat expected given the amenities associated with living in or near towns.  
In Table 3A, we define treatment as the number of wells drilled within 1 mile. 
The structure of the table is similar to that of Table 3 in the main paper. We find 
qualitatively similar results when using this alternative treatment definition. Each well 
drilled within a mile is associated with a decrease in sale price of 2%.  
At the advice of an informal reviewer, we estimate Equation 4 in levels instead of 
logs in Table 4A. We again find qualitatively similar results. In our preferred 
121 
 
specification in Column 4, we estimate that having an unconventional well within a mile 
of a property decreases sale price by $52,000. This is similar to an analogous estimate 
using the mean sale price in our study area and our estimate from Table 3, Column 4.  
In Table 5A, we test for the robustness of our results in Table 3 of the main paper 
across a number of additional models. In Column 1, we include only those properties that 
are within three miles of a well drilled from 1980 to 1999. This model tests whether or 
not our treatment effect estimates are associated with differing levels of historical oil and 
gas development. In Columns 2 and 3, we relax our definition of a split estate – those 
properties with federal mineral ownership – to allow properties with 90% and 75% 
coverage, respectively, within federal mineral ownership boundaries. In Columns 4 and 
5, we use alternative well distance restrictions to our 20 and 10 mile distances used in 
Columns 2 and 3 from our robustness table in the main text. In Column 6, we cut 
observations below the 5% and above the 95% distribution in acreage. We do this to 
avoid the influence of outlying observations based on property size. Lastly, in Column 7, 
we include mobile homes while also controlling for them using a binary indicator. 
Our results from our additional models suggest that our results are robust. Our 
results are similar when we relax our definition of the split estate. Although these 
definitions are still restrictive and are likely including observations with federal mineral 
ownership, they suggest that we could increase our sample size and still obtain similar 
results. Our results are also similar to our main results when we use alternative 
restrictions based on distance to the closest well and when we cut outlying observations 
by acreage. 
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In Table 6A, we provide a brief summary of pre and post-matching statistics from 
Table 5 in the main text. Mean standardized differences in the matching covariates are 
reduced. Also, the Pseudo-R² is reduced and the p-value of the likelihood ratio test of 
joint significance of the matching covariates is significantly higher, post-matching. These 
results suggest that there are no differences in observed characteristics between control 
and treatment observations, post-matching.  
In Table 7A, we use our full sample in line with Table 6 in the main text. Instead 
of only including properties with federal mineral ownership, we now include properties 
with unknown mineral ownership. However, we now define treatment as the number of 
unconventional wells drilled within a mile of the property. In Column 1, we find that 
each well within a mile is associated with a 0.3% decrease in property sale price. This 
effect is not significant and is much smaller than the estimates found in Table 2A (1.7 to 
2.0%). In Column 2, we differentiate the effect of well development by whether or not 
the property is within federal mineral ownership boundaries. We find that the effect of 
well development is much larger for those properties with federal mineral ownership (-
1.6%). For those properties with unknown mineral ownership, the effect is close to zero 
and insignificant. These findings support those from Table 6 in the main text. Since those 
properties with unknown mineral ownership are likely to include properties with unified 
mineral rights, our treatment effect for these properties is likely to be a net effect of 
financial benefits and external costs of development.  
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Table 1A: Mineral rights ownership in the previous literature on unconventional oil and gas 
development 
Authors and Year Study Area Mineral Rights 
Gopalakrishnan and 
Klaiber (2014) 
Washington County, 
Pennsylvania 
Argue that their estimated valuation of the 
environmental costs is a lower bound due to the 
inclusion of properties with mineral rights 
ownership. Highlight the need for future work to 
differentiate the impacts of development on 
homebuyers by mineral rights ownership. 
Muehlenbachs et al. 
(2015) 
New York & 
Pennsylvania 
Note that their estimated valuation does not 
capture positive impacts of development on 
nearby property prices if properties that are close 
to development are split from their mineral rights 
Delgado et al. (2015) 
Northeastern 
Pennsylvania 
Argue that their estimated valuations capture both 
the positive effects and negative effects of 
development due to their choice in study area, 
which may have less severance.  
James and James 
(2015) 
Weld County, Colorado 
Argue that their identification strategy avoids the 
mineral rights issue by controlling for both 
distance to the closest well and whether or not the 
property overlays the well's horizontal lateral 
Bennett and Loomis 
(2015) 
Weld County, Colorado 
Argue that some of their estimated positive 
impacts are due to the potential that properties 
near wells are more likely to own their minerals 
Boslett et al. (2016) 
Border of New York & 
Pennsylvania 
State that their study is recovering a net valuation 
of development due to relatively high mineral 
ownership by landowners in the study region 
Weber and Hitaj 
(2015) 
Pennsylvania and Texas 
Argue that the larger appreciation in farmland 
values found in Pennsylvania are likely associated 
with greater mineral rights ownership in the state 
relative to Texas 
Weber et al. (2016) 
Dallas & Forth Worth, 
Texas 
Note that there is relatively low local ownership 
of mineral rights in the study area, which suggests 
that the estimated appreciation in housing prices 
after development is likely due to the expansion of 
the tax base (rather than expected financial 
benefits of drilling) 
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Table 2A: Comprehensive results of our models from Table 3 in the main text 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
= 1 if Wells < 1 Miles 
-0.211*** -0.343*** -0.362*** -0.348*** 
(0.033) (0.025) (0.064) (0.059) 
     
Beds 
-0.143 -0.129 -0.152 -0.104 
(0.107) (0.135) (0.146) (0.119) 
     
Beds * Beds 
0.019 0.013 0.018 0.011 
(0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.016) 
     
Baths 
-0.023 -0.070 -0.083 -0.084 
(0.208) (0.138) (0.130) (0.117) 
     
Baths * Baths 
0.024 0.034 0.041* 0.042** 
(0.035) (0.023) (0.021) (0.018) 
     
Age 
-0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
     
Age * Age 
-3.00e-05 -3.56e-05 -3.70e-05 -5.38e-05 
(5.95e-05) (5.71e-05) (5.61e-05) (5.58e-05) 
     
LivingArea 
0.073*** 0.074*** 0.070*** 0.065*** 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) 
     
LivingArea * LivingArea 
-1.12e-
05*** 
-1.12e-
05*** 
-1.06e-
05*** 
-9.99e-
06*** 
(1.12e-06) (1.41e-06) (1.51e-06) (1.92e-06) 
     
Acres 
0.005* 0.006* 0.004 0.002 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
     
Acres * Acres 
-2.11e-
05*** 
-2.25e-
05*** -1.77e-05* -1.12e-05 
(6.31e-06) (6.70e-06) (8.03e-06) (1.13e-05) 
     
Municipality 
0.0009 0.001 -0.040* -0.097*** 
(0.014) (0.008) (0.021) (0.026) 
     
Municipality * 
Municipality 
0.0006 0.0004 0.002** 0.005*** 
(0.001) (0.0007) (0.001) (0.0009) 
     
Agr % 
-0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
     
Agr % & Agr % 
0.005 0.005 0.006 0.009 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
     
R-Squared 0.397 0.499 0.513 0.547 
Property & Location Vars. Y Y Y Y 
Year F.E. N Y Y Y 
County F.E. N N Y N 
Track F.E. N N N Y 
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Notes: Notes: This table displays coefficient estimates from our control variables in our 
models highlighted in Table 3. Beds is the number of bedrooms in the property's house. 
Baths is the number of bathrooms in the property's house. LivingArea is the square 
footage of finished area in the property (in 00s). Acres is the property's acreage. Age is 
the property's age (years). Municipality is the distance to closest municipality (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2010). Agr % is the percentage of the property in an agricultural use 
(National Land Cover Dataset 2001).  
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Table 3A: The effect of unconventional development on the residential 
properties with federal mineral ownership, count treatment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
# of Wells < 1 Miles 
-0.017*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
(0.0009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
     
R-Squared 0.455 0.535 0.545 0.583 
Property & Location Vars. Y Y Y Y 
Year F.E. N Y Y Y 
County F.E. N N Y N 
Track F.E. N N N Y 
Notes: Observations represent single family residential properties sold from 
2000 to early 2015 in Garfield, Mesa, and Rio Blanco counties (N = 783). We 
truncate the data set to exclude the 5 and 95 percentiles of sale price. The 
dependent variable is the natural log of sale price (CPI-adjusted to 2014 values). 
Property variables include quadratics of # of bedrooms and bathrooms, parcel 
acreage, property finished living area, and property age. Location variables 
include quadratics of distance to the closest municipality and the percentage of 
the property in an agricultural use. Census tracts are based on U.S. Census 2010 
boundaries. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using 
tract-level cluster-robust inference: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4A: The effect of unconventional development on the residential properties with 
federal mineral ownership in levels of sale price 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
= 1 if Wells < 1 Miles 
-27,531*** -53,853*** -54,272*** -52,290*** 
(6,890) (5,887) (12,977) (11,486) 
     
R-Squared 0.398 0.499 0.513 0.576 
Property & Location Vars. Y Y Y Y 
Year F.E. N Y Y Y 
County F.E. N N Y N 
Track F.E. N N N Y 
Notes: Observations represent single family residential properties sold from 2000 to 
early 2015 in Garfield, Mesa, and Rio Blanco counties. We truncate the data set to 
exclude the 5 and 95 percentiles of sale price. The dependent variable is sale price 
(CPI-adjusted to 2014 values). Property variables include quadratics of # of bedrooms 
and bathrooms, parcel acreage, property finished living area, and property age. 
Location variables include quadratics of distance to the closest municipality and the 
percentage of the property in an agricultural use. Census tracts are based on U.S. 
Census 2010 boundaries. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated 
using tract-level cluster-robust inference: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5A: Additional robustness checks 
 (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Vert. Well 
Restriction 
Split Estate Definition   
Well Distance 
Restriction Acres Cut 
+ Mobile 
Homes 
  > 90% > 75%   15 miles 5 miles 
         
= 1 if Wells < 1 
Miles 
-0.347* -0.363*** -0.352***  -0.351*** -0.325** -0.382*** -0.354*** 
(0.116) (0.062) (0.069)  (0.068) (0.101) (0.084) (0.064) 
         
# of observations 558 860 882  701 589 703 804 
R-Squared 0.561 0.528 0.521   0.522 0.540 0.579 0.563 
Property & 
Location Vars. Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Year F.E. Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Tract F.E. Y Y Y   Y Y Y Y 
Notes: In this table, we provide additional robustness checks to those shown in Table 3. In Column 1, we restrict our 
sample to only include those observations that are in historic oil and gas drilling areas, measured by being within a 
distance of 3 miles to the closest vertical well drilled from 1980 to 1999. In Columns 2 and 3, we ease the split 
definition to include those properties that have 90% and 75%, respectively, of their acreage within the federal 
mineral ownership boundaries. In Columns 4 and 5, we restrict our observations to those within 15 and 5 miles, 
respectively, of a pre or post-sale horizontal well. In Column 6, we cut off the 5% tails of the acreage distribution. In 
Column 7, we include mobile homes and control for this type of property with a binary indicator. Standard errors are 
shown in parentheses and are estimated using tract-level cluster-robust inference: *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6A: Pre and post-matching statistics 
  Pre-Matching Post-Matching 
Mean Normalized Bias 23.2 5.4 
Pseudo R² 0.094 0.021 
Likelihood Ratio Test P-Value < 0.001 0.756 
Notes: We used Nearest Neighbor Matching (3 - 1) with replacement a 0.05 caliper. We 
matched on the # of bedrooms and bathrooms, living area, property age, distance to 
municipality, percentage of the property in an agricultural use, and the number of vertical wells 
drilled within a mile from 1980 to 1999. 
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Table 7A: The effect of unconventional development on all residential properties 
(N = 47,139), continuous treatment 
  (1) (2) 
   
# of Wells < 1 Miles 
-0.003 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) 
   
Federal Mineral Ownership 
 0.048 
 (0.063) 
   
# of Wells < 1 Miles * Federal Mineral 
Ownership  
 -0.016*** 
 (0.002 
   
R-Squared 0.446 0.447 
Property & Location Vars. Y Y 
Year F.E. Y Y 
Track F.E. Y Y 
Notes: Observations represent single family residential properties sold from 2000 
to early 2015 in Garfield, Mesa, and Rio Blanco counties. We truncate the data 
set to exclude the 5 and 95 percentiles of sale price. The dependent variable is the 
natural log of sale price (CPI-adjusted to 2014 values). Property variables include 
quadratics of the # of bedrooms and bathrooms, parcel acreage, property finished 
living area, and property age. Location variables include quadratics of distance to 
the closest municipality and the percentage of the property in an agricultural use. 
Federal Mineral Ownership is a binary variable equal to 1 if the property is within 
the boundaries of federal mineral ownership. Census tracts are based on U.S. 
Census 2010 boundaries. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are 
estimated using tract-level cluster-robust inference: *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
  
131 
 
Figure 1A: Close-up view of unconventional well development in southern Garfield 
County and northwestern Mesa County 
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Abstract 
 
Silica sand mining has increased significantly since the beginning of the boom in 
unconventional oil and gas development. This increase in mining has had economic, 
environmental, and socio-economic impacts on local citizens. Yet, there has only been 
limited work exploring these issues in the academic literature. In this study, I explore how 
residential property buyers value the benefits and external costs of silica sand mining in 
Wisconsin. To my knowledge, this is the first hedonic valuation of silica sand mining in 
the academic literature. Evidence suggest that silica sand mining can decrease residential 
property sale prices through viewshed and air quality impacts. These effects are 
economically and statistically significant. I estimate stronger effects for those properties 
that are subject to both viewshed impacts and air pollution from silica sand mining. I find 
additional evidence that properties that are not subject to viewshed and air quality impacts 
appreciate in value post-mining. This suggests that there is potential for post-mining 
appreciation, perhaps associated with expectations of leasing-derived benefits from future 
on-property mining or price premiums associated with property sales to mining companies.  
 
Keywords: silica sand mining; hydraulic fracturing; hedonic valuation; viewshed; air 
quality 
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1. Introduction 
The demand for silica sand has increased measurably since the beginning of the 
boom in unconventional oil and gas development. Silica sand is one of the key 
ingredients in hydraulic fracturing, a process that has spurred significant oil and gas 
production from previously inaccessible shale resources. This type of sand is the most 
often-used proppant in hydraulic fracturing. A proppant is injected to maintain the 
fractures created during hydraulic fracturing (Benson and Wilson 2015). Hydraulic 
fracturing can require over 450 tons of proppant per well (King 2016). Although sand 
mined in the Midwest United States has historically been used in a variety of 
applications, most often in glass-making, the proportion of sand purchased by the oil and 
gas industry has increased over time. It comes as no surprise that silica sand mining is 
increasingly known as ‘frac’ sand mining.  
Though the academic literature has explored many of the impacts of the 
unconventional oil and gas boom, there has been considerably fewer studies on local 
impacts associated with silica sand mining. These impacts can be both a blessing and a 
curse. In terms of positive impacts, the increase in demand for silica sand from the oil and 
gas industry has led to employment and income creation, a welcome boost for rural 
communities that have not recovered from the great recession (Prengaman 2012). Sand 
mining may also lead to growth in other sectors of the economy, including the rural rail 
economy (Davies 2012a). Local landowners and farmers may also receive significant 
signing bonuses and royalty payments from leasing their land to mining companies. 
Others have sold their land outright to mining companies for prices above and beyond 
assessed value (e.g., Davies 2012b; Lenker and Auch 2013; Dirr 2014; Mertens 2014).  
135 
 
Yet, these positive benefits are juxtaposed against environmental quality 
concerns. Despite its name, ‘frac’ sand mining involves no hydraulic fracturing and is 
instead extracted using surface mining techniques. This type of mining can take a 
significant toll on the landscape by leveling hills and causing habitat fragmentation. 
These mines can be very large; the average (maximum) size of permitted or operational 
frac sand mines in Wisconsin is 341 (4000) acres (Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources 2016). There are potential health concerns associated with increased local air 
pollution and ambient silica dust (e.g., Pierce 2011). Sand mines also use a significant 
amount of water and chemicals for sand processing (Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources 2012; Minnesota Department of Health 2014). This may lead to local water 
quality and quantity concerns for nearby farm owners and residents (Mundahl et al. 2014; 
Verburg 2014). Many stakeholder groups have petitioned silica sand mining over these 
environmental concerns (Pearson 2013) and some towns have passed short-term 
moratoria on silica sand mining (Kennedy 2013).  
The focus of this paper is on the residential property market in western 
Wisconsin. As of 2016, there are over a hundred silica sand mines in the state, most of 
which are located in counties along the Mississippi River. The growth in the industry has 
been rapid over the last five years. In 2011 alone, the number of active sand mines 
doubled in the state. From 2002 to 2013, total production of sand and gravel in Wisconsin 
increased by around 1,100% (United States Geological Survey 2016). Figure 1 provides a 
map of the current extent of silica sand mining in Wisconsin. Other states that have frac-
quality silica sand basins include Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, and Minnesota (Benson and 
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Wilson 2015), though as of 2014, Wisconsin produces over half of the United States’ 
total production of silica sand (Content 2015). 
In this paper, I use hedonic pricing theory to value the local impacts of silica sand 
mining in Wisconsin. This technique has a wide history of use in the economic literature 
and has recently been applied to understand how people value unconventional oil and gas 
development (e.g., Muehlenbachs et al. 2015). To my knowledge, this is the first 
economic study to use hedonic valuation to understand how citizens value silica sand 
mining’s impacts. 
My approach relies on regression models that relate the level of local silica sand 
mining to residential property sale prices. I first estimate a series of preliminary models 
exploring how general proximity to silica sand mining has influenced residential property 
sale prices from 2011 to 2016. I then explore the potential for heterogeneous impacts by 
impact of mine. I focus on the capitalization of viewshed impacts and air quality impacts 
associated with mining. These are two of the major environmental costs of sand mining. I 
differentiate the effect of mining by whether or not it is in view of the residential 
property. I hypothesize that having to view mining activity may negatively influence sale 
price beyond the effect of mere proximity. My approaches are similar to those used in the 
hedonic valuation of the impact of wind turbine views on housing prices (e.g., 
Heintzelman and Tuttle 2012; Gibbons 2015).41   
                                                          
41 This work builds on an extended literature incorporating property views into hedonic valuation models. 
Much of this literature has focused on views of environmental amenities or natural land uses (see Bourassa 
et al. 2004 for an extensive review).  More recent work has focused on viewshed impacts associated with 
energy infrastructure, including wind turbines and nuclear energy stations (e.g., Heintzelman and Tuttle 
2012; Dickes et al. 2013; Lang et al. 2014; Gibbons 2015). 
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Following this analysis, I explore how air pollution and dust from mines influence 
the sale price of residential properties. Given the rural character of my study area, I do 
not have spatially-explicit air pollution data. Instead, I use an indicator of cardinal 
direction away from each mine as a proxy for likelihood of air pollution associated with 
mining. I argue that those properties on the eastward side of sand mines are more likely 
to be impacted by dust and particulates from mining activity. An estimated differential 
effect between properties in opposite directions away from the mine is likely to be 
connected with greater air pollution effects on the eastward side of mines. 
In my preliminary models, I find only weak evidence that silica sand mining has a 
significant impact on residential property prices. When I differentiate by whether a 
property is in-view or out-of-view of a mine, my results suggest that sand mining has a 
negative impact on sale prices for those properties in-view of a mine. Each in-view frac 
sand mine within two to four miles of the properties is associated with a 6 to 11% 
decrease in property sale price. However, I do not find a significant impact of sand 
mining that occurs within one mile of the property. Out-of-view sand mining generally 
has positive effects on sale price, but these are not significant. 
My hypothesis regarding air quality impacts is supported by my findings. Sand 
mining from the west can have a negative impact on sale prices of downwind residential 
properties. At the same time, I find significant evidence of appreciation for properties that 
are upwind of mining activity. Each eastward sand mine within a mile of a property is 
associated with an increase in property sale price of 12%. This effect decreases to around 
10% for mines within one to two miles and to 3-4% for mines within two to four miles. 
These effects are much stronger than the effects for corresponding westward mines.  
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Given the above results, I examine how silica sand mining influences residential 
properties across indicators of both views of and the direction of mining activity. 
Estimates suggest that silica sand mining from the west significantly reduces residential 
property sale price, though the effect is considerably stronger for those properties that are 
in view of a sand mine. I also find sale price appreciation for residential properties that 
are out-of-view of eastward sand mining. 
My results are suggestive of highly-localized positive capitalization of mining, as 
well as significant negative capitalization of viewshed and air quality impacts for those 
properties that are close but not adjacent to sand mining. Appreciation associated with 
silica sand mining makes sense, as Wisconsin sand mines have expanded outward over 
time42 and mining companies have been active in leasing or buying land outright for 
mining (e.g., Davies 2012b; Dirr 2014). Appreciation may be linked to (1) property sales 
to mining companies at prices above assessed values, or (2) expectations for this type of 
sale price premium in the future (especially for those properties that are in close 
proximity to mining activity but have not been sold to mining companies yet). It may also 
be linked to property price compensation packages used by frac sand mine companies to 
alleviate concerns from local residents regarding property price impacts. These packages 
are used to compensate property owners for any losses in value, post-mining. According 
to an unnamed county councilman in western Wisconsin, a sand mining company will 
typically pay a premium over the listing price if a nearby residential property is unsold 
six months after listing. It is currently unclear how often this type of transaction occurred 
                                                          
42 Based on aerial footprints of mines across time from Ted Auch, FracTracker Alliance.  
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in our data set. If it happened often, it may contribute to my findings of no change in 
price or appreciation for certain properties. 
At the same time, depreciation associated with silica sand mining appears to be 
driven by both view and air quality changes. This is especially true for those properties 
that are close but not adjacent to mining activity. Since I do not find any significant 
evidence of environmental costs being capitalized within one mile, it seems as though the 
benefits of mining are highly localized around mines but the costs are diffused outwards 
from the mine to at least four miles away.  
To my knowledge, this is the first economic study to explore the economic 
impacts related to silica sand mining (concurrent with Kalinin et al. 2016). Although 
Parker and Phaneuf (2013) provide a discussion of the potential impacts of silica sand 
mining on property prices, their insights were based on price impacts associated with 
other types of industrial activity. My results provide additional context of the mining-
driven changes that have occurred in rural areas of Wisconsin. I move beyond the 
literature review and provide estimates of the impact of silica sand mining on nearby 
property prices. Despite the recent slowdown in drilling, oil and gas development using 
hydraulic fracturing is expected to continue in the future (United States Energy 
Information Administration’s Annual Energy Outlook 2015). As a result, ‘frac’ sand 
mining is likely to continue to be an issue in rural Wisconsin. Understanding how the 
impacts of this type of sand mining are valued by local homeowners will be an important 
topic into the foreseeable future. This study provides an important first step in 
understanding how and why silica sand mining is capitalized into housing prices and 
valued by homebuyers.  
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 This paper is structured in the following manner. In Section 2, I provide 
background on silica sand mining and its economic, environmental, and socio-cultural 
implications. In Section 3, I discuss my study area of western Wisconsin and outline my 
data. In Section 4, I highlight my methodological approach. In Section 5, I present my 
empirical results and finish with some brief conclusions in Section 6.  
2. Background 
2.1. Silica sand mining in Wisconsin 
Although sandstone basins are located in many areas of the United States, the 
sandstone deposits in Wisconsin have characteristics that make it ideal in hydraulic 
fracturing applications. This sand has a high silica content and mostly consists of quartz, 
which is very hard (7.0 on the Mohs scale). As a result, it is able to resist pressure and 
hold open fractures from hydraulic fracturing. The sand deposits in the region are also 
generally close to the surface. This is in part a result of the fact that this general area of 
Wisconsin avoided significant glaciation during the last ice age.43 This anomaly has made 
it easier for companies to access and retrieve the sand through surface mining (Benson 
and Wilson 2015).   
2.2. Silica sand mining and its impacts 
Academic research on the economic and socio-cultural impacts of silica sand 
mining has been fairly limited. Deller and Schreiber (2012) explore the relationship 
between general mining activity and various economic and socio-cultural variables, 
though their methodology was unable to differentiate silica sand mining from other types 
of mining. They also use county-level data at the national scale. Other economic studies 
                                                          
43 This is why this area of Wisconsin is known as the “Driftless Area” (Benson and Wilson 2015). 
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have been either non-academic or associated with stakeholder group funding. Power and 
Power (2013) raise caution over high expectations of economic impact from silica sand 
mining, but their suggestions are extrapolated from general mining activity across the 
United States and rest of the world. Using IMPLAN and data from Illinois’ LaSalle 
County, Harger (2015) estimates large direct and indirect employment and income effects 
from local silica sand mining.44 In a review of literature related to the economic and 
environmental impacts of industrial activity and mining, Parker and Phaneuf (2015) 
suggest that silica sand mining may negatively impact property values and tourism in 
Pepin County, Wisconsin. However, this conclusion was based on anecdote and insights 
from the hedonic valuation literature of general industrial activity.  
In the sociology literature, Pearson (2013) highlights community expectations 
regarding the financial and employment benefits of silica sand mining versus the 
environmental costs received by the general public in the vicinity of the mines. Although 
some rural landowners may receive hundreds of thousands of dollars for selling their land 
to mining companies, he generally describes the local community as opposed to silica 
sand mining on environmental, public health, and socio-cultural grounds. In later work, 
Pearson (2016) argues that the rapid pace and intensity of silica sand mining can reduce 
residents’ sense of place and community.  
 A number of studies have explored the environmental impacts of silica sand 
mining. Air pollution and increased silica dust in the local atmosphere is a prominent 
concern in public media, though studies have found mixed results regarding the 
magnitude of impact. Richards and Brozell (2015) were unable to detect differences in 
                                                          
44 As a note, this work was funded by the LaSalle County Mining Coalition and the Illinois Associate of 
Aggregate Producers. 
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upwind/downwind respiratory crystalline silica levels. However, Walters et al. (2015) 
found PM2.5 levels above the Environmental Protection Agency’s annual standard. 
Although each silica sand mine can use as much as 2.5 million gallons of water a day 
(Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources 2012) and silica sand mining may change 
groundwater aquifer recharge (Parsen and Gotkowitz 2013), there have been no studies 
that evaluated pre and post-mining water quality in areas around silica sand mines. 
However, in 2012, 20% of active mines and processing plants in Wisconsin were cited 
for environmental violations (Prengaman 2013). Locke (2015) argues that this is an 
increasing concern given that silica sand mines are often located in unzoned areas 
without formal planning procedures.  
2.3. Related hedonic valuation literature 
 There is a relatively limited literature on the hedonic valuation of mining activity 
or its associated impacts. In early work, Hitzhusen et al. (1997) use lakeside property 
prices to estimate the economic cost of pollution associated with abandoned strip mines 
in Ohio. Their results indicate that close proximity to abandoned mines reduces the sale 
price of properties. In later work, Damigos (2006) describes a National Resource Damage 
Assessments that used hedonic valuation to value environmental costs of the Eagle Mine 
in Colorado. The mine reduced sale price by $25,000 for those properties within six 
miles. Williamson et al. (2007) explore the property price impacts associated with acid 
mine drainage-impaired streams in West Virginia. They observe impacts of -$4,800 for 
those properties located within a quarter-mile of an impaired stream.  
 To my knowledge, there are no studies using hedonic valuation to infer how 
residents value the impacts of silica sand mining. Although Parker and Phaneuf (2013) 
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discuss some of potential implications of mining on housing prices, their insights are 
based on a survey of the related literature on other types of mining and industrial activity.  
3. Data 
3.1. Study Area 
My study area is focused in thirteen counties in western Wisconsin (Figure 2). 
These counties are primarily rural with some scattered larger cities and towns, including 
Chippewa Falls, Eau Claire, La Crosse, Marshfield, and Sparta. All counties overlay 
sandstone formations that are sources of ‘frac’ sand and have experienced recent mining. 
There are 95 ‘frac’ sand mines within the counties (out of 101 in the entire state). Many 
of these mines were permitted between 2011 and 2016. Only seven of the mines were 
permitted for reclamation prior to the mid-2000s, which is generally agreed as the starting 
point to the boom in unconventional oil and gas development (Bauer 2014). There is 
some limited evidence that another sixteen mines were in place in 2004, based on aerial 
imagery from the National Agriculture Imagery Program (NAIP). However, this evidence 
is highly subjective, as it is difficult to differentiate mining and agriculture in aerial 
imagery. 
3.2. Data 
I use real estate transfer data from the Wisconsin Department of Revenue. This 
data set includes all residential property transfers that occurred in Wisconsin since the 
beginning of 2011. I only include those properties where the buyer and seller have no 
prior relationship and where the seller has not retained any rights associated with the 
property (e.g., a life estate or conservation easement). I also exclude multi-family 
properties. To avoid using non-fair market value property sales, I cut all property 
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transactions with sale prices less than $20,000. After these cuts, I have 33,843 property 
transactions in my study area.  
 Although this data set contains all residential property transactions since 2011, it 
includes only a limited amount of property information. It comprises no information on 
the structural characteristics of the property beyond whether it is a mobile or multi-family 
home. However, I did receive structural characteristic data for a limited number of 
properties from Chippewa, Eau Claire, Jackson, Monroe, and Trempealeau. This 
information was provided by some of the state’s regional Multiple Listing Services. A 
limitation of this data is that only those observations that were listed through the Multiple 
Listing Service were included in their databases. For each county in my data set, only 30 
to 60% of my observations have matching MLS data. Thus, I incorporate this data only as 
a robustness check for my main models. 
 Using each property’s unique parcel identification code, I supplement my data 
from the DOR by creating a rich dataset of locational information. I calculate the distance 
to the closest perennial stream from the National Hydrography Dataset. I also calculate 
the distance to the closest railway line and interstate highway (from the U.S. Census 
Bureau, circa 2010). I calculate each property’s average elevation using data from the 
Natural Resource Conservation Service’s Data Gateway. I use land cover data from the 
National Land Cover Dataset (NLCD) 2011 to calculate the average agricultural and 
forest land cover in and around each parcel.45  
                                                          
45 The parcel data that I used was not amenable to calculating statistics within parcel boundaries due to 
some overlapping parcel boundaries. Thus, I used focal statistics in ArcGIS and calculated local statistics 
within 500 meters around each parcel’s centroid. For example, instead of calculating the percentage of each 
parcel in an agricultural use, I calculated the percentage of land in an agricultural use within a 500m buffer 
of each parcel’s centroid. 
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 I received silica sand mining location data from the Wisconsin Department of 
Natural Resources.46 This data set included 127 silica sand mining locations, including 
mines, processing and drying plants, rail stations, and resin coating facilities. I only 
consider those facilities classified as performing at least some mining activity (N = 101). 
All other facilities are dropped from the analysis.  
The data set provides coordinate location and production status for all silica sand 
mines in the state. However, the data does not include any information on when the 
mines were first permitted or excavated. Most permitting and regulation of sand mining 
in Wisconsin is done at the local level (e.g., Schuessler 2015). Although sand mines must 
abide by state air and water regulations, all reclamation permitting is done either by the 
county or the township where the mine is located. In order to commence non-metallic 
mining, each company must receive a reclamation permit (Haines 2012). I received 
reclamation permitting dates for 93 frac sand mines in Wisconsin through 
correspondence with local county and township officials in zoning and land information 
departments.47 I use this as my proxy for before-after status of mining for each property 
transaction. If a property is close to mining activity that was permitted for reclamation 
before the time-of-sale, then the property is considered “treated” by silica sand mining. If 
the mine was permitted for reclamation after the time-of-sale, then the property is 
considered a “control” observation since silica sand mining was not occurring at the time-
                                                          
46 Wisconsin’s Department of Natural Resources’ “Locations of industrial sand mines and processing plants 
in Wisconsin”, Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. 
47 There were eight frac sand mines from which I could not find associated reclamation permitting 
information. These eight mines were prospective mines as of January of 2016 that had only just applied for 
reclamation permitting.     
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of-sale. Thus, for all analyses in this study, properties that are “treated” with nearby sand 
mining are those that were sold after a mine was first permitted for reclamation.  
 I calculated the distance to and direction from all frac sand mines within twenty 
miles for all properties in my study area. I used this information to estimate the distance 
to the closest silica sand mine and the number of silica sand mines within different 
buffers of each property’s extent. Additionally, I used ArcGIS and digital elevation data 
to outline the viewshed of each sand mine in my study area. I estimated the local 
viewshed of each mine’s centroid. Unfortunately, I did not have surveyed mine 
boundaries that would better capture the extent of mining. The implication of this is that 
both my distance and viewshed estimates are likely conservative. Properties are likely 
closer to mining activity than what would be suggested by my distance measure and there 
are likely some properties that are incorrectly classified as being out of a mine’s 
viewshed. Future work will exploit mine boundaries aerial-digitized by Auch (2016).  
4. Methodology 
 
4.1. The effect of silica sand mining on local property prices 
In my analyses, I estimate hedonic valuation models to value the impacts of silica 
sand mining as perceived by home buyers in western Wisconsin. This approach has a 
long history of use in applied economics research (see Rosen (1974) for an early outline 
of the model). The main idea underlying the approach is that the price of a heterogeneous 
good is associated with its attributes and characteristics. The price of the good can then 
be decomposed as a function of its characteristics. This approach is particularly useful in 
eliciting how homebuyers value the impacts associated with neighborhood amenities and 
disamenities.  
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My first models relate the sale price of a home to the number of silica sand mines 
that are within a series of distance bins away from the property: 
(1) isttsistististist XMineMineP  
'
21 ...)21()10()ln(  
istP is the sale price of residential property i at time t in census tract s. istMine )10(   and 
istMine )21(   are equal to the number of frac sand mines within 0 – 1 miles and 1 – 2 
miles, respectively, of property i at the time of sale, t (see Figure 3 for examples of frac 
sand mine buffers of one mile, two miles, and five miles). The β parameters reflect the 
percentage change of each sand mine within the given spatial area on the natural log of 
sale price. Although I only show counts for two rings, I also include a count of mines 
within 2 – 4 miles in my main specifications. 
I control for property and location characteristics in
'
istX , as well as census tract 
fixed effects, 
s , and year fixed effects, t . These fixed effects help control for 
unobservable factors that vary across space and time and may influence the likelihood of 
local sand mining and residential property sale price. This approach relies on the 
comparison of a group of properties with a nearby sale mine permitted or in operation 
before the sale of the property versus (1) those properties without a nearby mine at any 
time and (2) those properties with a nearby mine permitted only after the sale of the 
property. 
 I infer a valuation of the impacts of silica sand mining using my β parameters. In 
these models, I do not identify separate impacts so any valuation from these parameters is 
net of the benefits and costs of nearby mining. Given the possibility of both positive and 
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negative impacts associated with silica sand mining, I have no prior expectation of the 
signs of these parameters. 
To test for the robustness of these results, I estimate the model with alternative 
subsets of the data. I describe each robustness check in Section 5. 
 
4.2. The effect of silica sand mining’s viewshed changes on local property prices 
Next, I explore the possibility of heterogeneous impacts based on certain 
characteristics of the spatial relationship of each property to silica sand mining. I first 
estimate how changes in views associated with silica sand mining impact nearby 
residential property prices. The landscape and land use fragmentation impacts of silica 
sand mining may lead to greater property price impacts for those properties that are in 
sight of a nearby sand mine, ceteris paribus.  
I estimate the following regression model: 
(2) 
isttsist
ististist
X
YXMineNonVisibleYXeVisibleMinP




'
21 )()()ln(
. 
This distance bin-based approach is similar to that used in Tables 2 and 3 except I now 
differentiate these counts by whether the mines are in-view or out-of-view of the 
property. istYXeVisibleMin )(   and istYXMineNonVisible )(   are equal to the number of 
the in-view and out-of-view frac sand mines, respectively, within X and Y miles of 
property i at the time of sale, t. The β parameters now reflect the percentage change of 
each in-view or out-of-view sand mine within X to Y miles on the natural log of sale 
price. Although I only show counts for one arbitrary X – Y mile ring, I include multiple 
mine counts in my main regression models (i.e., 0 to 1 miles, 1 to 2 miles, and 2 to 4 
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miles). I control for property and location characteristics, census tract fixed effects, and 
year fixed effects.  
I have no prior expectation of the sign of either 
1  or 2  due to the potential for 
the environmental costs of silica sand mining to be offset by positive appreciation, 
perhaps due to expectations of a future sale premium from a mining company. However, 
I believe that these parameters may both be positive if the costs of mining are lower than 
any perceived financial benefits. On the other hand, they may both be negative if its costs 
are greater than its positive impacts. However, I hypothesize that 
1  will be attenuated if 
2  is positive or larger in absolute magnitude if 2  is negative as a result of negative 
capitalization of viewshed changes due to silica sand mining. 
For any given X – Y spatial area, I estimate the viewshed impact of silica sand 
mining by subtracting 
2  from 1 . This value is the difference in housing price between 
those properties in sight of a frac sand mine versus those out of sight of a frac sand mine, 
post-permitting. For now, I argue that the only difference between these properties is the 
impact of the viewshed itself, though I relax this assumption in my discussion of later 
results. 
To test for the robustness of my viewshed results, I estimate various alternatives 
of Equation 1. These models vary by different subsets of the data. I describe them in 
Section 5.  
As an additional source of robustness, I follow Gibbons (2015) and use a slightly 
different approach to identification. My viewshed approach described above defines 
treatment using a bin framework, where I differentiate the effect of in-view and out-of-
view silica sand mining across different spatial areas. I now use a strict r mile buffer 
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approach and limit my observations to only those within r miles of a mine at any time. I 
again include counts of both visible and non-visible frac sand mines, permitted prior to 
the sale of the property, within r miles.  
(3) isttsistististist
XMineNonVisibleeVisibleMinP   '21)ln(  
where istesVisibleMin   is the number of visible frac sand mines located within r miles and
istMinesNonVisible is the number of non-visible frac sand mines located within the same 
distance for residential property i at time t in census tract s. 
1  and 2  indicate the 
impact of each visible and non-visible sand mine, respectively, within r miles on 
residential property sale price. I estimate this model across alternative values of r, 
including integers from 1 to 4 miles.  
For each buffer, I estimate two versions of Equation 3. The first model restricts 
the control group to only include those properties that are close to nearby mining that has 
not been permitted at the time-of-sale. Thus, these are properties that are close to future 
mining sites. By restricting my control observations to only those properties that are close 
to pre or post-sale mining, I avoid the potential issue of unobserved variability in housing 
and neighbor stock across my study area. I am more likely comparing observations in my 
control and treatment groups that are similar in characteristics and have experienced the 
same local economic and market trends.  
The second version is more inclusive and does not use this restriction. This model 
incorporates control observations within twenty miles of present or future silica sand 
mining. This is the approach applied in the analyses in Tables 2 through 4. Our control 
observations are those properties that are either (1) close to future mining sites, as in the 
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first version of Equation 3, or (2) those residential properties that are outside of r miles 
but within twenty miles of a mine permitted before or after the time of sale.  
4.4. Heterogeneity across cardinal direction 
I then test for heterogeneity of impact by cardinal direction in order to get a first-
order approximation of the impact of frac sand mine-driven air pollution on sale price. I 
use westerly and easterly cardinal direction away from the mine’s meridian as a proxy for 
prevailing wind conditions. I hypothesize that wind blows more often to the east. Thus, 
those properties with westward frac sand mines are at a greater risk of air dust and 
pollution versus those with eastward frac sand mines.  
 I estimate a structurally similar model to Equation 2: 
(4) 
isttsist
ististist
X
YXEastwardYXWestwardP




'
21 )()()ln(
 
istYXWestward )(   is the number of westward frac sand mines located within X and Y 
miles and istYXEastward )(  is the number of eastward frac sand mines located within 
the same distance for residential property i at time t in census tract s. For each given X – 
Y spatial area,
1  and 2  indicate the impact of each westward and eastward sand mine, 
respectively, on residential property sale price. 
I again have no prior expectations of the sign of 
1  or 2 . However, I hypothesize 
that 
1  will be attenuated or more negative relative to 2  as a result of presumed higher 
levels of ambient dust and pollution for properties with westward-situated mining 
activity.  
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 I use the difference between 
1  and 2  as a first-order approximation of the 
capitalization of local air quality impacts in housing prices. The primary assumptions in 
this interpretation is that (1) air quality effects are felt predominately by those on the 
eastward side of mines, and (2) the only difference between properties on either side of 
the mine is the relative levels of air pollution and dust. However, a concern is that my 
control group - those mines with eastward mines - are likely to incur air quality impacts, 
as well. To the extent that my control group suffers from spillover effects associated with 
air quality impacts, my estimate is an underestimation of the valuation of air quality 
impacts of silica sand mining in housing prices.  
4.4. Heterogeneity across both viewshed and cardinal direction 
In my last series of models, I combine my indicators from Equations 1 and 3 and 
allow the impact of viewshed to vary based on cardinal direction from the mine. I now 
differentiate across two margins: (1) in-view or out-of-view of a mine, and (2) east or 
west of a mine (Equation 5): 
(5) 
isttsist
istist
ististist
X
EastwardNonVisibletwardVisibleEas
WestwardNonVisibletwardVisibleWesP





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'
43
21)ln(
 
Each variable is a separate count of frac sand mines within r miles of each potential 
combination of visibility and direction. Parameter interpretations are similar to those 
above. They represent the differential impacts of each type of mine, specified by 
visibility and direction, on residential property sale price.  
 Comparisons in parameters from 
1  through 4  allow a more thorough 
exploration of the implications of air pollution and views of frac sand mines on prices for 
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residential properties near frac sand mines. Each combination of visibility and cardinal 
direction is associated with a different combination of impact. I hypothesize that 
1 will 
be the most negative or, if all parameters are positive, strongly attenuated parameter, due 
to the fact that these properties are subject to both the viewshed and air pollution impacts 
of silica sand mining. I also hypothesize that 
4  will be the most positive or, if all 
parameters are negative, strongly attenuated parameter, due to the fact that these 
properties do not face either the viewshed or the air pollution impacts of silica sand 
mining. I have no prior expectation of the relative differences between 
2  and 3  since I 
do not know whether the air pollution impact (i.e.,
2 ) or the viewshed impact (i.e., 3 ) 
will be more strongly valued in housing prices.  
 As a final note, this analysis allows us to estimate which properties are most 
impacted by the viewshed and air pollution impacts of silica sand mining. Although I can 
approximate the valuation of viewshed impacts by differencing my 
1  from 2  or 3  
from 
4 , there may be concerns that those properties that are in view and to the east of 
silica sand mining are also more subject to air pollution costs than those out-of-view but 
also to the east of silica sand mining. This may be the case if topography serves as a 
source of deposition of dust for those out-of-view properties to the east of mining. In this 
case, the difference of 
1  and 2  may capture viewshed impacts and the increased 
impact of air pollution based on viewshed.  
With that concern acknowledged, however, I still believe that this is an important 
analysis. By controlling for both viewshed and cardinal direction, I obtain a more 
nuanced understanding of the differential impact of silica sand mining across spatial and 
topographical characteristics.  
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5. Results 
5.1. The effect of silica sand mining’s viewshed changes on local property prices 
 I estimate Model 1 with treatments across three different spatial areas: a 0 to 1 
mile buffer, a 1 to 2 mile ring, and a 2 to 4 mile ring. I control for a quadratic function of 
property acreage, quadratic functions of a series of locational variables, year fixed 
effects, and census tract fixed effects. My locational variables include the proximities to 
the closest interstate highway and railroad and the percentage of land in an agricultural 
use within 500 meters of the parcel's centroid. I only use those observations above the 5th 
percentile and below the 95th percentile to reduce the potential for outlying sale prices (~ 
$30,000 to $340,000).  
Table 1 provides summary statistics for my main sample, as well as those 
properties that are within four miles of a frac sand mine, pre-sale. Properties share 
generally similar characteristics, though properties near silica sand mining are also closer 
to the interstate highway system and railroad system. This makes sense given the 
transportation needs of silica sand mining production and transportation. 
 My results in Table 2 suggest that nearby silica sand mining can have a significant 
and negative impact on residential property prices, though this effect seems to only exist 
for properties with mines located between two to four miles away. However, this effect is 
not statistically-significant when including census tract fixed effects. Across all models, I 
uncover no evidence that mining has an influence on price within two miles.   
 These results are somewhat surprising. The typical assumption in the literature is 
that environmental impacts diminish with increasing distance away from the source. In 
the mining context, one would expect attenuating effects of proximity to sand mining as 
one moves further away from mining activity. However, I find some limited evidence of 
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a significant effect of mining beyond two miles, but no effect of sand mining within two 
miles.   
Since census tract fixed effects help control for unobserved differences in housing 
price across the study area, Column 4 in Table 2 is the preferred model. The estimate of 
this model suggests no significant effect of sand mining on nearby property prices. To 
test for the robustness of this non-result, I estimate models of Equation 1 with alternative 
subsets of the data. In Column 1, I relax our restriction on sale price to only exclude those 
observations sold for less than $20,000. Columns 2 through 4 gradually restrict the 
dataset to avoid potential unobserved differences in spatially-varying characteristics that 
drive sale price. In Column 2, I only include observations from census tracts with sand 
mining activity at least within two miles away from the tract’s borders. In Column 3, I 
exclude all observations that are outside of ten miles from the nearest sand mine. In 
Column 4, I only include observations from those counties from which we have structural 
characteristic information from the state’s Multiple Listing Service databases. Lastly, I 
only include those observations with structural characteristic information in Column 5. In 
this model, I also control for quadratic functions of the number of bedrooms, number of 
bathrooms, and living area of the property. 
My results in Table 3 provide further support for results in Column 4 of Table 2. I 
am unable to find any significant evidence that silica sand mining has a significant net 
effect on sale price. Although I find slightly larger estimates of some of our treatment 
effects, none of these differences are significant. 
5.2. The effect of silica sand mining’s viewshed changes on local property prices 
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My results from Tables 2 and 3 suggest that sand mining has at most a limited 
effect on the sale price of residential property prices. I now explore whether this finding 
of only a limited relationship is masking potential heterogeneity of valuation outside of a 
pure distance measure.  
I first explore whether the impact of local silica sand mining is different for those 
properties that are in-view versus out-of-view of mining activity. In Table 4, I estimate 
four models of Equation 2. In each column, I control for property characteristics, year 
fixed effects, and census tract effects. In Columns 1 and 2, I restrict my control 
observations to be within 20 and 10 miles, respectively, of mining activity. In Column 3, 
I only include observations from those census tracts with sand mining activity or are 
within two miles of a sand mine. In Column 4, I only include those observations that have 
structural characteristic information from the MLS. I use these various subsets due to the 
fact that my study area is extensive, covering thirteen counties. There may be significant 
heterogeneity across the region, especially between those areas with silica sand mining 
and those without it. 
My results in Table 4 suggest that silica sand mining can be negatively capitalized 
into residential properties prices if it is in-view of the property. This is especially true if 
the mines are located from 1 to 4 miles away from the property. I estimate that each in-
view frac sand mine from 1 to 2 miles and 2 to 4 miles is associated with 5-7 and 10-11% 
decreases, respectively, in sale price. Most estimated effects in these two bins are 
statistically significant.  
However, I find no statistically-significant impacts within 1 mile of the property. 
In fact, the magnitude of the effect of in-view silica sand mining seems to increase as one 
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moves further away from the property. This result is again surprising. One would expect 
that the impact of views would generally be smaller for properties that are further away 
from mining.  
 I find some limited evidence that out-of-view silica sand mining has a 
statistically-significant effect on nearby residential property prices. However, my 
estimates are only statistically significant for one subset of the data – only those 
properties in census tracts with silica sand mining – and only within the 1 to 2 mile ring. I 
find that effects of out-of-view mining attenuate with increasing distance away, which is 
the opposite of the relationship between estimated effect and distance away for in-view 
mining. 
These results provide some insight as to why I find significant effects only 
beyond a certain distance away of mining activity. I find positive but statistically 
insignificant effects for properties within one mile of out-of-view silica sand mining. This 
may be driven by highly-localized expectations of financial benefits associated with silica 
sand mining. As one moves further away from mining, these expectations diminish, as 
suggested by out-of-view effects attenuating with increasing distance.  
Yet, at the same time, I find that the effect of in-view mining increases with 
increasing distance. It is possible that those properties beyond a mile of a mine are not 
likely to receive financial benefits from leasing land for mining or selling land to mining 
companies. If this is the case, then these properties face viewshed impacts without a 
strong likelihood of compensation. For those properties that are in closer proximity to 
silica sand mining (i.e., within a mile), there may be a stronger likelihood of financial 
benefits, which may compensate for some of the viewshed impacts. This explanation is 
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speculative, but does make sense given the estimated relationships between in-view and 
out-of-view mining and distance away from mining activity.  
 As an additional form of robustness, I follow Gibbons (2015) in Table 5 and focus 
exclusively on those properties that are close to sand mining activity, pre or post-sale. In 
doing so, I differentiate those properties sold after mining occurs by visibility of the frac 
sand mines. Thus, I compare properties in-view and out-of-view of silica sand mining 
after it occurs versus properties sold in the same area, pre-mining. By focusing in such a 
small area, I remove the potential for omitted variable bias associated with differences 
between control areas without mining versus treatment areas with mining. 
 I estimate Equation 3 across four different buffers with radii of 1, 2, 3, and 4 
miles. I include two models for each distance buffer: (1) a model that only includes a 
count of the visible sand mines at the time-of-sale, and (2) a model that includes counts 
of both visible and non-visible sand mines at the time-of-sale. I use the same control 
variables and fixed effects and sale price distribution from Tables 2 and 4. 
  All of these models suggest that visible sand mines have a negative impact on the 
sale price of nearby residential properties. My estimates are statistically-significant for 
the three and four mile buffers. I estimate that each visible sand mine within three miles 
is associated with a 6% decrease in sale price.  This effect increases in magnitude to 7-
8% at four miles.  
However, I do not obtain statistically-significant effects for the one and two mile 
buffers. Estimates for these buffers are also smaller in magnitude than those found in the 
larger buffers. Although this is surprising, it matches up with what I found in Tables 2 
through 4. There are two main reasons why this may be happening. First, I have a very 
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limited sample in these regions very close to mining activity. When I relax my 
econometric specification and only control for year and census tract fixed effects, I obtain 
stronger estimates in the -12 to -7% range that are close to statistical significance at the 
10% level. Second, the potential financial benefits of silica sand mining that accrue to 
landowners may complicate any comparison between models across buffer sizes. In-view 
properties within one mile of a mine may have greater expectations of potential financial 
benefits from mining activity than those that are in-view of mines, but are further away. 
Those that are relatively far away from mining may have viewshed impacts without the 
potential for compensation.   
5.3. Heterogeneity across cardinal direction 
 In Table 5, I estimate Equation 3 using the same spatial areas defined in Table 2 
and 3. I follow the structure of Table 3 and use various subsets of the data in order to test 
for robustness of the result across different spatial restrictions. Instead of differentiating 
by view of mining activity, I now differentiate properties sold after mining occurs by the 
cardinal direction away from the frac sand mines. I hypothesize that properties with 
westward mines are more likely to be negatively impacts by air pollution impacts from 
silica sand mining than those properties with eastward mines.  
 Within the 2 to 4 mile ring away from the property, I generally find that each 
silica sand mine from the west is associated with a decrease in sale price on the order of 2 
to 3%. However, I do not find significant effects for properties within two miles.  
Importantly, close proximity to eastward frac sand mines is associated with an 
increase in property sale price, relative to pre-mining properties. This effect is statistically 
significant across all treatment areas. The effects attenuate with increasing distance away, 
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as expected. The impact of each eastward frac sand mine within a mile is on the order of 
12-13%. For eastward frac sand mines located within 1 to 2 miles, the impact is on the 
order of 10%. From 2 to 4 miles, the effect is around 3.5%.  
Negative estimates associated with westward sand mining provide supportive 
evidence of capitalization of air pollution and ambient dust impacts of silica sand mining. 
At the same time, positive estimates for eastward sand mining is suggestive of the 
capitalization of either (1) actual or expected property prices premiums from direct sales 
of land to mining companies, or (2) expected payments from leasing land for silica sand 
mining.  
 5.4. Heterogeneity across both viewshed and cardinal direction 
 In Sections 5.1 through 5.3, I observed that viewshed and air quality impacts 
influence the sale price of residential properties in close proximity to silica sand mining. I 
now differentiate the effect of mining by both viewshed and cardinal direction at the 
same time by estimating Equation 4. Each viewshed/direction combination captures a 
different combination of impacts: (1) westward, visible frac sand mines influence both air 
quality and viewshed, (2) westward, non-visible frac sand mines influence only air 
quality, (3) eastward, visible frac sand mines influence only viewshed, and (4) eastward, 
non-visible frac sand mines are subject to neither viewshed nor persistent air quality 
impacts.  
 Evidence from Table 7 largely supports earlier results. Properties subject to both 
viewshed and air quality impacts decrease in value across all four buffer sizes, though the 
effect is only statistically significant from two to four miles (8-10% for each frac sand 
mine). There is no effect of westward, non-visible mines.  Additionally, I find evidence 
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of appreciation for those properties that are not impacted by either environmental cost 
(i.e., those properties with non-visible, eastward mines). This effect is statistically 
significant across all models and attenuates from 20% at 1 mile to 6% at 4 miles. My 
estimates are not statistically significant for eastward, visible sand mines. However, the 
difference in estimates for in-view and out-of-view eastward mines is suggestive of there 
being a strong viewshed impact on property prices. 
 In Table 8, I test for the robustness of my results for my four mile buffer estimates 
across alternative subsets of the data. My results from Table 8 generally support my 
results from Table 7. Parameter estimates across the models are similar to those found in 
Column 4. Some estimates are larger than from the main sample, but not significantly so. 
From these results, it appears as those the properties that are most impacted by silica sand 
mining are those properties that are both in-view and east of the mines. This makes sense, 
as they are most subject to the viewshed and air pollution impacts of silica sand mining.  
6. Conclusions 
 
Although these results are exploratory, they are meaningful as a first step in a 
longer analysis of the local economic impacts of silica sand mining. Overall, I find 
evidence of both appreciation and depreciation associated with nearby silica sand mining. 
My results suggest that silica sand mining’s impacts on local views and air quality can be 
a source of depreciation in home values. Properties with westward mines decrease in 
value, post-mining, whether or not they have a view of the mine. In-view, westward 
mines have a larger influence on sale price than those out-of-view, though I am unable to 
find significant viewshed effects for eastward mines. This may be driven by the small 
number of observations with viewable, eastward mines. This may be a cause of concern 
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in Tables 4 and 5, where I do not control for cardinal direction of mines. If only 10% of 
properties are in view of a mine, I may be misattributing my effect to viewshed when it is 
more an air quality impact. There also may be an additive effect of air pollution for 
properties in view of a mine versus those without a view of a mine. Deposition of sand 
and particulates from mining on trees and topography may lead to greater air quality 
effects for properties with a clear line of sight to a sand mine. Results from Tables 7 and 
8 seem to support this possibility.  
Although many frac sand mines were permitted after the beginning of my 
dataset’s timeline, I do not have a large group of pre-mining control observations near 
future mining sites, nor do I have a rich set of structural property characteristics from 
which I could use as controls in a propensity score matching analysis. This limits my 
ability to estimate causal relationships between silica sand mining and residential 
property prices. It also makes it difficult to fully understand the balance in property 
characteristics between those properties treated with mining and those that are not treated 
with mining. The same issue is evident in my comparisons of observations across 
different directions and views of silica sand mining. However, it is encouraging that my 
results are similar when I only use those observations with structural information data 
from the state’s Multiple Listing Services. 
With that said, these findings reveal an intuitive and consistent story. Silica sand 
mining seems to influence homebuyers, especially through viewshed and air quality 
impacts. These results support anecdotal evidence from local residents in Wisconsin, as 
well as the insights from Parker and Phaneuf (2013), that silica sand mining has 
environmental impacts that may manifest in housing price decreases. At the same time, 
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some of my results suggest the possibility of limited price appreciation. Although the 
mechanism is not clear, this may be due to expectations regarding future leasing activity 
or direct sales to mining companies for a large premium. Future work in this literature 
should focus on addressing the above issues to provide stronger policy information for 
decision-makers and stakeholders in Wisconsin and the surrounding region.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
 Properties with a sand mine 
  < 20 miles away < 4 miles away 
     
Sale Price (in $000s, CPI-adjusted 
to 2015) 
135.0 129.8 
(70.0) (65.9) 
Distance to interstate highway 
14.1 9.6 
(12.1) (10.5) 
Distance to railway 
2.3 1.6 
(2.8) (2.0) 
Agricultural % 
22.1 25.3 
(23.2) (23.0) 
Lot size (acres) 
3.7 4.2 
(8.4) (9.3) 
     
# of observations 25,953 4,507 
% of properties with a sand 
mine… 
r = 1 
miles 
r = 2 
miles 
r = 3 
miles 
r = 4 
miles 
     
within r miles 1.5% 6.4% 14.1% 25.0% 
within r miles and in view 0.8% 2.0% 3.5% 4.9% 
within r miles and to the west 1.2% 4.9% 10.9% 19.5% 
within r miles, in view, and to the 
west 
0.7% 1.7% 3.0% 4.3% 
          
Notes: All distance variables are in miles. Distance to the closest interstate 
highway and railway is based on U.S. Census Bureau's Tiger Geodatabase data 
from 2010. Agricultural % values are based on National Land Cover Database 
(NLCD) 2011 data. As a note, the parcel data that I used were not amenable to 
calculating statistics within parcel boundaries due to some overlapping parcel 
boundaries. Thus, I used focal statistics in ArcGIS and calculated local statistics 
within 500 meters around each parcel’s centroid.  
 
 
  
169 
 
Table 2: Impact of silica sand mining on nearby residential property prices 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
# of mines: 0 to 1 miles 
0.045 0.012 0.007 0.049 
(0.065) (0.042) (0.042) (0.0482) 
     
# of mines: 1 to 2 miles 
0.006 -0.012 -0.016 0.012 
(0.031) (0.038) (0.039) (0.0248) 
     
# of mines: 2 to 4 miles 
-0.038* -0.060** -0.067*** -0.013 
(0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.014) 
     
# of observations 25,953 25,953 25,953 25,953 
R-Squared 0.001 0.080 0.085 0.182 
Property variables N Y Y Y 
Year FE N N Y Y 
Census tract FE N N N Y 
Notes: Our variable of interest is a count variable indicating the number of sand mines 
within the given buffer at the time-of-sale. Observations represent single family 
residential properties sold from 2011 to early 2016 in our study area in Wisconsin. 
We truncate the data set to exclude the 5 and 95 percentiles of sale price. We only use 
those residential properties that are within twenty miles of a sand mine permitted 
before or after the sale of the home. The dependent variable is the natural log of sale 
price (CPI-adjusted to 2015 values). Property variables include quadratics of acreage, 
distance to the closest interstate highway, distance to the closest railway, and the 
percentage of land in an agricultural use within 500 meters of the parcel's centroid. 
Census tracts are based on U.S. Census 2010 boundaries. Standard errors are shown 
in parentheses and are estimated using tract-level cluster-robust inference: *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: Additional robustness checks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
No price 
restriction 
Only 
census 
tracts w/ 
mines 
< 10 
miles 
away 
Counties 
w/ 
structural 
variables 
Properties 
w/ 
structural 
variables 
 
  
      
# of mines: 0 to 1 miles 
0.074 0.056 0.052 0.084 -0.038 
(0.053) (0.048) (0.048) (0.071) (0.082) 
      
# of mines: 1 to 2 miles 
0.016 0.015 0.017 0.021 0.003 
(0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.034) (0.029) 
      
# of mines: 2 to 4 miles 
-0.018 -0.014 -0.007 -0.027 -0.021 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.020) 
      
# of observations 28,703 14,783 11,167 10,552 4,039 
R-Squared 0.185 0.148 0.136 0.157 0.543 
Property variables Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Census tract FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: This table is used to test for the robustness of my results in Table 2. In Column 1, I 
include no price restrictions. In Column 2, I only include observations from those census 
tracts that contain or are within two miles of a frac sand mine. In Column 3, instead of only 
cutting observations that are beyond twenty miles away from a sand mine, I now 
additionally cut those beyond ten miles away from a mine. In Column 4, I only include 
observations from counties from which I received property structural data from the state’s 
Multiple Listing Services (i.e., Chippewa, Eau Claire, Jackson, Monroe, and Trempealeau). 
In Column 5, I only include those observations from Column 5 for which I have structural 
data. I control for these variables, including the number of bedrooms, bathrooms, and the 
finished living area of the property. Census tracts are based on U.S. Census 2010 
boundaries. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using tract-level 
cluster-robust inference: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Impact of silica sand mining on nearby residential property prices, by visibility 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
< 20 
miles 
< 10 
miles 
Only census 
tracts w/ 
mines 
Only 
properties 
with structural 
chars. 
Control obs. Buffer 
     
# of in-view mines: 0-1 miles 
0.021 0.025 0.022 -0.038 
(0.076) (0.077) (0.076) (0.076) 
     
# of out-of-view mines: 0-1 miles 
0.067 0.075 0.072 -0.053 
(0.058) (0.057) (0.058) (0.117) 
     
# of in-view mines: 1-2 miles 
-0.071* -0.064 -0.070 -0.052 
(0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.033) 
     
# of out-of-view mines: 1-2 miles 
0.032 0.033 0.037* 0.021 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.029) 
     
# of in-view mines: 2-4 miles 
-0.107*** -0.103*** -0.099*** -0.110*** 
(0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.039) 
     
# of out-of-view mines: 2-4 miles 
-0.0003 -0.002 0.005 -0.005 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.020) 
     
# of observations 25,953 14,783 11,167 4,039 
R-Squared 0.183 0.151 0.140 0.546 
Property variables Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Census tract FE Y Y Y Y 
Notes: My variable of interest are a series of count variables indicating the numbers of in-view and 
out-of-view sand mines within given buffers at the time-of-sale. Observations represent single family 
residential properties sold from 2011 to early 2016 in our study area in Wisconsin. I include only 
those observations that overlay a sandstone basin with sand suitable for hydraulic fracturing. I 
truncate the data set to exclude the 5 and 95 percentiles of sale price. The dependent variable is the 
natural log of sale price (CPI-adjusted to 2015 values). Property variables include quadratics of 
acreage, distance to the closest interstate highway, distance to the closest railway, and the percentage 
of land in an agricultural use within 500 meters of the parcel's centroid. I include year fixed effects 
and census tract fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 restrict our control observation subset to be located 
within 20 and 10 miles, respectively, of a mine at any time. Column 3 only includes observations 
from those census tracts that contain or are within two miles of a frac sand mine. Column 4 only 
includes those observations with structural data from the Multiple Listing Services in Wisconsin. I 
control for these variables, including the number of bedrooms, bathrooms, and the finished living area 
of the property. Census tracts are based on U.S. Census 2010 boundaries. Standard errors are shown 
in parentheses and are estimated using tract-level cluster-robust inference: *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Alternative visibility approach using r-mile buffers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (5) (6) 
Buffer = r miles 1 mile 2 mile 3 mile 4 mile 
         
In-view mines < r miles 
-0.047 0.020 -0.025 -0.051 -0.060* -0.065** -0.073*** -0.082*** 
(0.102) (0.081) (0.040) (0.038) (0.030) (0.029) (0.025) (0.026) 
         
Out-of-view mines < r miles 
-0.033 0.074 0.018 0.041* -0.002 0.018 0.0003 0.011 
(0.089) (0.058) (0.020) (0.024) (0.013) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) 
         
# of observations 471 25,953 1,777 25,953 3,513 25,953 5,432 25,953 
R-Squared 0.316 0.182 0.247 0.182 0.201 0.182 0.181 0.183 
r-mile limit for controls Y N Y N Y N Y N 
Property variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Census tract FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: In this table, I continue to explore the impact of views of silica sand mining on residential property sales. In odd columns, I 
only include those properties within r miles of a frac sand mine, pre and post-mining. In even columns, I do not make the above 
restrictions for control observations. In these columns, I use all observations with twenty miles of a sand mine, conditional on sale 
price and property type restrictions. My controls are the same as those used in Table 2. Standard errors are shown in parentheses 
and are estimated using tract-level cluster-robust inference: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: Impact of silica sand mining on nearby residential property prices, by cardinal direction 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
< 20 miles < 10 miles 
Only 
Census 
Tracts w/ 
mines 
Only 
properties 
with 
structural 
chars. 
 
     
# of westward mines: 0 to 1 miles 
0.018 0.023 0.021 -0.061 
(0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.090) 
     
# of eastward mines: 0 to 1 miles 
0.125* 0.131* 0.124* 0.034 
(0.072) (0.074) (0.074) (0.064) 
     
# of westward mines: 1 to 2 miles 
-0.025 -0.022 -0.020 -0.014 
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) 
     
# of eastward mines: 1 to 2 miles 
0.097*** 0.097*** 0.103*** 0.050 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.044) 
     
# of westward mines: 2 to 4 miles 
-0.033** -0.032** -0.025 -0.029 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) 
     
# of eastward mines: 2 to 4 miles 
0.0346* 0.030 0.036** 0.014 
(0.0189) (0.019) (0.017) (0.028) 
          
# of observations 25,953 14,783 11,167 4,039 
R-Squared 0.183 0.150 0.139 0.544 
Property variables Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Census tract FE Y Y Y Y 
Notes: In this table, I explore the effect of silica sand mining based on whether it is westward or 
eastward of a property. I do this in an effort to understand how air pollution and ambient dust levels 
influence sale price. My indicator of cardinal direction is based on the direction field for each frac 
sand mine in our data set. I hypothesize that residential properties with frac sand mines that are 
situated to the west are more likely to be negatively influenced by air pollution and ambient dust. 
Columns 1 and 2 restrict our control observation subset to be located within 20 and 10 miles, 
respectively, of a mine at any time. Column 3 only includes observations from those census tracts 
that contain or are within two miles of a frac sand mine. Column 4 only includes those observations 
with structural data from the Multiple Listing Services in Wisconsin. I control for these variables, 
including the number of bedrooms, bathrooms, and the finished living area of the property. Standard 
errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using tract-level cluster-robust inference: *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7: Impact of silica sand mining on nearby residential property prices, by view and 
cardinal direction 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Buffer 1 mile 2 mile 3 mile 4 mile 
     
Visible, westerly sand mine 
0.011 -0.078* -0.092*** -0.104*** 
(0.090) (0.041) (0.029) (0.028) 
     
Visible, easterly sand mine 
0.068 0.074 0.056 0.032 
(0.121) (0.061) (0.046) (0.039) 
     
Non-visible, westerly sand mine 
0.022 0.003 -0.016 -0.010 
(0.061) (0.031) (0.018) (0.012) 
     
Non-visible, easterly sand mine 
0.202*** 0.121*** 0.092*** 0.056*** 
(0.071) (0.029) (0.025) (0.018) 
     
# of observations 25,953 25,953 25,953 25,953 
R-Squared 0.182 0.183 0.183 0.184 
Property variables Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Census tract FE Y Y Y Y 
Notes: In this table, I differentiate the effect of mining on residential property sale price 
by both views and air quality level. Each variable represents a count of one combination 
of viewshed level (i.e., in-view or out-of-view of a frac sand mine) and cardinal 
direction (i.e., eastward or westward of a frac sand mine). I again only include those 
properties within r miles of a frac sand mine, pre and post-mining. Thus, I am 
comparing those observations with westward, visible mines; westward, non-visible 
mines; eastward, visible mines; and eastward, non-visible mine, post-mining, to 
observations close to the future, but not current, mines, and observations that are 
relatively far way (> 2 - 4 miles, depending on model) from mining activity. My 
controls are the same as those used in Table 2. Standard errors are shown in parentheses 
and are estimated using tract-level cluster-robust inference: *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8: Robustness checks for four mile buffer models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
No price 
restriction 
> 10 miles 
Only 
census 
tracts w/ 
mines 
Counties 
w/ 
structural 
variables 
Properties 
w/ 
structural 
variables 
 
  
      
Visible, westerly mine 
-0.105*** -0.099*** -0.099*** -0.111*** -0.091*** 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.035) (0.030) 
      
Visible, easterly mine 
0.066 0.026 0.039 0.072* -0.010 
(0.066) (0.037) (0.039) (0.042) (0.099) 
      
Non-visible, westerly mine 
-0.007 -0.011 -0.004 -0.013 -0.010 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.018) (0.023) 
      
Non-visible, easterly mine 
0.043** 0.053*** 0.058*** 0.062** 0.027 
(0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.029) (0.030) 
      
# of observations 28,703 14,783 11,167 11,009 4,039 
R-Squared 0.187 0.152 0.141 0.152 0.546 
Property variables Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Census tract FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: In this table, I test for the general robustness of our results from Column 3 in Table 7, 
using a four mile buffer. In Column 1, I do not use a sale price restriction. In Column 2, I only 
use those observations that are within ten miles of a mine. In Column 3, I only use those 
observations from census tracts that contain or are within two miles of a frac sand mine. In 
Column 4, I include observations from only those counties from which we received limited 
structural information. In Column 5, I only include those observations from which we received 
limited structural information. I control for quadratics of the number of beds, the number of 
bathrooms, living area, and acreage. I also include year fixed effects and census tract fixed 
effects. I relax our control variables and do not include any locational variables (e.g., distance to 
interstate highway) due to our small sample size. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and 
are estimated using tract-level cluster-robust inference: *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1: Silica sand regions in Wisconsin 
 
Notes: Silica sand mine locations are from the Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources. I followed Locke (2015) in her work on silica sand mining and zoning to 
determine the boundaries of silica sand basins. These boundaries are based on Wisconsin 
Department of Natural Resources and United States Geological Survey data. Wisconsin 
DNR data was used to understand the location of different types of bedrock, including 
sandstone, while the USGS data was used to classify the sandstone’s age. Only those 
sandstone basins from the Cambrian and Ordovician ages are shown.   
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Figure 2: Study area in western Wisconsin 
 
Notes: Silica sand mine locations are from the Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources. My study area includes Barron, Buffalo, Chippewa, Clark, Dunn, Eau Claire, 
Jackson, Monroe, Pepin, Pierce, St Croix, Trempealeau, and Wood counties.  
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Figure 3: Silica sand mining buffers 
 
Notes: This figure shows examples of distance buffers around silica sand mines in our 
sample. Silica sand mine locations are from the Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources. 
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Technical Appendix 
 Each manuscript of my dissertation relies heavily on hedonic valuation. This 
technique was first outlined by Rosen (1974) and has a long history of use in the 
economics literature. In this technical appendix, we describe the methodology’s 
theoretical underpinnings and its key assumptions. We discuss the first and second stages 
of hedonic valuation in turn.  
First Stage of Hedonic Valuation 
 
Hedonic valuation is based on the idea that a good’s price is related to levels of its 
characteristics. This approach is only relevant to those classes of projects that are 
differentiated in characteristics. This makes sense, as goods with homogeneous 
characteristics would all sell at the same price. Two examples of goods that are 
differentiated in terms of their characteristics include residential houses and automobiles. 
All residential houses have beds and bathrooms, but the level of these assets varies across 
houses. Some residential properties have two bedrooms; others have three bedrooms. On 
the other hand, automobiles vary in size, miles per gallon, and interior options. Some 
automobiles have leather interiors, while others have basic fabric interiors. 
These and other characteristics of these types of goods influence sale price. 
Residential property prices are generally higher for properties with more bedrooms; 
automobile prices are higher for cars with a sunroof. These types of characteristic-price 
relationships form the logic behind hedonic valuation. By exploring how sale prices 
change in response to changes in characteristics, one can decompose how each 
characteristic influences the good’s ultimate price at the margin. 
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How is a hedonic price function formed in a competitive market setting? 
Following Rosen (1974) and Freeman (2003), consider a hypothetical housing market 
where each house is decomposed into vectors of its characteristics: 
(1) ),,( ENSh  . 
Characteristics of houses are included in three vectors: S includes structural 
characteristics, such as the number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, and acreage of 
the property; N includes neighborhood characteristics, such as local school quality, 
proximity to local grocery stores, and local crime levels; and E includes environmental 
characteristics, such as the level of surrounding tree cover, air quality levels, and 
proximity to local parks and greenspaces.  
These characteristics are important in determining sale prices because they provide 
utility to the consumer. 
(2) ),,,( xENSU . 
x is an index to represent all other utility-bearing goods consumed. Thus, consumers 
essentially face a trade-off between characteristics associated with the house and what 
they could buy in terms of all other goods. It is generally assumed that homebuyers have 
perfect information regarding the level of these characteristics.  
In this housing market, consumers are presented with a sufficiently large number 
of options such that he or she can choose which house has the desired levels of 
characteristics in terms of maximizing utility. Subject to their income, it is assumed that 
consumers can locate anywhere in the market and that there are no transaction costs 
associated with re-location.  
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It is also assumed that consumers cannot repackage goods through arbitrage. This 
condition is important in that it ultimately leads to marginal prices that are non-linear. 
This forbids consumers from buying two houses with different characteristic 
combinations at a lower price than if they had only bought one house with the combined 
characteristics from the two houses. As a result, the budget constraint for the consumers 
is nonlinear: the marginal price of a characteristic is positive but decreases with 
increasing levels of the characteristic.  
Consumers are price-takers and observe price, )( ihp , which is a function of 
property characteristics: 
(3) ),,()( iiii ENSphp   
In determining which house to buy, they consider each good’s bundle of characteristics 
and their relationships to house price, conditional on their household budget, y:  
(4) xZpy i  )(  
For simplification purposes, we combine 
iS , iN , and iE  into a single vector of house 
characteristic, 
iZ . Equation (4) states that what a consumer does not spend on a home is 
spent on all other goods, x.  
One can solve the utility-maximization using consumer optimization, which yields:  
(5) 
x
U
Z
U
Z
p i
i 






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Equation (5) states that the implicit price of a particular house characteristic is equal to 
the ratio of the marginal utility of the house characteristic and the marginal utility of the 
numeraire good.  
Given Equations (2) and (4) above, consumers spend their budget to receive utility 
from consumption of a house, represented by iZ , and the numeraire good, x. Each 
consumer chooses their consumption of house characteristics and the numeraire good to 
maximize their utility, subject to their non-linear budget constraint. Various combinations 
of iZ  and x provide the same level of utility. These combinations represent indifference 
curves: 
(6) uxZU i ),( . 
Consumers select a package that provides the highest level of utility and is tangent to 
the nonlinear budget constraint. The consumer’s utility function U is strictly concave and 
is a function of the numeraire good and the characteristics associated with the given 
house: 
(7) uzzzyU n  ),...,,;( 21  
Rosen (1974) connects this utility function to bid functions, )( ih . Bid functions 
highlight one’s maximum willingness to pay for a particular house, iZ , with utility-
bearing characteristics, 
1z  through nz : 
(8) ),;,...,,( 21 yuzzz n . 
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Utility, u, is held constant in any given bid function. Thus, this function represents a 
substitution between the level of characteristics within the chosen bundle and the amount 
of y used to pay for the bundle while receiving the same utility. This essentially reflects 
the budget tradeoff between money spent on a house characteristic versus money spent 
on all other goods.  
The slope of the bid function is the marginal rate of substitution between the house 
characteristic and the numeraire good (i.e., Equation 5). Thus, the bid function  increases 
in value with increases in characteristic jz  but at diminishing rates. Holding utility and 
income constant, the derivative of the bid function represents a consumer’s marginal 
willingness to pay for jz .  
Each consumer faces a market-clearing price of )( iZp  for any given house iZ . For 
each individual characteristic jz  and holding all other characteristics constant, the 
optimal bundle *Z  occurs where the partial derivative of the hedonic price function with 
respect to characteristic jz  is equal to the consumer’s marginal willingness to pay for that 
attribute (Equation 9): 
(9) )( *i
jj
j
Zp
U
U
zz
X
z
  
At this optimal bundle, the bid function lies tangent with the hedonic price function.  
(10) ),;()(
*** yuZZp ii    
 In Figure 1 below, we show two buyers with different bid functions for 
characteristic 
1Z . The solution for each buyer to maximize utility lies at a tangency point 
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along the hedonic price function. Each buyer has different tastes for characteristics, 
which can be represented in their utility functions. From Figure 1, Buyer #2 has stronger 
tastes for 
1Z  than Buyer #1, and thus purchases more 1Z .  
We have discussed the hedonic valuation framework from the perspective of 
consumers. This represents only one side of the market. We now outline the hedonic 
valuation framework from the perspective of producers or suppliers of houses. It is only 
through a combination between buyers and sellers that a hedonic price function is formed 
through pairs of bid functions and offer functions meeting at tangents with one another.  
 Instead of focusing on utility-maximization, producers maximize profit. Each firm 
produces M houses of specification, iZ . Each house specification iZ  includes a series of 
characteristics, which correspond to the consumer problem (i.e., nzzz ,...,, 21 ).  
Total costs associated with producing these houses are );,( iZMC , where β is a 
series of parameters that are in the cost minimization function for the producer (e.g., 
factor prices). There are no fixed costs associated with being in business without 
production. The cost to produce a particular specification increases with increasing 
characteristics (i.e., 0
iZ
C ) at a non-decreasing rate.  
 Each firm maximizes profit by choosing specification and the number of houses 
to produce: 
(11) ),...,,,()( 21 ni zzzMCZpM  , 
where )( iZp is the hedonic price function. Each firm faces the same price schedule since 
firms are competitors and are unable to change prices by adjusting M. 
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 Each firm chooses specification iZ  and M based on (1) equalizing marginal 
revenue and marginal cost of additional characteristics and (2) producing M number of 
specifications such that unit revenue )( iZp equals marginal production cost per house: 
(12) 
M
zzzMC
z
Zp nz
j
i j
),...,,;()( 21



 
),...,,;()( 21 nMi zzzMCZp   
 
 We now define an offer function which indicates the price a firm is willing to 
accept for the housing bundle, iZ , given a profit level of π.  
(13) ),;,...,,( 21  nzzz  
This offer function is analogous to the bid function from the consumer problem. It 
represents the amount of money needed to be received from providing house bundles 
with varying attributes while holding profit constant. It can be substituted into Equation 
10.  
(14) ),...,,;( 21 nzzzMCM   . 
Similar to the consumer problem, profit-maximizing firms will adjust the specification of 
iZ  in order to receive the highest profit possible. Producers maximize their offer price 
subject to the market-clearing hedonic price function, which is again given by )( iZp .  
(15) ),;()(
***  iziz ZZp jj   
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 So far, we have described the consumer and producer problems separately and 
have assumed that )( iZp  is observed in the market by both parties. However, their 
decisions are not made in isolation from each other. They are made simultaneously. 
Consumers purchase houses, iZ , with characteristics nzzz ,...,, 21  such that their utility is 
maximized and any deviations in characteristics lead to relative decreases in utility. At 
the same time, producers create properties with characteristics and levels that maximize 
profit at a certain sale price. Any deviations in characteristics or asking price lead to a 
loss in π.  
 In the market, each buyer is matched to a seller that is willing to sell the desired 
housing bundle at the buyer’s willingness to pay. The agreed-on price maximizes utility 
for the consumer and profit for the firm. Others buyers with different tastes and 
preferences are also matched with sellers with different production costs. This variation 
leads to multiple matches between buyers and sellers all at different points along the 
characteristics-price frontier. These paired bid and offer functions, tangent to each other 
at a single point, meet and form a joint envelope that represents )( iZp , hedonic price 
function (Figure 1). Thus, a hedonic price function is the set of tangencies between 
consumers and producers of goods in the market, as represented by individual bid and 
offer functions. 
Second Stage of Hedonic Valuation 
 
The first two sections of Rosen (1974) describe the joint envelope of bid and offer 
functions from consumers and producers, respectively, which ultimately combine to 
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create a hedonic price function. The hedonic price function is a reduced-form equation, 
relating the sale price of a good to its underlying characteristics. In the applied economics 
literature, most researchers have focused explicitly on estimating the hedonic price 
function by regressing residential property price against a set of property characteristics. 
Partial derivatives of this function with respect to each characteristic provide marginal 
prices for each characteristic, which are equivalent to the marginal rate of substitution 
between the characteristic and the numeraire good 
Yet, the hedonic price function is not a structural equation defining the supply and 
demand of each characteristic. The first-stage estimated hedonic price function is only 
relevant for welfare changes due to marginal changes in characteristics. 
A second stage of hedonic valuation uses the estimated hedonic price relationship 
to infer the parameters of marginal bid and offer functions. This stage is especially 
important since estimates of the marginal bid function allow one to infer the welfare 
change associated with an exogenous, non-marginal change in one of the characteristics 
of the good. An estimated marginal bid function would allow for the assessment of 
welfare changes associated with large, widespread changes in characteristics that cause 
shifts in the hedonic price function. 
Rosen (1974) recommends a two-stage least squares process to solve the 
following system of supply and demand functions, derived from derivatives of the bid 
and offer functions: 
(16) 
),,...,,()(
),,...,,()(
21
21


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zz
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
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F() represents a marginal demand price for characteristic jz , which is a derivative of the 
bid function with respect to the characteristic. On the other hand, G() is the marginal 
supply price for characteristic jz , which is the derivative of the offer function with 
respect to the characteristic. α are exogenous variables that represent consumer-specific 
demographic variables, tastes, and preferences that may influence one’s value function. β 
is a corresponding set of exogenous variables for the producer (e.g., differences in factor 
prices and technologies). These exogenous supplier variables are used as instruments for 
the marginal demand price function. 
 Yet, the identification of this structural model is complicated. Following Bartik 
(1987), the nonlinear nature of hedonic prices leads to consumers choosing both quantity 
consumed and marginal price. This leads to an endogeneity problem. Each consumer’s 
marginal prices are correlated with unobserved tastes and preferences. These tastes and 
preferences lead to a choice of housing bundle that is indirectly correlated with producer 
characteristics. Thus, the instruments used for identification are correlated with the 
residuals in the marginal demand function.  
 There have been multiple strategies proposed to circumvent this issue. Bartik 
(1987) proposes an instrumental variable approach that uses exogenous shifts in the 
consumer budget constraint as instruments. These instruments must be uncorrelated with 
unobserved consumer tastes and preferences, the main issue inherent in Rosen (1974). 
Kahn and Lang (1988) advise the use of data from multiple markets and then use market 
binary indicators as instruments. Consumers across different markets may have similar 
tastes and preferences but face varying marginal price schedules. The differences in these 
marginal price schedules are exogenous to consumer tastes and preferences. However, 
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the underlying assumption of this approach – that consumers in different markets have 
similar distributions of tastes and preferences – is questionable. More recent approaches 
include Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004), Bishop and Timmins (2015), and 
Bishop and Timmins (2016). Ekeland et al. (2004) support the general intuitions behind 
the second stage approach used in Rosen (1974) and suggest two approaches to 
identification: (1) a non-parametric transformation approach, and (2) a non-linear 
instrumental variables approach. Bishop and Timmins (2015) employ a maximum 
likelihood approach to estimate the marginal bid function that is most likely given 
consumer choices and their demographic information. Bishop and Timmins (2016) apply 
a panel data approach where they observe multiple sales per household. Since each sale is 
subject to a different hedonic price function, they are able to estimate two amenity 
choices under different supply conditions. They use this information to infer individual-
specific demand functions. Due to the computational difficulties and theoretical issues 
associated with estimation of the supply and demand functions in the second stage, most 
papers restrict their focus to estimating the hedonic price function. However, there have 
been limited attempts to estimate both the first stage hedonic price function, as well as the 
underlying demand function (e.g., Bishop and Timmons 2015; Bishop and Timmons 
2016).  
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Tables & Figures 
 
Figure 1: Joint envelope of bid and offer functions 
 
Notes: Based on a combination of Figures 1 and 2 in Rosen (1974). X-axis represents 
level of characteristic Z1. Θ1 and Θ2 represent marginal willingness to pay for an 
additional unit of Z1 for two separate consumers with different bid functions. Φ 1 and Φ 2 
represent marginal cost to prove an additional unit of Z1 for two separate producers with 
different offer functions. Consumers maximize utility subject to their budget constraint 
and choose a level of Z1 such that the marginal willingness to pay for additional Z1 is 
equal to its marginal cost. Producers maximize profit by choosing a level of Z1 such that 
the marginal revenue of an additional unit is equal to its marginal cost. These bid and 
offer functions form an envelope.  
